A brief update on Iran

In a previous post, I ran through a brief history of Iran's nuclear program, its current status under international law, and touched very lightly on the economic interests of China and Russia in Iran. This update focuses more on the analysis of Iranian politics and negotiation options for stopping the nuclear weapons program.

Warning:I don't have a lot of insight into the Iranian nuclear conundrum - I'm just a curious guy trying to get a better context for the crisis.

I've been digging through a few online sources and news articles. Here are my key findings:

1. Almost everyone agrees that it's tough to make predictions about the politics of Iran. In a comparatively rare show of modesty, most of the authors/experts said that it's a pretty opaque process, with real power resting in the hands of the Supreme Council and the Revolutionary Guard, and with lesser power held by the President.

2. The recent parliamentary elections overwhelmingly favored Ayatollah Khameini's allies. This could translate into an effort to actually get rid of the presidency, and create a parliamentary edifice for the theocracy. This could be done prior to the next presidential election, scheduled for June, 2013.

3. Khameini actually issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. He reiterated this recently in a comment made late February. He also has criticized Ahmadinejad for "personalizing" the nuclear issue. On the other hand, he was probably the single person best suited to stop the nuclear program if he so desired (note that Khomeini actually did precisely that). Also noteworthy: even moderate reformers like Mousavi have stated that Iran's nuclear program is non-negotiable (although Mousavi said that it should not be used to develop nuclear weapons).

4. Ahmadinejad is actually term-limited, and can't run in 2013, barring a change in Iran's constitution. Like American presidents, his power has been on the decline. Unlike (?) American presidents, he is also handicapped by increasing friction between him and the religious leadership.

5. One expert at the Council on Foreign Relations has an interesting suggestion for the structure of negotiations - use a third-party mediator. The mediator would act as a go-between between the US (or the Permanent members of the UN Security Council+Germany, or P5+1) and Iran. This apparently was the model that worked to free the embassy hostages in Iran in 1981. In the hostage crisis case, the go-between was Algeria (possibly because they were Muslim, but also far away from both the US and Iran, and the critical interests of either party). The expert recommends Turkey for the role. Its role as a NATO member, aspiring member of the EU, and a Muslim secular* democracy helps. What may actually also help, oddly enough, is that it currently has pretty poor relations with Israel. In this case, that would help its credibility in Iranian eyes.

6. Experts are also pessimistic about the odds of a negotiated settlement prior to two major elections - the US  elections in November 2012 and the Iranian elections in June 2013. I can see how a re-elected Obama would maybe have a freer hand vis-a-vis Israel to negotiate with Iran. But I hesitate to think that the Israelis would be willing to wait that long before attempting a strike, given that the Israeli defense minister suggested in February that Iran would enter a "zone of immunity" within six months. Although this was somewhat walked back later, the timing suggests that Israel might not wait for electoral politics to settle.

7. One thing I have NOT found much material on is how Syria's civil war could affect negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. Does it strengthen the hand of those interested in isolating Iran, given that a key regional ally has its own problems? Alternatively, does it make Russia and China even more reluctant to pressure Iran, given that, especially in the case of the former, Syria's long and relatively close relationship?

8. I know next to nothing about internal Israeli politics. Given that it is a multi-party parliamentary system with a presidency that is largely ceremonial in nature, it is arguably more unstable than, say, the American political system. I'm also confused why Avigdor Lieberman is the Foreign Minister - from what I understand of his politics, it would be a bit like making Governor Jan Brewer the Secretary of State. Or John Bolton the UN ambassador. (Oh, wait, the latter actually happened.)

More seriously, this means that John McCain's comments about the need to impose a no-fly zone in Syria might in fact be counterproductive to negotiations with Iran.