Hi,
Recently, Dr. Steve Biddle, adviser to General Petraeus, spoke at the 2007 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) meeting in Ithaca, NY, organized by the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.
I'm posting my notes on his comments because you may be in a better position to gather information and influence the debate than I. Either strategic option proposed by Dr. Biddle would have strong long-term economic and political consequences for America and its workforce - even astronomy will not remain unscathed by the expense that this, and social security, will inevitably pose upon the government budgets and the economy as a whole. Should you know of any current research on the economic and political impact of a Middle East regional conflict, please forward that information to me.
Kennedy once said that the greatest challenge facing a democracy is a loss of focus and mission. Our generation has often been criticized for being indecisive, noncommittal. We have been chastised for our pretensions to jadedness and wisdom, though we lack the experience that makes either credible. Perhaps it is in this area we may find purpose and rewarding employment of our talents.
Best wishes, and good luck with everything.
- Ryan
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Summary of Steven Biddle talk: US Strategy in Iraq
Dr. Steven Biddle began with a recap of Iraq strategy under George Casey. Casey focused on three criteria for success:
1. political reform, in the form of a new Iraqi constitution, representative democracy, and an effective system of courts
2. economic development that provides incentive for individuals to be personally invested in the success of the nascent democracy
3. developing indigenous forces that would provide security and permit the phased withdrawal of US forces.
Stalled progress in these three areas have led to two principle policy changes:
1. increase in troop strength
2. joint campaign plan that focused on clearing operations in Baghdad
Biddle suggests that the perceived problem in Baghdad are conflicts between Sunni and Shiite militias in the city center. In actuality, Baghdad is now Shiite-dominated. Sunni militias are operating from a ring of suburban areas and villages about 10-50 miles outside of the capital, commonly known as the Baghdad belt.
Biddle tells two anecdotes to illustrate his point. The first involves his trip to a marketplace, surrounded by 12-foot concrete blast walls and several checkpoints. Escorted by a squad of heavily armed infantry, Dr. Biddle explored the marketplace and noted that the marketplace, at least, was economically vibrant, with CD players, radios, and other consumer goods readily available. He points this out to demonstrate that given a certain troop density, security infrastructure, and a system of checkpoints, it is possible to stop car bombers and attacks, or at least mitigate them enough to allow the local economy to recover.
His second anecdote tells of a trip in a column of humvees along a road policed by Iraqi forces. After passing the checkpoint controlled by an Iraqi officer, the column proceeded along a road, exchanged a bit of small arms fire from nearby rooftops, and eventually stopped in front of an improvised barricade that had been constructed in the last 12 hours. Observing that they were now surrounded by buildings with high rooftops, covered by swarming militia forces with machine guns, Biddle et al. soon beat a hasty retreat. He feels that the only reason why they did not receive a salvo of RPGs was that the convoy had arrived about 12 hours early, catching the would-be ambushers unawares. As they retreated through the checkpoint, the same Iraqi officer watched the convoy pass by, with the same impassive look on his face.
This story illustrates his point that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by both Sunni and Shiite militias. This has compromised both the efficacy of Iraqi forces to effectively keep the peace, and may even mean that improved training is only improving the combat effectiveness of sectarian militias anticipating the withdrawal of coalition forces and a full-scale civil war.
Biddle described the two main strategic theories underpinning the recent surge around Baghdad.
1. If you build it, they will come
According to this theory, Baghdad is the key to security in Iraq. If security can be guaranteed, then the political leaders of the various factions will be able to meet and, through the new democratic institutions, forge a grand compromise. Such a political settlement will translate into greater peace across the country.
Biddle's problem with this theory is that it assumes the factions want to forge a compromise. In fact, each faction perceives the others as a potential genocide threat. With that much at stake, no faction has an incentive to pursue negotiations with the goal of a final compromise, and instead will use the political process merely to prepare for what is believed to be an inevitable civil war.
2. Inkspot argument
According to this theory, just as an inkspot can slowly spread across a napkin, local stability can translate into regional stability. The strategy envisioned uses US soldiers as assault forces, clearing neighborhoods of sectarian militias. The Iraqi forces, though less well trained and equipped, do possess the competence needed to hold cleared neighborhoods and restore the rule of law.
Biddle notes that this would work if it weren't for the fact that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by sectarian militias. Consequently, when Iraqi forces are placed in command of cleared neighborhoods, these zones revert to sectarian violence. Without an Iraqi army capable of sectarian disinterestedness, there is no possibility for translating the local gains made by tactical actions into long-term strategic success, either locally or regionally.
Biddle then proposes two possible solutions:
1. The Long Shot
The Long Shot envisions a 20-year (generational) occupation of Iraq, with as many forces as possible. Biddle proposes 110,000 combat troops (not including support staff) as economically sustainable and politically feasible. These forces would selectively use military action to acquire and enforce bilateral arrangements with local leaders. Combined with very powerful incentives (patronage), the threat of military reprisal might be enough to maintain a dependence relationship between security forces and local tribal/civic leaders.
The reason why this approach might work is that Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other militias have disrupted the patronage trade that keeps local leaders in power. By exchanging material wealth for cooperation, US forces could help turn the militias into a common security threat, attacking and destroying those that refuse to be bought off or controlled by local leaders.
Biddle does not detail the cost in dollars, though he suggests that the human toll would be about 700 American lives a year. Assuming America does everything right, he places the probability of successfully averting a civil war at at 10%.
2. Complete Withdrawal
Complete Withdrawal could occur at best over 1-2 years. Biddle believes it would take this long because American forces would probably have to fight their way out, and also would need to move a vast amount of materiel in order to withdraw in good order.
This approach runs the risk of catalyzing the onset of a full-scale civil war. While such a war may be inevitable, Biddle believes that the greater problem lies in regionalizing the conflict. He claims that it takes about 10 years for a civil war to burn itself out, for the parties involved to be completely exhausted and materially depleted enough to pursue peace. However, by year 8 or so, it is highly likely that domestic pressures from religious/political groups and the strain of refugees will cause Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and possibly other nations to enter into the conflict on various sides.
Biddle acknowledges that some feel that the potential nation-state belligerents will restrict their participation to monetary and covert logistical support, and will not commit armed forces.
Beyond the obvious humanitarian issues, a regional conflict would severely impact oil production and transportation, driving up global petroleum prices and precipitating economic crises worldwide.
A third alternative which no one mentions is to commit about 500,000 soldiers (plus support staff) to peacekeeping in Iraq. This would likely require a draft.
Biddle also remarked on partition. He notes that while partition might lead to more defensible borders, fundamental problems remain. The Sunni heartland is perceived to not be economically viable. A three-state solution that depends upon a piece of paper for economic guarantees to oil profits would probably be unacceptable, leading to pressure to capture oil fields by force.
Biddle notes that neither option is popular in Congress. The most popular options involve a compromise between the two, which he feels would be doomed to failure and a waste of resources. Furthermore, the US military is currently forbidden from working on a withdrawal plan, particularly because it would be met by howls of derision from current pro-war Republicans that are staking their political lives on support for the president and the military. Biddle suggests that the White House might be able to manage the political fallout if it openly pushed drafting withdrawal plans out of prudence and responsibility to the American strategic position.
Finally, Biddle notes that no one in Europe has a plan in the event of a regional war. His conversations with his German counterparts suggest that they are unwilling or unable to shift away from the politically salient priorities of environmental security, narcoterrorism, democratization in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union states, and other domestic concerns and focus on the dire impact should Iraq fail. In fact, according to Biddle, an economic analysis of the impact of war in the Middle East is a severe gap in current scholarship and policy analysis, and could serve to better cast the debate and discussion.
