After a long hiatus, I've decided that writing on a blog is a handy way to help refine my ideas. I have no idea if anyone reads this, nor does it really matter. What matters is the attempt to better frame, refine, and articulate ideas that are complicated, and yet require the attention and energy of all committed citizens.
To this end, I will begin by posting some recent articles/comments that appear on my Facebook page, but might potentially find interested parties here. Also going up will be my list of ten questions that will be the key questions of our age.
Saturday, October 20, 2007
Comments on talk - "The Traditional Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons"
Letter to Dr. T. V. Paul
Dr. T. V. Paul,
Thank you for an interesting and enlightening talk. I have had a bit of time to digest your talk, and want to share my thoughts on the two aspects of reputation that were brought up: deterrence and non-use. Granted, I'm not a political scientist and have little formal training - please bear with me as I articulate my thoughts.
My comments are organized along the following points:
1. Reputational benefits for non-use and deterrence, while in principle coming at the expense of each other, both depend upon the potential for actual use.
Reputation from both non-use and deterrence both stem from one fundamental assumption: that the weapons could credibly be used. Without the credible potential for use, a nation gains no reputational advantage for not using them. Only by being in a position of strength is nonagression seen as a benevolent action. A state gains no positive reputation unless (1) the weapons could be used, (2) the state might incur some tactical or strategic disadvantage from their nonuse, (3) the potential target or third parties recognize both (1) and (2).
2. I assume that the credible use of nuclear weapons by any of the major nation-states has decreased with time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
The reasons for this are many - the decrease in great powers defining the conflict with other powers in existential terms; increased interdependence for economic growth, increasingly seen as a good in its own right and a source of legitimacy and power for ruling elites; and, not the least among these, the acceptance of non-use as a norm. It is possible that the diminished perceived possiblity of the use of nuclear weapons by the US or the other four major nuclear states comes from a qualitative change in the international system, where actual dominance over another nation's land, resources, and people occurs in the economic sphere.
Alternatively, perhaps because of the issues associated with the passage of time that Judith Reppy and others brought up at your talk, the credible use of nuclear weapons may have diminished with time. I have read Hiroshima; my family is from the area, and have a fair idea of the physics and material substance of a nuclear weapon. However, it is very, very hard for me - perhaps because I was born in 1983 - to imagine the use of nuclear weapons by anyone other than a rogue state/terrorist organization. While at some level this is a good thing - it reflects the strength of the norm, or at least the image of a norm, it does lead to problems, which takes me to point 3.
3. With diminished credibility of the threat comes a decrease both in their deterrence value and in the reputation for non-use.
A difference may exist between non-use against other nuclear powers, non-use against non-nuclear powers, and non-use against non-state actors. I believe you mentioned this in your talk, and would love to hear more about this.
4. Instead of strengthening the norm of non-use, the diminished credibility leads to a decrease in relevance of nuclear weapons.
In particular, the reputational benefit nuclear weapons provide, either deterrence or non-use, is diminished. By contrast, the opportunity cost of continuing to fund nuclear weapons development and maintenance instead of other areas of potential investment has increased because of increased opportunities to invest outside of one's national borders.
5. To restore the relevance of nuclear weapons as a tool of policy, the US could modify its nuclear arsenal to increase the credibility of the nuclear threat to uncooperative nations.
The most obvious way of doing this is to lower the yield. Though conventional weapons have equivalent yields, nuclear weapons will still remain a distinctive threat precisely because of the remaining differences in the material (specifically, radiation) and constructed (historical legacy, images of radiation) natures of the bomb.
6. Scientists, elements of the Pentagon, and perhaps elements of other branches in American government may acceede to such a policy for distinct reasons, but which converge upon a policy of a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon:
Scientists
a. assumption that the norm will not be violated gives scientists a clear moral conscience
b. need to redefine institutional and professional relevance of nuclear stockpile and associated workforce after end of Cold War
c. absence of alternative work opportunities (in the short-term), pending commitment in money and policy to an energy policy incorporating a heavy investment in nuclear energy
Department of Defense
a. restore credibility of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence
b. institutional desire to retain budgets and priority for programs
Other Branches
a. a credible nuclear deterrent is seen as a low-cost alternative to a conventional buildup (rationale probably originates from Eisenhower's desire to balance budgets while maintaining an effective counterweight to Soviet expansionism)
b. nuclear weapons (and advanced technology in general) is easier to sell to the American public than an increase in the number of people in the armed services
Aside:
One of the interesting features of the behavioral economics course I am taking is the concrete experimental evidence that losses are felt more strongly than gains by individuals. Generalizing from the micro to macro picture, it's possible not only to say that an institution/group will defend strongly its existing resources/budgets, but that it will do so even when faced with alternatives that may in fact be slightly more beneficial. What is true for money is definitely true for work experience and training, one thing that I hope US workforce retraining initiatives take into account. (I was inspired by this when thinking about the personal difficulty I am having leaving research science for a career in policy.)
Other notes:
Attitudes to the use of nuclear weapons may differ between the military and civilians, but is far from definite and may fall along defense/diplomacy lines (i.e., State department officials may have more in common with a Sec State who happens to be a general than other civilians in the DoD). Interesting case studies would include individuals who had served in both miliitary and civilian capacities (George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Colin Powell). It might be interesting to consult the literature on whether there is a difference between the uniformed individuals who serve as elected officials versus those appointed to civilian posts. Also, is there a selection effect - are the "right" generals more likely to be selected for civilian office?
-----
Historical aside:
A good illustration in the distinct personalities that exist within the military would be the contrast drawn between MacArthur and Eisenhower. There is a particularly vivid image of this, highlighted by Mark Perry in "Partners in Command", in which MacArthur's callous use of force and image of a commander surveying the battlefield is contrasted with Eisenhower's resigned, somber expression during the use of military
force against the "Bonus Army" of WWI veterans in the late Hoover administration. (image at http://images.encarta.msn.com/xrefmedia/sharemed/targets/images/pho/t029/t029187a.jpg) Perry writes: "But the difference between the two was obvious for all who saw them at Anacostia Flats: 'There is MacArthur in full regalia, complete with several decks of ribbons, looking sternly upon the 'battlefield,; with the look of eagles in his eyes,' a reporter later reflected. 'Next to him is Ike, dressed in a regular unadorned uniform. If you take a close look at the expression on Eisenhower's face, you realize it is one of cold, caustic contempt. This is the closed Eisenhower, who later observed he had learned acting from MacArthur." (Perry, 48)
-----
Best of luck. I hope these comments have proven worth your time reading.
Cheers,
Ryan
Dr. T. V. Paul,
Thank you for an interesting and enlightening talk. I have had a bit of time to digest your talk, and want to share my thoughts on the two aspects of reputation that were brought up: deterrence and non-use. Granted, I'm not a political scientist and have little formal training - please bear with me as I articulate my thoughts.
My comments are organized along the following points:
1. Reputational benefits for non-use and deterrence, while in principle coming at the expense of each other, both depend upon the potential for actual use.
Reputation from both non-use and deterrence both stem from one fundamental assumption: that the weapons could credibly be used. Without the credible potential for use, a nation gains no reputational advantage for not using them. Only by being in a position of strength is nonagression seen as a benevolent action. A state gains no positive reputation unless (1) the weapons could be used, (2) the state might incur some tactical or strategic disadvantage from their nonuse, (3) the potential target or third parties recognize both (1) and (2).
2. I assume that the credible use of nuclear weapons by any of the major nation-states has decreased with time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
The reasons for this are many - the decrease in great powers defining the conflict with other powers in existential terms; increased interdependence for economic growth, increasingly seen as a good in its own right and a source of legitimacy and power for ruling elites; and, not the least among these, the acceptance of non-use as a norm. It is possible that the diminished perceived possiblity of the use of nuclear weapons by the US or the other four major nuclear states comes from a qualitative change in the international system, where actual dominance over another nation's land, resources, and people occurs in the economic sphere.
Alternatively, perhaps because of the issues associated with the passage of time that Judith Reppy and others brought up at your talk, the credible use of nuclear weapons may have diminished with time. I have read Hiroshima; my family is from the area, and have a fair idea of the physics and material substance of a nuclear weapon. However, it is very, very hard for me - perhaps because I was born in 1983 - to imagine the use of nuclear weapons by anyone other than a rogue state/terrorist organization. While at some level this is a good thing - it reflects the strength of the norm, or at least the image of a norm, it does lead to problems, which takes me to point 3.
3. With diminished credibility of the threat comes a decrease both in their deterrence value and in the reputation for non-use.
A difference may exist between non-use against other nuclear powers, non-use against non-nuclear powers, and non-use against non-state actors. I believe you mentioned this in your talk, and would love to hear more about this.
4. Instead of strengthening the norm of non-use, the diminished credibility leads to a decrease in relevance of nuclear weapons.
In particular, the reputational benefit nuclear weapons provide, either deterrence or non-use, is diminished. By contrast, the opportunity cost of continuing to fund nuclear weapons development and maintenance instead of other areas of potential investment has increased because of increased opportunities to invest outside of one's national borders.
5. To restore the relevance of nuclear weapons as a tool of policy, the US could modify its nuclear arsenal to increase the credibility of the nuclear threat to uncooperative nations.
The most obvious way of doing this is to lower the yield. Though conventional weapons have equivalent yields, nuclear weapons will still remain a distinctive threat precisely because of the remaining differences in the material (specifically, radiation) and constructed (historical legacy, images of radiation) natures of the bomb.
6. Scientists, elements of the Pentagon, and perhaps elements of other branches in American government may acceede to such a policy for distinct reasons, but which converge upon a policy of a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon:
Scientists
a. assumption that the norm will not be violated gives scientists a clear moral conscience
b. need to redefine institutional and professional relevance of nuclear stockpile and associated workforce after end of Cold War
c. absence of alternative work opportunities (in the short-term), pending commitment in money and policy to an energy policy incorporating a heavy investment in nuclear energy
Department of Defense
a. restore credibility of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence
b. institutional desire to retain budgets and priority for programs
Other Branches
a. a credible nuclear deterrent is seen as a low-cost alternative to a conventional buildup (rationale probably originates from Eisenhower's desire to balance budgets while maintaining an effective counterweight to Soviet expansionism)
b. nuclear weapons (and advanced technology in general) is easier to sell to the American public than an increase in the number of people in the armed services
Aside:
One of the interesting features of the behavioral economics course I am taking is the concrete experimental evidence that losses are felt more strongly than gains by individuals. Generalizing from the micro to macro picture, it's possible not only to say that an institution/group will defend strongly its existing resources/budgets, but that it will do so even when faced with alternatives that may in fact be slightly more beneficial. What is true for money is definitely true for work experience and training, one thing that I hope US workforce retraining initiatives take into account. (I was inspired by this when thinking about the personal difficulty I am having leaving research science for a career in policy.)
Other notes:
Attitudes to the use of nuclear weapons may differ between the military and civilians, but is far from definite and may fall along defense/diplomacy lines (i.e., State department officials may have more in common with a Sec State who happens to be a general than other civilians in the DoD). Interesting case studies would include individuals who had served in both miliitary and civilian capacities (George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Colin Powell). It might be interesting to consult the literature on whether there is a difference between the uniformed individuals who serve as elected officials versus those appointed to civilian posts. Also, is there a selection effect - are the "right" generals more likely to be selected for civilian office?
-----
Historical aside:
A good illustration in the distinct personalities that exist within the military would be the contrast drawn between MacArthur and Eisenhower. There is a particularly vivid image of this, highlighted by Mark Perry in "Partners in Command", in which MacArthur's callous use of force and image of a commander surveying the battlefield is contrasted with Eisenhower's resigned, somber expression during the use of military
force against the "Bonus Army" of WWI veterans in the late Hoover administration. (image at http://images.encarta.msn.com/xrefmedia/sharemed/targets/images/pho/t029/t029187a.jpg) Perry writes: "But the difference between the two was obvious for all who saw them at Anacostia Flats: 'There is MacArthur in full regalia, complete with several decks of ribbons, looking sternly upon the 'battlefield,; with the look of eagles in his eyes,' a reporter later reflected. 'Next to him is Ike, dressed in a regular unadorned uniform. If you take a close look at the expression on Eisenhower's face, you realize it is one of cold, caustic contempt. This is the closed Eisenhower, who later observed he had learned acting from MacArthur." (Perry, 48)
-----
Best of luck. I hope these comments have proven worth your time reading.
Cheers,
Ryan
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Consecration Sunday Speech
(delivered at St. Paul's United Methodist Church, Ithaca, NY, 7 Oct 2007)
Good morning everyone! My name is Ryan Yamada. I have the distinct privilege of announcing to this wonderful body of Christ that Consecration Sunday is this October 25! Consecration Sunday is a chance to ask ourselves what we feel compelled to give to God and His service, as so beautifully and remarkably demonstrated by all the good that comes from this faith community.
I've been asked to provide my own experiences in the Church and how I intend to approach Consecration Sunday, both of which I am happy to do.
About a year ago, you welcomed me into this congregation, and entrusted me with a most precious task - to help nurture and encourage the senior high students in confirmation class. I'm still amazed you let a virtual stranger do this - though Rebecca kept an eye on me to make sure no damage was done. I found the youth to be brilliant, kind, passionate, and most of all, generous in heart and spirit. I'm not sure what they got out of my presence, other than some wisecracks and enthusiastic support for the appreciation of caffeinated beverages. I found myself wondering, over and over again: why is it that these men and women are so awesome?
Credit goes to them of course, their friends and families, and God. But I think this spiritual community also played, and continues to play, a key role. During service, I'm often struck by a vision of a multi-generational construction project, in which you are building, brick by brick, an awesome sanctuary that extends far beyond these walls, and far beyond Sunday morning. From Buffalo Street to Bosnia, you extend comfort, nurture the spirit, and challenge hearts and minds to become stronger, wiser, and more loving. What you do demonstrates courage and conviction that can come only from loving something greater than yourself. It is here that I first felt the full force of 1 Cor 13:13 - "And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love, but the greatest of these is love."
Of course we’re not perfect. We are often failed saints, and all too often successful sinners; we have imperfect moral resumes. Even my flaws have flaws. But we do God's work as well as we can, however we can.
In so many ways I have trusted you with my heart and my soul; that decision to embrace this community has been one of the best of my life. It is therefore easy for me to trust this living church with what offerings I can give, for it is here that I see it work, in ways subtle and sublime.
We decide, as individuals, what we can give. Our reasons for giving are as complex and diverse as our reasons for coming here, and often remain unknown even to ourselves. But we must never underestimate the power of gifts, of talent, time, and tithe, to do so much good in the world, and to enrich our own lives. It truly is better to give than to receive, but by the grace of God we can do both.
As we approach October 28, I hope that all of us will take some time to increase our mindfulness of why we give, what it means to give, what we are called to give. And in these weeks, we will also reflect upon all that God gives to us, in particular, the opportunity to share a special time and spirit in a truly remarkable community.
Blessings to you in the coming weeks - may you feel what I feel, see what I see, whenever I walk among this living, awesome, sanctuary.
Good morning everyone! My name is Ryan Yamada. I have the distinct privilege of announcing to this wonderful body of Christ that Consecration Sunday is this October 25! Consecration Sunday is a chance to ask ourselves what we feel compelled to give to God and His service, as so beautifully and remarkably demonstrated by all the good that comes from this faith community.
I've been asked to provide my own experiences in the Church and how I intend to approach Consecration Sunday, both of which I am happy to do.
About a year ago, you welcomed me into this congregation, and entrusted me with a most precious task - to help nurture and encourage the senior high students in confirmation class. I'm still amazed you let a virtual stranger do this - though Rebecca kept an eye on me to make sure no damage was done. I found the youth to be brilliant, kind, passionate, and most of all, generous in heart and spirit. I'm not sure what they got out of my presence, other than some wisecracks and enthusiastic support for the appreciation of caffeinated beverages. I found myself wondering, over and over again: why is it that these men and women are so awesome?
Credit goes to them of course, their friends and families, and God. But I think this spiritual community also played, and continues to play, a key role. During service, I'm often struck by a vision of a multi-generational construction project, in which you are building, brick by brick, an awesome sanctuary that extends far beyond these walls, and far beyond Sunday morning. From Buffalo Street to Bosnia, you extend comfort, nurture the spirit, and challenge hearts and minds to become stronger, wiser, and more loving. What you do demonstrates courage and conviction that can come only from loving something greater than yourself. It is here that I first felt the full force of 1 Cor 13:13 - "And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love, but the greatest of these is love."
Of course we’re not perfect. We are often failed saints, and all too often successful sinners; we have imperfect moral resumes. Even my flaws have flaws. But we do God's work as well as we can, however we can.
In so many ways I have trusted you with my heart and my soul; that decision to embrace this community has been one of the best of my life. It is therefore easy for me to trust this living church with what offerings I can give, for it is here that I see it work, in ways subtle and sublime.
We decide, as individuals, what we can give. Our reasons for giving are as complex and diverse as our reasons for coming here, and often remain unknown even to ourselves. But we must never underestimate the power of gifts, of talent, time, and tithe, to do so much good in the world, and to enrich our own lives. It truly is better to give than to receive, but by the grace of God we can do both.
As we approach October 28, I hope that all of us will take some time to increase our mindfulness of why we give, what it means to give, what we are called to give. And in these weeks, we will also reflect upon all that God gives to us, in particular, the opportunity to share a special time and spirit in a truly remarkable community.
Blessings to you in the coming weeks - may you feel what I feel, see what I see, whenever I walk among this living, awesome, sanctuary.
Thursday, October 4, 2007
The Red Moon Rises: Sputnik and the Space Age Turn 50
My article in the Cornell Daily Sun, published October 2, 2007, two days before 50th anniversary.
http://cornellsun.com/node/24971/
http://cornellsun.com/node/24971/
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