Note: the uploaded posts have been dated according to my post dates on Facebook.
If you've got any advice on the layout or the content of this blog, please let me know!
Thanks,
The Management
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Updated blog - New posts available!
I've added a number of notes I have written over the last few months, but never uploaded onto this blog. This update should roughly synchronize this blog with my postings on Facebook. Notes on FB becomes pretty ornery after about 50.
Note: the uploaded posts have been dated according to my post dates on Facebook.Consequently, you will need to browse the archives to see them. For now, they should all be visible in the first page. I'll change it in a week or so to a more manageable format (3 postings visible at a time).
If you've got any advice on the layout or the content of this blog, please let me know!
Thanks,
The Management
Note: the uploaded posts have been dated according to my post dates on Facebook.
If you've got any advice on the layout or the content of this blog, please let me know!
Thanks,
The Management
Friday, July 25, 2008
Stephen Biddle on Iraq - CU-SWAMOS Reception, July 22, 2008
Dr. Stephen Biddle, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Iraq Study Group, addressed the CU-SWAMOS conference this evening. His speech was focused on the state of Iraq, the changes between now and the situation when he last spoke at SWAMOS, and his perspective on what it would take to stabilize the situation.
A few things before I go into what he said.
First, Dr. Biddle was much more optimistic in his assessment than in the summer of 2007, for a number of reasons apparent in his comments.
Second, unlike his talk in 2007, he did not use two stories about his experiences in Iraq to illustrate the situation in Iraq. Rather, he focused on describing the trends and changes that have taken place at the local, national, and regional level. While this may seem less personal, I felt it allowed him to go into more detail about the overall strategic situation.
Enough from me - here are my draft notes from his talk.
*****
Biddle began by pointing out that strategic objectives should define troop counts and withdrawal schedules, not the other way around. Existing political discussions frequently take a contrary approach, starting with a desired troop level and a withdrawal date, and working from there to define objectives that can be met.
His talk was divided into two main sections:
(1) the causal dynamics of the continuing counterinsurgency/peacekeeping in Iraq
(2) achievable goals
He stated clearly that the probability of achieving the chief goal - avoiding persistent, large-scale violence - had improved dramatically since the last time he spoke in 2007. (In 2007, he claimed success probability of 10%, assuming the US did everything perfectly - and this assessment caused him to claim that he was far more optimistic than most. For those at SWAMOS, yes, I've got proof that Dr. Kirschner was wrong, and Biddle was right in his memory. Sorry Jon - not picking on you.)
He did emphasize that the achievable, positive outcome was not "Eden on the Euphrates" - that is, a vibrant, stable liberal democracy. Instead, the US can hope for, at best, a decentralized state or an authoritarian government similar to that under Saddam Hussein.
*****
Biddle said that the United States had two chief war aims, one humanitarian, and the other narrowly strategic.
1. Humanitarian: avert rapid escalation of violence
2. Strategic: ensure that the war does not spread to the rest of the oil-producing Middle East.
Unlike in 2007, Biddle is optimistic about prospects for success, as defined above, in Iraq.
One of the chief reasons is that the underlying strategic landscape is different from a year ago. He mentioned that the decline in violence has not been ephemeral. It is in fact sustained by a change in the self-interested strategic calculus of the principal combatants in Iraq.
Biddle focused on three particular changes - two which the United States did not plan, one of which we would have actively prevented if we could have.
1. Bombing of the Askariyya (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra in 2006.
Prior to the bombing, the Sunni insurgency felt that it was in a superior position to Shiite forces. Consequently, their goals were to facilitate an American withdrawal, then retake control of the country.
However, the bombing and subsequent battle in Baghdad over the next year taught them that the Shiite militias were, in fact, far more powerful than they had predicted. This was facilitated by the fact that, prior to Samarra, the Shiite militias' function had been primarily defensive. After the bombing, Shiite militias successfully cleansed Baghdad of Sunni populations.
At the time, most Americans viewed the yearlong battle in Baghdad as a catastrophe. And, Biddle notes, it was, in humanitarian terms. Neither US ground forces nor the Iraqi Army was able to intervene in the struggle. Both opted to stay largely on the sidelines. But, as a consequence, the Sunni insurgency realized that if the Americans withdrew, Shiite forces alone could defeat them.
Biddle believes that in 5-10 years, when historians look back upon the Iraq War, they will see the "Battle of Baghdad" as a turning point.
2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq brutality to Sunni coreligionists
The second key shift came as a consequence of the defeat of Sunni insurgents by Shiite militias. Al-Qaeda has dealt harshly with its own allies, often providing severed heads of the children of Sunni leaders viewed to be less than enthusiastic in their support of the insurgency. The Sunni population had tolerated such brutality because their only alternative had been to face Shiite death squads.
This calculus changed after the Battle of Baghdad. Even with Al-Qaeda's help, Sunni insurgents were unable to prevent the Shiite takeover of Baghdad. The calculus that had supported the alliance had changed - in Biddle's words, it had become "all pain and no gain".
At this point, Sunni leaders began approaching US forces and attempted to broker a deal. They offered a cease-fire, in which Sunni forces would not engage US forces, Iraqi army, or other Sunni groups. (Biddle rather conspicuously left out Shiite militias; I assume that the agreement permitted self-defense against Shiite forces.) Furthermore, Sunni leaders would provide biometrics (fingerprints) and a contact list of their armed members and the names of their family. In return, the US provided identifying uniforms (polo shirts, baseball caps, chinos) to help identify non-hostile Sunni forces, recognized the Sunni forces as legitimate police authorities over their current zone of control, and provided a payment of $300 per month, per person. Contrary to some reports, they received no ammunition or armaments - as Biddle dryly pointed out, the insurgency hadn't had a problem with procuring ammunition and arms when it was firing at US forces over the last few years.
Consequently, by mid-2007, the Sunni insurgency had largely died out.
3. "The Surge"
Biddle points out that the negotiated settlements with Sunni leaders depended upon the Surge. The additional US forces helped were not sufficient to guarantee security to the nation as a whole - what they were able to do was provide security in regions where the Sunnis had negotiated cease-fires. With these new allies, Al-Qaeda lost the "cover and concealment" that is needed by any insurgency. Sunni allied forces, often referred to as the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq, provided the locations of Al-Qaeda safehouses and bomb-making factories, as well as a list of leadership and operatives.
Al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had facilitated the rise of Shiite militias. These militias, including Jaish al Mahdi, realized that the Shiite population was completely dependent upon them for security. Consequently, the militias began assuming control over necessities and commodities (such as cooking oil) and profiting at the expense of local Shia. Increasingly, they were viewed as predators, not protectors, though the relationship was deemed, as in the Sunni case, as a necessary evil.
The Surge corresponded with the declining popularity of the Jaish al Mahdi, and thus changed the calculus for Shiite militias. In the prior two engagements with US forces, the Shiite militias had met heavy losses. However, the popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders guaranteed that they would be able to make good their losses. But their eroded support, combined with increased US Army presence, caused many Shiite militias to negotiate a cease-fire.
Consequently, in autumn of 2007, the Sunni and Shiite militias had negotiated peace. Al-Qaeda and the remaining Sunni insurgency had retreated to a few areas in Mosul and its environs.
This change precipitated an interesting development in March/April 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Army took the fight to the Jaish al Mahdi in Basra. Ultimately - though only with the support of US and British forces - they were able to defeat al-Sadr's forces in Basra.
*****
Biddle notes that Iraq remains in the grip of an ethnosectarian civil war. Two prerequisites are needed for a sustained reduction in violence:
1. Cease fire participants continue to see peace as in their own self-interest
2. The presence of an outside peacekeeper that locals trust.
Biddle feels that #1 has already been achieved through over 200 negotiated cease-fires with various insurgent groups/militias. As he notes, many of these take the form of explicit contracts.
However, #2 remains a tricky issue. Neither Sunnis nor Shia trust the other with weapons, and both remain fully armed. Right now, the only possible outside force that can serve as effective peacekeepers trusted by each side is the US Army.
This brought the talk to the issue of troop withdrawal and counts. Biddle underlined his assessment that early drawdown would be dangerous - as noted in his 2007 talk, he felt that it could lead to a civil/regional war. He felt US forces needed to remain through two critical events in Iraq:
1. Provincial elections (2008)
2. National parliamentary elections (2009)
Biddle anticipates that both would be targeted for violent disruption, and had the potential to spark renewed conflict, depending upon the results.
The Balkans was held up as an example of what the United States should expect regarding its future commitment - a few years of sustained peacekeeping and stability, followed by a gradual reduction to half the existing force. Biddle suggests that a detailed Pentagon study would be needed to assess what forces are needed - but to provide an idea, Biddle recommends that about 100,000 (plus or minus a couple brigades) would be needed. If Iraq remained largely stable through provincial and national elections, then the United States could expect to reduce its forces by about 50% from 2010-2012.
On Afghanistan:
Biddle disagrees with Obama's emphasis that Afghanistan is the central front on the War on Terror, for two reasons:
First, Iraq is substantially more volatile. He notes that Afghanistan is currently under-resourced. (He quotes a figure of 10-15%, which he seemed to indicate should not be taken too seriously.) However, he felt that while things are getting worse, they would get incrementally worse over the course of 2-3 (maybe even 4!) years without running the risk of catastrophe. On the other hand, Iraq's stability is less certain, with the possibility, given a triggering event, of returning to high levels of violence over a matter of weeks.
Second, US interests in Iraq are more critical than its interests in Afghanistan, since Iraq is adjacent to the chief oil-producing nations in the Middle East. At present, Al-Qaeda has a significant presence in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan - it is currently headquartered in western Pakistan. However, Biddle believes if bin Laden were to choose which of the two countries he would rather have as a headquarters, he would probably choose Iraq because of its greater potential instability and resources.
He concludes with a clear call for an Iraq first strategy, akin to the Europe-first strategy that was outlined (though not always followed) in World War II.
I'll fill in Q&A a bit later - it was fairly extensive.
Q1: Where do the militias get their money?
A1: The Shiite militias get a lot of their money from Iran. The Sunnis get money from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Biddle also notes that a lot of money acquired by Ba'athists while Saddam Hussein was in power left the country. [NB: I don't think he mentioned when] Much of that money is returning to Iraq now. Critically, Iraq's own oil revenue helps the insurgency to be financed from internal resources.
Q2: What is your prediction for the configuration of US forces in the Middle East around 2010?
A2: Biddle focused on what he would like to see. He envisions 100,000 ground troops in 10-12 combat brigades. Some would be distributed among Iraqi army, and others doing peacekeeping. The key is to have American forces in sufficient numbers such that their presence is known and available, should fighting flare up. Currently, a lot of the American ground forces have shifted from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping (e.g. helping local law enforcement/militas track down violators of cease-fires using forensics).
Q3: My experience in Pakistan causes me to believe that it will be indefinitely unstable. Your thoughts?
A3: Biddle agrees that Pakistan is "a mess". He feels that principal-agent theory would play a prominent role in analyzing the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan is already waging a counterinsurgency war within its borders, especially in the West. He said that Pakistan deserved its own talk, and would defer to a Pakistan specialist.
Q4: Jonathan Kirschner pointed out that Biddle's talk a year ago claimed that either extreme (immediate withdrawal or continued, indefinite presence) would be preferable to a slow drawdown (a "middle road"). This year, it sounds like Biddle is actually advocating a "middle road" toward withdrawal. He also offered a realist take on Iraq: the issue is not security or confidence-building, but simply that the interests of the players are fundamentally different and irreconcilable. Wouldn't a withdrawal timetable just lead to the respective parties backward inducting and shifting their plans to incorporate the withdrawal date? Furthermore, you assume that the US peacekeeping effort will go through successfully - even if it did, mistakes might be made that would lead to renewed conflict.
A4: Biddle first noted, with humor, that he was happy realists were alive and well at Cornell. He feels, however, that currently it's in everyone's interest to cooperate. The key is to use the Balkans model of continued presence and a shift to peacekeeping to make sure it continues in everyone's interest to adhere to the 200 or so individual cease-fire agreements that have been negotiated.
Q5: How do you anticipate that your plan, McCain's plan, and Obama's plan would be affected by troop fatigue?
A5: The current level of 15 brigades (140,000 troops) is unsustainable.
One of the problems is that the current level may exist, in part, as a negotiation tactic by the current administration to make sure that troop levels aren't drawn down significantly below the minimum needed to maintain stability. (In his words, the administration would probably draw down to about 12 brigades today if they were certain that Obama wouldn't cut the force to 5 brigades upon taking office.)
Biddle feels that a political solution would be to work out a deal by which Bush and, say, an Obama administration would each help with the drawdown.
Q6: How would this assessment change if Israel attacked the Iran nuclear program?
A6: Biddle thinks this would be a huge disaster to American interests. However, he felt that America could prevent an Israeli raid. Israel would likely need to use Iraqi airspace in order to launch a strike. If the US were to withhold the IFF codes, it's possible that the Israelis would not want to run the risk of either crossing their powerful ally, or, barring that, being shot down by American anti-aircraft defenses.
Biddle says that very senior members of the administration have confirmed that the administration does not want a war with Iran. According to them, they have to pretend that military options are on the table to negotiate with a stronger hand to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. They also note that it may be perceived to be an empty threat, because of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In response to a comment that Dick Cheney might decide we should go to war: "Dick Cheney might pull a gun in the Oval Office and get a war in Iran. Life is probabilistic." (Biddle said "Life is probabilistic" a couple times in his talk, to underline that weird things happen that good theorists might not be able to predict or anticipate.)
The Israelis are another matter - they will definitely seek to attack Iran if it does not give up its nuclear ambitions.
Q7: Could you respond to Prime Minister al-Maliki's comments that indicated support for Obama's plan for withdrawal of US forces?
A7: Biddle believes that this is primarily driven by Iraqi domestic politics. He notes a couple key trends:
(1) Incumbents in Iraq are tremendously unpopular.
(2) Even though the al-Mahdi army and insurgent groups may be less popular then they are now, they are still considerably more popular than incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that they will increase their political representation in the upcoming provincial elections.
(3) The Sunnis will also increase their representation, especially in the form of political alignments built around the Sons of Iraq (note: the Sunnis largely boycotted the last election.)
According to Biddle, al-Maliki does not have a political base. He is Prime Minister because he was "everyone's second choice and no one's tenth choice."
Al-Maliki sees an opportunity to position himself as a Shiite nationalist - he can do this by pushing for a withdrawal of American troops.
Predictably, most Iraqi politicians do not want a withdrawal but will not say so publicly. More interestingly, most of the Iraqi people also do not want a withdrawal, but also blame American troops for a lot of the country's problems.
Anti-American rhetoric had been tolerated by the United States as being politically necessary for Iraqi politicians to campaign successfully. However, since the political debate has bid itself up such that withdrawal is a necessary plank in any candidate's platform, it will be difficult to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits US forces to legitimately remain in the country. However, Biddle thinks there will be a solution - possibly depending on some formula that provides enough flexibility for sufficient ground forces to remain in the country.
Q8: How long can we permit Afghanistan to deteriorate?
A8: Biddle feels that the condition in Afghanistan is not nearly as critical as that in Iraq. This is primarily because of the weakness of support for the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the enemy depends heavily upon ideology and not very much on ethnicity. Furthermore, the Taliban's ideology is itself unpopular with the majority. In Iraq, on the other hand, the prime driver for insurgents is ethnic, not ideological. He reiterated that Afghanistan is under-resourced, and will grow consistently - though steadily - worse, with a crisis occurring in 2-4 years if no additional forces are deployed.
Q9: Is it reasonable to envision UN forces in Iraq?
A9: Yes, but it will take a couple of years. Unlike in most countries, the UN is not very popular (because of the sanctions), and would not be welcomed any more than American troops.
Q10: Where in the world is Moqtada al-Sadr?
A10: He is apparently in Iran studying to be an ayatollah. Biddle claims that he wants to be the new al-Sistani. He is also establishing offices in Europe.
His policies are viewed as inconsistent with the needs and desires of his core constituency - poor Shiites - who seek basic access to necessities and jobs more than global revolution. His eroding political position has made Maliki think he can claim poor Shiites as his political base.
Q11: What could happen domestically that would convince America that your plan is correct? Alternatively, what could happen that would make your plan of 100,000 troops until 2012 impossible?
A11: It's important for negotiations about peacekeeping through 2012 to be distinct from the idea of permanent war. As Biddle pointed out, the Democratic party has been supportive of peacekeeping in the past. He maintains that it is important to recognize that whatever errors were made going into the war, it would be a gross national error to withdraw prematurely and leave an unstable Iraq, where a civil war would extend to a regional war, engulfing most of the oil-producing Middle East.
Epilogue:
Dr. Stephen Biddle is an incredibly impressive person - he's one of the most solid scholars I've met. At Cornell, I've had the privilege of listening to a number of distinguished public figures and academics discuss world affairs. But unlike some of them (Frank Fukuyama comes to mind - not that I'm picking on him), Stephen has a solid delivery, a clear logical structure, and a way of covering just about all the bases in an hour address. Though I've never heard or read any of George Marshall's speeches during World War II, I have heard that a large part of the general's distinctiveness was his ability to think widely and deeply, and articulate that thought in a distilled, concise manner. This is the impression I got today.
I'm also happy to report that, unlike when I greeted General Zinni with a half-chewed Nutter Butter in my mouth, I was able to comport myself with (relative) dignity in this gathering.
As additional evidence of Biddle's solid memory, he remembered that I had sent him an email and given him some astronomy pictures for his daughter, Anna. With a mind like that working on Iraq, I'm sleeping a bit more easily. :)
A few things before I go into what he said.
First, Dr. Biddle was much more optimistic in his assessment than in the summer of 2007, for a number of reasons apparent in his comments.
Second, unlike his talk in 2007, he did not use two stories about his experiences in Iraq to illustrate the situation in Iraq. Rather, he focused on describing the trends and changes that have taken place at the local, national, and regional level. While this may seem less personal, I felt it allowed him to go into more detail about the overall strategic situation.
Enough from me - here are my draft notes from his talk.
*****
Biddle began by pointing out that strategic objectives should define troop counts and withdrawal schedules, not the other way around. Existing political discussions frequently take a contrary approach, starting with a desired troop level and a withdrawal date, and working from there to define objectives that can be met.
His talk was divided into two main sections:
(1) the causal dynamics of the continuing counterinsurgency/peacekeeping in Iraq
(2) achievable goals
He stated clearly that the probability of achieving the chief goal - avoiding persistent, large-scale violence - had improved dramatically since the last time he spoke in 2007. (In 2007, he claimed success probability of 10%, assuming the US did everything perfectly - and this assessment caused him to claim that he was far more optimistic than most. For those at SWAMOS, yes, I've got proof that Dr. Kirschner was wrong, and Biddle was right in his memory. Sorry Jon - not picking on you.)
He did emphasize that the achievable, positive outcome was not "Eden on the Euphrates" - that is, a vibrant, stable liberal democracy. Instead, the US can hope for, at best, a decentralized state or an authoritarian government similar to that under Saddam Hussein.
*****
Biddle said that the United States had two chief war aims, one humanitarian, and the other narrowly strategic.
1. Humanitarian: avert rapid escalation of violence
2. Strategic: ensure that the war does not spread to the rest of the oil-producing Middle East.
Unlike in 2007, Biddle is optimistic about prospects for success, as defined above, in Iraq.
One of the chief reasons is that the underlying strategic landscape is different from a year ago. He mentioned that the decline in violence has not been ephemeral. It is in fact sustained by a change in the self-interested strategic calculus of the principal combatants in Iraq.
Biddle focused on three particular changes - two which the United States did not plan, one of which we would have actively prevented if we could have.
1. Bombing of the Askariyya (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra in 2006.
Prior to the bombing, the Sunni insurgency felt that it was in a superior position to Shiite forces. Consequently, their goals were to facilitate an American withdrawal, then retake control of the country.
However, the bombing and subsequent battle in Baghdad over the next year taught them that the Shiite militias were, in fact, far more powerful than they had predicted. This was facilitated by the fact that, prior to Samarra, the Shiite militias' function had been primarily defensive. After the bombing, Shiite militias successfully cleansed Baghdad of Sunni populations.
At the time, most Americans viewed the yearlong battle in Baghdad as a catastrophe. And, Biddle notes, it was, in humanitarian terms. Neither US ground forces nor the Iraqi Army was able to intervene in the struggle. Both opted to stay largely on the sidelines. But, as a consequence, the Sunni insurgency realized that if the Americans withdrew, Shiite forces alone could defeat them.
Biddle believes that in 5-10 years, when historians look back upon the Iraq War, they will see the "Battle of Baghdad" as a turning point.
2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq brutality to Sunni coreligionists
The second key shift came as a consequence of the defeat of Sunni insurgents by Shiite militias. Al-Qaeda has dealt harshly with its own allies, often providing severed heads of the children of Sunni leaders viewed to be less than enthusiastic in their support of the insurgency. The Sunni population had tolerated such brutality because their only alternative had been to face Shiite death squads.
This calculus changed after the Battle of Baghdad. Even with Al-Qaeda's help, Sunni insurgents were unable to prevent the Shiite takeover of Baghdad. The calculus that had supported the alliance had changed - in Biddle's words, it had become "all pain and no gain".
At this point, Sunni leaders began approaching US forces and attempted to broker a deal. They offered a cease-fire, in which Sunni forces would not engage US forces, Iraqi army, or other Sunni groups. (Biddle rather conspicuously left out Shiite militias; I assume that the agreement permitted self-defense against Shiite forces.) Furthermore, Sunni leaders would provide biometrics (fingerprints) and a contact list of their armed members and the names of their family. In return, the US provided identifying uniforms (polo shirts, baseball caps, chinos) to help identify non-hostile Sunni forces, recognized the Sunni forces as legitimate police authorities over their current zone of control, and provided a payment of $300 per month, per person. Contrary to some reports, they received no ammunition or armaments - as Biddle dryly pointed out, the insurgency hadn't had a problem with procuring ammunition and arms when it was firing at US forces over the last few years.
Consequently, by mid-2007, the Sunni insurgency had largely died out.
3. "The Surge"
Biddle points out that the negotiated settlements with Sunni leaders depended upon the Surge. The additional US forces helped were not sufficient to guarantee security to the nation as a whole - what they were able to do was provide security in regions where the Sunnis had negotiated cease-fires. With these new allies, Al-Qaeda lost the "cover and concealment" that is needed by any insurgency. Sunni allied forces, often referred to as the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq, provided the locations of Al-Qaeda safehouses and bomb-making factories, as well as a list of leadership and operatives.
Al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had facilitated the rise of Shiite militias. These militias, including Jaish al Mahdi, realized that the Shiite population was completely dependent upon them for security. Consequently, the militias began assuming control over necessities and commodities (such as cooking oil) and profiting at the expense of local Shia. Increasingly, they were viewed as predators, not protectors, though the relationship was deemed, as in the Sunni case, as a necessary evil.
The Surge corresponded with the declining popularity of the Jaish al Mahdi, and thus changed the calculus for Shiite militias. In the prior two engagements with US forces, the Shiite militias had met heavy losses. However, the popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders guaranteed that they would be able to make good their losses. But their eroded support, combined with increased US Army presence, caused many Shiite militias to negotiate a cease-fire.
Consequently, in autumn of 2007, the Sunni and Shiite militias had negotiated peace. Al-Qaeda and the remaining Sunni insurgency had retreated to a few areas in Mosul and its environs.
This change precipitated an interesting development in March/April 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Army took the fight to the Jaish al Mahdi in Basra. Ultimately - though only with the support of US and British forces - they were able to defeat al-Sadr's forces in Basra.
*****
Biddle notes that Iraq remains in the grip of an ethnosectarian civil war. Two prerequisites are needed for a sustained reduction in violence:
1. Cease fire participants continue to see peace as in their own self-interest
2. The presence of an outside peacekeeper that locals trust.
Biddle feels that #1 has already been achieved through over 200 negotiated cease-fires with various insurgent groups/militias. As he notes, many of these take the form of explicit contracts.
However, #2 remains a tricky issue. Neither Sunnis nor Shia trust the other with weapons, and both remain fully armed. Right now, the only possible outside force that can serve as effective peacekeepers trusted by each side is the US Army.
This brought the talk to the issue of troop withdrawal and counts. Biddle underlined his assessment that early drawdown would be dangerous - as noted in his 2007 talk, he felt that it could lead to a civil/regional war. He felt US forces needed to remain through two critical events in Iraq:
1. Provincial elections (2008)
2. National parliamentary elections (2009)
Biddle anticipates that both would be targeted for violent disruption, and had the potential to spark renewed conflict, depending upon the results.
The Balkans was held up as an example of what the United States should expect regarding its future commitment - a few years of sustained peacekeeping and stability, followed by a gradual reduction to half the existing force. Biddle suggests that a detailed Pentagon study would be needed to assess what forces are needed - but to provide an idea, Biddle recommends that about 100,000 (plus or minus a couple brigades) would be needed. If Iraq remained largely stable through provincial and national elections, then the United States could expect to reduce its forces by about 50% from 2010-2012.
On Afghanistan:
Biddle disagrees with Obama's emphasis that Afghanistan is the central front on the War on Terror, for two reasons:
First, Iraq is substantially more volatile. He notes that Afghanistan is currently under-resourced. (He quotes a figure of 10-15%, which he seemed to indicate should not be taken too seriously.) However, he felt that while things are getting worse, they would get incrementally worse over the course of 2-3 (maybe even 4!) years without running the risk of catastrophe. On the other hand, Iraq's stability is less certain, with the possibility, given a triggering event, of returning to high levels of violence over a matter of weeks.
Second, US interests in Iraq are more critical than its interests in Afghanistan, since Iraq is adjacent to the chief oil-producing nations in the Middle East. At present, Al-Qaeda has a significant presence in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan - it is currently headquartered in western Pakistan. However, Biddle believes if bin Laden were to choose which of the two countries he would rather have as a headquarters, he would probably choose Iraq because of its greater potential instability and resources.
He concludes with a clear call for an Iraq first strategy, akin to the Europe-first strategy that was outlined (though not always followed) in World War II.
I'll fill in Q&A a bit later - it was fairly extensive.
Q1: Where do the militias get their money?
A1: The Shiite militias get a lot of their money from Iran. The Sunnis get money from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Biddle also notes that a lot of money acquired by Ba'athists while Saddam Hussein was in power left the country. [NB: I don't think he mentioned when] Much of that money is returning to Iraq now. Critically, Iraq's own oil revenue helps the insurgency to be financed from internal resources.
Q2: What is your prediction for the configuration of US forces in the Middle East around 2010?
A2: Biddle focused on what he would like to see. He envisions 100,000 ground troops in 10-12 combat brigades. Some would be distributed among Iraqi army, and others doing peacekeeping. The key is to have American forces in sufficient numbers such that their presence is known and available, should fighting flare up. Currently, a lot of the American ground forces have shifted from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping (e.g. helping local law enforcement/militas track down violators of cease-fires using forensics).
Q3: My experience in Pakistan causes me to believe that it will be indefinitely unstable. Your thoughts?
A3: Biddle agrees that Pakistan is "a mess". He feels that principal-agent theory would play a prominent role in analyzing the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan is already waging a counterinsurgency war within its borders, especially in the West. He said that Pakistan deserved its own talk, and would defer to a Pakistan specialist.
Q4: Jonathan Kirschner pointed out that Biddle's talk a year ago claimed that either extreme (immediate withdrawal or continued, indefinite presence) would be preferable to a slow drawdown (a "middle road"). This year, it sounds like Biddle is actually advocating a "middle road" toward withdrawal. He also offered a realist take on Iraq: the issue is not security or confidence-building, but simply that the interests of the players are fundamentally different and irreconcilable. Wouldn't a withdrawal timetable just lead to the respective parties backward inducting and shifting their plans to incorporate the withdrawal date? Furthermore, you assume that the US peacekeeping effort will go through successfully - even if it did, mistakes might be made that would lead to renewed conflict.
A4: Biddle first noted, with humor, that he was happy realists were alive and well at Cornell. He feels, however, that currently it's in everyone's interest to cooperate. The key is to use the Balkans model of continued presence and a shift to peacekeeping to make sure it continues in everyone's interest to adhere to the 200 or so individual cease-fire agreements that have been negotiated.
Q5: How do you anticipate that your plan, McCain's plan, and Obama's plan would be affected by troop fatigue?
A5: The current level of 15 brigades (140,000 troops) is unsustainable.
One of the problems is that the current level may exist, in part, as a negotiation tactic by the current administration to make sure that troop levels aren't drawn down significantly below the minimum needed to maintain stability. (In his words, the administration would probably draw down to about 12 brigades today if they were certain that Obama wouldn't cut the force to 5 brigades upon taking office.)
Biddle feels that a political solution would be to work out a deal by which Bush and, say, an Obama administration would each help with the drawdown.
Q6: How would this assessment change if Israel attacked the Iran nuclear program?
A6: Biddle thinks this would be a huge disaster to American interests. However, he felt that America could prevent an Israeli raid. Israel would likely need to use Iraqi airspace in order to launch a strike. If the US were to withhold the IFF codes, it's possible that the Israelis would not want to run the risk of either crossing their powerful ally, or, barring that, being shot down by American anti-aircraft defenses.
Biddle says that very senior members of the administration have confirmed that the administration does not want a war with Iran. According to them, they have to pretend that military options are on the table to negotiate with a stronger hand to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. They also note that it may be perceived to be an empty threat, because of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In response to a comment that Dick Cheney might decide we should go to war: "Dick Cheney might pull a gun in the Oval Office and get a war in Iran. Life is probabilistic." (Biddle said "Life is probabilistic" a couple times in his talk, to underline that weird things happen that good theorists might not be able to predict or anticipate.)
The Israelis are another matter - they will definitely seek to attack Iran if it does not give up its nuclear ambitions.
Q7: Could you respond to Prime Minister al-Maliki's comments that indicated support for Obama's plan for withdrawal of US forces?
A7: Biddle believes that this is primarily driven by Iraqi domestic politics. He notes a couple key trends:
(1) Incumbents in Iraq are tremendously unpopular.
(2) Even though the al-Mahdi army and insurgent groups may be less popular then they are now, they are still considerably more popular than incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that they will increase their political representation in the upcoming provincial elections.
(3) The Sunnis will also increase their representation, especially in the form of political alignments built around the Sons of Iraq (note: the Sunnis largely boycotted the last election.)
According to Biddle, al-Maliki does not have a political base. He is Prime Minister because he was "everyone's second choice and no one's tenth choice."
Al-Maliki sees an opportunity to position himself as a Shiite nationalist - he can do this by pushing for a withdrawal of American troops.
Predictably, most Iraqi politicians do not want a withdrawal but will not say so publicly. More interestingly, most of the Iraqi people also do not want a withdrawal, but also blame American troops for a lot of the country's problems.
Anti-American rhetoric had been tolerated by the United States as being politically necessary for Iraqi politicians to campaign successfully. However, since the political debate has bid itself up such that withdrawal is a necessary plank in any candidate's platform, it will be difficult to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits US forces to legitimately remain in the country. However, Biddle thinks there will be a solution - possibly depending on some formula that provides enough flexibility for sufficient ground forces to remain in the country.
Q8: How long can we permit Afghanistan to deteriorate?
A8: Biddle feels that the condition in Afghanistan is not nearly as critical as that in Iraq. This is primarily because of the weakness of support for the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the enemy depends heavily upon ideology and not very much on ethnicity. Furthermore, the Taliban's ideology is itself unpopular with the majority. In Iraq, on the other hand, the prime driver for insurgents is ethnic, not ideological. He reiterated that Afghanistan is under-resourced, and will grow consistently - though steadily - worse, with a crisis occurring in 2-4 years if no additional forces are deployed.
Q9: Is it reasonable to envision UN forces in Iraq?
A9: Yes, but it will take a couple of years. Unlike in most countries, the UN is not very popular (because of the sanctions), and would not be welcomed any more than American troops.
Q10: Where in the world is Moqtada al-Sadr?
A10: He is apparently in Iran studying to be an ayatollah. Biddle claims that he wants to be the new al-Sistani. He is also establishing offices in Europe.
His policies are viewed as inconsistent with the needs and desires of his core constituency - poor Shiites - who seek basic access to necessities and jobs more than global revolution. His eroding political position has made Maliki think he can claim poor Shiites as his political base.
Q11: What could happen domestically that would convince America that your plan is correct? Alternatively, what could happen that would make your plan of 100,000 troops until 2012 impossible?
A11: It's important for negotiations about peacekeeping through 2012 to be distinct from the idea of permanent war. As Biddle pointed out, the Democratic party has been supportive of peacekeeping in the past. He maintains that it is important to recognize that whatever errors were made going into the war, it would be a gross national error to withdraw prematurely and leave an unstable Iraq, where a civil war would extend to a regional war, engulfing most of the oil-producing Middle East.
Epilogue:
Dr. Stephen Biddle is an incredibly impressive person - he's one of the most solid scholars I've met. At Cornell, I've had the privilege of listening to a number of distinguished public figures and academics discuss world affairs. But unlike some of them (Frank Fukuyama comes to mind - not that I'm picking on him), Stephen has a solid delivery, a clear logical structure, and a way of covering just about all the bases in an hour address. Though I've never heard or read any of George Marshall's speeches during World War II, I have heard that a large part of the general's distinctiveness was his ability to think widely and deeply, and articulate that thought in a distilled, concise manner. This is the impression I got today.
I'm also happy to report that, unlike when I greeted General Zinni with a half-chewed Nutter Butter in my mouth, I was able to comport myself with (relative) dignity in this gathering.
As additional evidence of Biddle's solid memory, he remembered that I had sent him an email and given him some astronomy pictures for his daughter, Anna. With a mind like that working on Iraq, I'm sleeping a bit more easily. :)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)