Dr. T. V. Paul,
Thank you for an interesting and enlightening talk. I have had a bit of time to digest your talk, and want to share my thoughts on the two aspects of reputation that were brought up: deterrence and non-use. Granted, I'm not a political scientist and have little formal training - please bear with me as I articulate my thoughts.
My comments are organized along the following points:
1. Reputational benefits for non-use and deterrence, while in principle coming at the expense of each other, both depend upon the potential for actual use.
Reputation from both non-use and deterrence both stem from one fundamental assumption: that the weapons could credibly be used. Without the credible potential for use, a nation gains no reputational advantage for not using them. Only by being in a position of strength is nonagression seen as a benevolent action. A state gains no positive reputation unless (1) the weapons could be used, (2) the state might incur some tactical or strategic disadvantage from their nonuse, (3) the potential target or third parties recognize both (1) and (2).
2. I assume that the credible use of nuclear weapons by any of the major nation-states has decreased with time, especially after the end of the Cold War.
The reasons for this are many - the decrease in great powers defining the conflict with other powers in existential terms; increased interdependence for economic growth, increasingly seen as a good in its own right and a source of legitimacy and power for ruling elites; and, not the least among these, the acceptance of non-use as a norm. It is possible that the diminished perceived possiblity of the use of nuclear weapons by the US or the other four major nuclear states comes from a qualitative change in the international system, where actual dominance over another nation's land, resources, and people occurs in the economic sphere.
Alternatively, perhaps because of the issues associated with the passage of time that Judith Reppy and others brought up at your talk, the credible use of nuclear weapons may have diminished with time. I have read Hiroshima; my family is from the area, and have a fair idea of the physics and material substance of a nuclear weapon. However, it is very, very hard for me - perhaps because I was born in 1983 - to imagine the use of nuclear weapons by anyone other than a rogue state/terrorist organization. While at some level this is a good thing - it reflects the strength of the norm, or at least the image of a norm, it does lead to problems, which takes me to point 3.
3. With diminished credibility of the threat comes a decrease both in their deterrence value and in the reputation for non-use.
A difference may exist between non-use against other nuclear powers, non-use against non-nuclear powers, and non-use against non-state actors. I believe you mentioned this in your talk, and would love to hear more about this.
4. Instead of strengthening the norm of non-use, the diminished credibility leads to a decrease in relevance of nuclear weapons.
In particular, the reputational benefit nuclear weapons provide, either deterrence or non-use, is diminished. By contrast, the opportunity cost of continuing to fund nuclear weapons development and maintenance instead of other areas of potential investment has increased because of increased opportunities to invest outside of one's national borders.
5. To restore the relevance of nuclear weapons as a tool of policy, the US could modify its nuclear arsenal to increase the credibility of the nuclear threat to uncooperative nations.
The most obvious way of doing this is to lower the yield. Though conventional weapons have equivalent yields, nuclear weapons will still remain a distinctive threat precisely because of the remaining differences in the material (specifically, radiation) and constructed (historical legacy, images of radiation) natures of the bomb.
6. Scientists, elements of the Pentagon, and perhaps elements of other branches in American government may acceede to such a policy for distinct reasons, but which converge upon a policy of a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon:
Scientists
a. assumption that the norm will not be violated gives scientists a clear moral conscience
b. need to redefine institutional and professional relevance of nuclear stockpile and associated workforce after end of Cold War
c. absence of alternative work opportunities (in the short-term), pending commitment in money and policy to an energy policy incorporating a heavy investment in nuclear energy
Department of Defense
a. restore credibility of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence
b. institutional desire to retain budgets and priority for programs
Other Branches
a. a credible nuclear deterrent is seen as a low-cost alternative to a conventional buildup (rationale probably originates from Eisenhower's desire to balance budgets while maintaining an effective counterweight to Soviet expansionism)
b. nuclear weapons (and advanced technology in general) is easier to sell to the American public than an increase in the number of people in the armed services
Aside:
One of the interesting features of the behavioral economics course I am taking is the concrete experimental evidence that losses are felt more strongly than gains by individuals. Generalizing from the micro to macro picture, it's possible not only to say that an institution/group will defend strongly its existing resources/budgets, but that it will do so even when faced with alternatives that may in fact be slightly more beneficial. What is true for money is definitely true for work experience and training, one thing that I hope US workforce retraining initiatives take into account. (I was inspired by this when thinking about the personal difficulty I am having leaving research science for a career in policy.)
Other notes:
Attitudes to the use of nuclear weapons may differ between the military and civilians, but is far from definite and may fall along defense/diplomacy lines (i.e., State department officials may have more in common with a Sec State who happens to be a general than other civilians in the DoD). Interesting case studies would include individuals who had served in both miliitary and civilian capacities (George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Colin Powell). It might be interesting to consult the literature on whether there is a difference between the uniformed individuals who serve as elected officials versus those appointed to civilian posts. Also, is there a selection effect - are the "right" generals more likely to be selected for civilian office?
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Historical aside:
A good illustration in the distinct personalities that exist within the military would be the contrast drawn between MacArthur and Eisenhower. There is a particularly vivid image of this, highlighted by Mark Perry in "Partners in Command", in which MacArthur's callous use of force and image of a commander surveying the battlefield is contrasted with Eisenhower's resigned, somber expression during the use of military
force against the "Bonus Army" of WWI veterans in the late Hoover administration. (image at http://images.encarta.msn.com/xrefmedia/sharemed/targets/images/pho/t029/t029187a.jpg) Perry writes: "But the difference between the two was obvious for all who saw them at Anacostia Flats: 'There is MacArthur in full regalia, complete with several decks of ribbons, looking sternly upon the 'battlefield,; with the look of eagles in his eyes,' a reporter later reflected. 'Next to him is Ike, dressed in a regular unadorned uniform. If you take a close look at the expression on Eisenhower's face, you realize it is one of cold, caustic contempt. This is the closed Eisenhower, who later observed he had learned acting from MacArthur." (Perry, 48)
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Best of luck. I hope these comments have proven worth your time reading.
Cheers,
Ryan
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