Dear Najet

As a grad student, I was pretty miserable. I  felt trapped on a path that seemed increasingly divergent from my interests and for which I felt increasingly unprepared and ill-equipped.

But if I am honest, there were bright moments. Najet was one of them.

She knocked on my apartment door. Evidently she had just moved in and was unfamiliar how the shower worked. I helped her with that, and took her grocery shopping. She cooked me a delicious meal, a curry I think, though to be honest I wasn't paying so much attention to the food. It was then that she told me that she had a boyfriend in France.

Still, we spent many months going out to eat, talking occasionally on the phone. By all external appearances, we probably seemed a couple to most people. We laughed, though internally I wept.

Then she broke up with Kader. After ten years, it was over.

In the months preceding the breakup, I remember talking with her several times. The relationship was never ideal. Sometimes she cried. I held her hand, and sometimes held her in my arms. I was a good friend.

I had learned a bad habit over the years. To deal with heartache and fear, I tended to rationalize why a relationship couldn't work out before it even started. It had taken many forms over the years.

"It's bad if we're both only children."

"I shouldn't fall for people in the same field."

"I'm a replacement for another Asian ex, and not valued in myself."

"I'm too young."

"I'm too old."

And always, in the background, my mind hissed:

"I will end up like my father. I must protect her from the horrible fate of having a mentally ill partner."

It was easy in Najet's case. Cultural difference (she was French Moroccan), religious difference (she was Muslim), and professional uncertainty (she was on a postdoc, and would leave within a year). I was also a mess at the time.

But I was a good friend. And because I was a good friend, I didn't seize upon her breakup.

And a week later, she had met someone else. Khalid. Online. In France.

We talked a bit of politics. But mostly it was about life. About relationships and family and academia and how many chickens she had killed as a virologist and whether life was out there in the universe.

Like all cases of heartache, I thought I would never get over her. But I did. We drifted apart. She moved to Germany. I moved to Maryland, and then back home. We haven't spoken in five years.

Did she ever know that I loved her? Or that I felt what I thought was love? It's hard to say. She might've known. Or maybe it's easier to believe in a less complicated friendship. Maybe I lacked the words -- or the right connection between words and feelings, in any language.

It's not just the Paris attacks that brought her to mind. I met up with Marc, a fellow grad student, on Monday. Marc speaks French. I remember when they met at a party, he and Najet were able to converse effortlessly . It speaks to my humanity, and I smile at it now. But how jealous I was at that moment! Even though I knew Marc was happily in a relationship with someone else, and in fact Najet, though less happily, was attached to one of the K boys at that time. Even though I had given up hope or ambition, still, I was in that moment, so profoundly human.

For that moment, and for all the others, I am grateful.

And so I think about her now. She is French, and spent many years in Paris, and so is in mourning. She is Muslim, and so is afraid perhaps of what is to come. I fear for her, too. I mourn with her, too.

And so this is what I think of when I think of Paris. I spent a week there, alone and somewhat depressed, in 2005. The city itself has no sentimental hold on me. But the people, I miss.

I worked with a postdoc, Frantz from France. He was seven feet tall. His wife might've been under five feet. He was so kind; even as my world and my mind was falling apart, he always treated me kindly and as a valued colleague. We talked about family, about the future. Though perhaps more than either me or Najet, he had a greater sense of calm and certainty. Maybe that came from aikido. Maybe it came from his own wisdom.

I remember one of the last times I went into the department, I heard his deep bass voice shout, "Ryan!" I didn't turn around; I was so depressed and lost at that time I felt numb. But I wish I had, and wish I had told you how much you had done for me. You hadn't saved my graduate career, but you did save a piece of my humanity and self-respect. And for that I am eternally grateful.

Frantz... he is safe. He is not in Paris. And he is not Arab. He is Safe. But Najet...

I have met other French citizens over the years. But those two loom largest. And so I can't grieve for Paris. I grieve for them. For their way of life, and what they love, and hate, and love to hate about their nation was attacked. And both the best and the worst of humanity will emerge from this. I grieve for them because I love them.

That will have to be enough.

Frantz -- I hope you are still mentoring and teaching, and doing amazing things with light that the French seem to own so well. Fresnel, Fourier, Fizeau, and Frantz. :)

And Najet -- bisou.

Doing something

I do not intend for the previous post to be nothing but self-indulgent emoting. I've been thinking a lot about what I can do.

In the discussions about what to do with any of the migration and humanitarian issues of the day, I've seen lots of criticism that we must look to our own citizens first. I've also seen critiques of aid agencies as being corrupt, or concerns about moral hazard exacerbating the power of smugglers and criminal elements, or -- in my view -- less rational arguments about racial or religious purity, terrorism, and claims that "we shouldn't have to do more if country/group X isn't doing anything".

I find all of them inadequate. Some may be grounded in a speck of truth. But I believe that ultimately, we as individuals shape our values and destinies by our actions and inactions.

I know that not everyone feels equally able, or equally responsible. The discussions tend to focus on one extreme or another, all-or-nothing views of service and duty.

I know, in my heart of hearts, that even images of drowned children will not cause me to part with everything I have, with the life I am building here. Nor, perhaps, should it. Philosophically, intellectually, and perhaps even at a bare emotional level, I do feel that our first duty is to our own citizens.

But it is not our only duty. And all-or-nothing thinking tends to rationalize inaction on all fronts.

So I've decided to be a bit more systematic, to explore and define where that line lies with me. It's potentially shameful how little I might find myself willing to do, but by looking for that line, and choosing to go up to that line, I'll do more. And that might have to be enough.

Direct Involvement:
Volunteering in Syria for at least a year
Volunteering in Syria for any amount of time
Volunteering in Turkey/Egypt/Jordan for at least a year
Volunteering in Turkey/Egypt/Jordan for any amount of time
Volunteering in the EU for at least a year
Volunteering in the EU for any amount of time
Volunteering at a local NGO for at least a year
Volunteering at a local NGO for at least 4 hours a week.
Volunteering at a local NGO for less than 4 hours a week.
Searching for a local NGO involved in relief efforts

That's all I feel capable of doing for now. It's depressingly low on the list, but it's more than I would do otherwise.

Financial:Donate life savings to an appropriate nonprofit
Donate $5,000
Donate $2,000
Donate $1,000
Donate $500
Donate $250
Donate $100
Donate $50
Donate $20
Donate $10
Donate $5
Donate nothing

I had Donate $500 highlighted for a good minute. But I struggled, and caved in to a lower amount. I'm not proud of that. It's been a good year for me. But it's more than I would do otherwise. I think I'll donate it to Doctors Without Borders -- they appear to be working at train stations directly, which seems like a good place for the money to work.

Now what about Americans? Don't I have an obligation to people here? Absolutely.

Direct Involvement:
Volunteer for more than 10 hours a week
Volunteer for 5-10 hours a week
Volunteer for less than 5 hours a week.
Look into volunteer opportunities.
Don't volunteer.

It's not a lot. I don't know how I found more time to volunteer at Mudd and carry a full courseload. Maybe I'm underestimating how much unpaid work I do. Maybe I am rationalizing my laziness. But I'm willing to cut out some Youtube and Wikipedia time to do so.

Now, what specific volunteering action should I take? I've long wanted to tutor children in shelters. I'm not sure if it's the best approach, given the limitations on shelter stay -- perhaps a long-term tutoring commitment at a local library or school is more important. But maybe I'm focused too much on my current skills/job. Brush clearance and trail cleanup might be a better option, though I think food pantry work would be more important.

Financial Involvement, Domestic:Donate life savings to an appropriate nonprofit
Donate $5,000
Donate $2,000
Donate $1,000
Donate $500
Donate $250
Donate $100
Donate $50
Donate $20
Donate $10
Donate $5
Donate nothing

$100 to the Inland Valley Hope Partners. Done. Sorry Bernie, but I'll give you something later.

Now, psychological research says that saying you're going to do something makes it less likely that you'll actually do it. To avoid that, I've submitted the donations before I posted this.

***

Look, I didn't do this to be a goddamn Pharisee about the thing. I don't think I did much. But again, I did more than I would've done otherwise. I had to grapple with just how little I was willing to do, but I made sure to do that.

It's important to really not give in to helplessness and figure out what exactly you will do. Not what you can do, but what you will do. And then do it. It's humbling, but it's necessary. It's perhaps not optimal, but what is in this life?

Make a spreadsheet. Conduct a more rigorous audit of your nonprofits. By all means conduct a more nuanced budget, building in persistent support instead of one-time gifts. But whatever you do, do something. Our values are reflected in both our actions and our lack of action.

Remember: you have something to give this world. Those who are most bitter, who are most angry -- they are the ones who feel the world owes them something, who feel, in their heart of hearts, too vulnerable to say, "I am of value, I have value to offer, and I give it with the confidence that, after I have given, I will be elevated, not diminished, as a human being." I know this because I struggle with it as well.

You do have value. Within my calculations of distant offerings, I am mindful of my need to also look nearer, and embrace you. I am rediscovering my better nature, and so I hope it will be manifest in my friendships, too.

Sorry for my long, lonely absence. I'm back. After a long, long journey, I'm back.

The Drowned Boy

Once upon a time, there was a father, a wood carver, who lived alone with a cat and a fish. He carved a wooden puppet of a boy and named it Pinocchio. He sighed and dreamed about what it would be like if he had a real son. That night, a fairy godmother, hearing the father's prayers, and recognizing him as a good man, gave life to the wooden boy, and enlisted a vagabond cricket to serve as his conscience and guide. She promises that if he proves himself "brave, truthful, and unselfish", she will transform Pinocchio into a real boy.

The father, upon waking, couldn't believe his eyes. He rejoiced and celebrated. He sent Pinocchio to school, with the cricket following. But Pinocchio was tricked by bad men, kidnapped and enslaved, and forced to perform as a stringless marionette to enrich his enslaver. He escaped with the help of his fairy godmother, who forgives his lies. But then was convinced by the same bad men to take a boat to Pleasure Island, where he indulged in vice and began transforming into an ass. He escapes, and flees toward home.

When he returns home, he finds that his father has gone looking for him, and was now trapped in a whale named Monstro. Pinocchio goes in search of him, but also becomes trapped. With his father, he hatches a plan to escape. They escape, but Pinocchio is found in shallow water, face down, dead.

He is mourned and honored for his sacrifice, but his fairy godmother, honoring his fulfillment of her command to be brave, truthful, and unselfish, restores him to life as a real boy.

By now, you have probably seen the images of the body of Aylan Kurdi, the three-year old boy who drowned off the coast of Turkey.

I've been thinking a lot about him. My grandmother died the same day, and yet I find myself mourning this unknown boy, not the mother of my father. This image, of a boy, face-down, in shallow water, is heartbreaking.

It's probably offensive to connect a real tragedy with a Disney story.

But is it so off the mark? 

Didn't his father celebrate when he was born? 

Weren't his attempts to explore the world or go to school cut short by evil men? 

Didn't he have to leave home, and, with his father, escape certain death of one type, only to meet it in the sea?

And finally, most shamefully:

If we are honest with ourselves, wasn't he not quite a real boy to us, not real at all, a construction, an idea, an abstraction -- was this boy not a real boy to us, until he washed up on a beach? 

Is he real enough now?

The Red Line: US jobs programs do not cover Binyamin Netanyahu

Despite claims to the contrary, Netanyahu is directly injecting himself into the US elections. He enjoys a closer relationship with Mitt Romney, and probably would be happier with a Romney victory. But regardless of his specific preference in the US Presidential election, he correctly senses that this US election gives him the maximum amount of influence, and is using it to push a more hawkish and explicit plan of attack against Iran's nuclear program.

Netanyahu is right about one thing - there is a red line approaching. But it's not the point of no return for Iran's nuclear weapons program. It is the point at which it becomes politically possible in the United States to question the nature and depth of the partnership with Israel.

I'm not exactly a dove regarding Iran. In the past I have tried summarizing the history of Iran's nuclear program with an addendum, and also considered a grim trigger strategy for Iran (and vented a bit about Netanyahu's rudeness at that time).

I don't think King Abdullah II of Jordan was correct during his extended Daily Show interview that Iranian nuclear ambitions would be curbed once the Israelis and Palestinians reached a peace settlement. It would help - Arab leaders could bring to bear pressure against Iran with less domestic political risk. But I don't think the most die-hard optimist thinks that is even possible, much less probable, before Iran develops a nuclear weapon.

But there's a difference between developing plans for surgical strikes and committing to them publicly. The former can meet the national security requirements of Israel. The latter meets the political requirements of the Israeli government in general, and Netanyahu in particular.

Some voices in Israel realize that Netanyahu may be putting the relationship between Israel and the US, undermining the long-term security of the latter. (Sadly, I was unable to find a free version of the full text of the Haaretz opinion piece - if anyone finds it, it will be much appreciated.)

But I think Netanyahu has already been demanding and rude on many occasions in the past - remember VP Joe Biden's visit to Israel, during which the government just happened to unveil plans for new settlements?

Sometimes I wish I understood more about Israeli domestic politics. It would give me a handle on whether Netanyahu represents mainstream thought (which I doubt), and to what extent the Iranian threat is seen as both imminent and existential (more interesting, and possibly mainstream). So maybe Netanyahu is responding to his constituency.

Or, maybe he's also playing domestic politics and is pursuing policies, and pursuing them in a way, that will help Likud, and by extension, himself. Last time I checked, Likud is the party of the right -- it sure sounds like it under Netanyahu.

Look, the United States is Israel's most powerful and most loyal ally, to the point where I think it has significantly hurt American interests. So it is seen as our job to ensure the safety of our ally. But it is not our job to make sure Netanyahu has a job. That's his. As he's been part of the Israeli government for an awful long time, he must be somewhat good at that, at least.

Israel prides itself on being the only democracy in the Middle East. Putting aside challenges to that, that means the Israeli people are responsible for his persistence in politics. Like it or not, leaders in democracies are mirrors of us. We had George W. Bush for eight years, and rightly had our balls busted on that one. Israel has a parliamentary government, and can change leadership somewhat more frequently than we can, should they desire.

So I can thus infer that Israel has a sizable population that really is jingoistic and feels entitled to US protection.

Someone, please remind me why we're allies again.



PS: this graphic was a poor choice.

If the issue really is as serious and imminent as is claimed, why use such a crappy, ridiculous graphic? Who is Netanyahu's communications director?

In his defense, an extensive search of the Internets reveal that this isn't a Wile E. Coyote bomb. The closest he comes is his trademark Acme rocket.

Here's hoping the Iranian weapons delivery systems prove equally defective.

For M, an old friend

Once, long ago, when the world was young and I was happy, well before 9/11, I had a friend. I'll call him M for this post.

M was a friend of mine since at least third grade, and perhaps earlier. But we were pretty close, at least as close as I was to anyone. We'd play stupid games at recess, and his sense of humor always made me laugh.

I knew M was Egyptian, and, if I thought about it at all, I assumed he was a Muslim. (I learned about Islam -or at least a brief history and a bit about the Five Pillars - in 7th grade history class.) But at some point he told me he was a Coptic Christian. I didn't really know what that meant at the time, and to some extent, I really don't know now.

M had pretty extreme conservative views, and I didn't know why. I assumed it was because he came from a fairly well-off family. His father was a nuclear engineer. But with his humor, there was a bitterness, and an anger.

At some point, he told me why. A number of his relatives, including some uncles, had been killed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

As a result, he carried a strong hatred of Islam. I still didn't quite know what that meant - I had no similar experiences, and I was too naive or stupid to really probe and asked him how he reconciled an Arab identity that has become tied to Islam.

We didn't really talk after high school; I saw him once at a BBQ just after college, and found out he was studying political science.

I didn't really think of him much in the following years, not even when the Arab Spring came to Egypt. But after the news identified the alleged filmmaker of the recent anti-Islam Youtube movie as a Coptic Christian, I started thinking about M. I remembered his anger, and could imagine that he would sympathize with, or actively promote, such a movie.

But I also hope that he and that his family is safe. I remember an image of Christians linking arms to protect Muslims praying in or near Tahrir Square. But memory of unity is fleeting, and Coptic Christians are now in greater danger.

I loathe the idea that a fool could make a movie, knowing full well the possible consequences. But the whole point of this ongoing tragedy is that a few individuals do not represent a faith, or a culture. Not for Coptic Christians. Not for Muslims. And not for Americans.

M, hope you're well. Politically, we're probably pretty far apart - perhaps to the point that friendship is nearly impossible. But I miss the times we had in grade school, and the jokes we'd exchange in econ class.

A Grim Trigger Strategy for Israel and Iran

One of the blessings of being an unknown, unimportant voice in the blogosphere is that my opinion matters so little, even to my own family and friends, that I can make a statement without fear of retribution or consequences. I do not expect those in power or responsibility or reputations worth defending to speak as plainly as I intend to now. But, one vainly hopes that plain words can, indirectly, promote reevaluation among those who do not have the luxury of that personal indulgence.

In an era of more limited resources and domestic inflexibility, American foreign policy may need to clarify its interests and reevaluate any commitments in which neither interests nor values are served.

For these reasons, I suggest two "grim trigger" strategies to modify existing American policy:

1. An ultimatum to Iran to suspend its entire nuclear program and submit to IAEA inspections within nine months, or face military reprisals.

2. A clear statement to Israel that if they attack unilaterally, all aid will be immediately suspended.

Iran:

Iran has demonstrated its inability to cooperate within the guidelines of the global community. Perhaps even more tragically, it has brutally demonstrated that reasonable voices of dissent are both unwelcome and powerless within the Iranian state. No one should wish ill upon the people of Iran for the folly of their leadership. But we also must recognize the limits of our power, diplomatically, economically, and militarily, to effect regime change anywhere, especially Iran.

Unfortunately, this means that the Iranian people are largely on their own. God willing, we will not attempt  nation-building in a country with over twice the population and four times the land area of Iraq, a nation that, religiously, linguistically, and historically, has found itself at mortal odds with most of its neighbors. Such an invasion and occupation would make the folly of Iraq look like Grenada.

At the same time, one should be pessimistic about the outcome of diplomatic efforts. Both Russia and China are not subject to the rules of either liberal democracy or a self-identity founded upon liberalism. Russia, in particular, has demonstrated a particularly brash willingness to support Syria to provide it strategic access to the Mediterranean. Both nations, because of their geography and demography, also have a vital interest in crushing self-determination movements of any form. They are, in short, not reliable partners in containing Iran, and cannot be trusted to adhere to sanctions. I pray that our national leadership never becomes so populated with fools that we would ever trust our national security to the whims of these two international actors.

Furthermore, Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon would severely damage the power of the United States to effectively negotiate. The North Korean experience indicates that containment is possible only given the conditions of (1) powerful, proximate allies, (2) powerful, proximate adversaries who, because of their own interests, serve to restrain the regime, and (3) a weak enough technological and military capacity that major shipping lanes are not affected. The Iranian situation has none of these, leading to the conclusion that containment would be impossible, and long-term disruption of American interests inevitable, should Iran possess a nuclear weapon.

Sadly, inevitably, America is left with the option to do its best to, again, disrupt and destroy the Iranian nuclear weapons program. This means continued covert operations directed toward sabotage, which has already postponed the Iranian nuclear weapons program by at least a decade. But it will also mean an ultimatum to Iran: open up all sites to IAEA inspections and turn over nuclear refinement to an external party (Russia if necessary, but ideally someone else) by January 1, or the US will  direct strikes against Iranian nuclear installations, military as well as civilian, and associated anti-air defenses.

Israel:

That I am now reluctantly inclined to think that a strike against Iran may be necessary does not, in any way, moderate my frustration with Israel's efforts to push the issue in America. Although intended for a separate post, I have decided to address Israel in this statement as well.

 Lord Palmerston once famously said, "Nations have no permanent friends or allies. They only have permanent interests." (Nearly as famous was the requotation by Gorbachev to Thatcher, following the US-UK schism over the Falkland Islands schism).

A secret: America is not an exceptional nation. Neither is Israel. Both are subject to restrictions, natural and cultivated advantages and weaknesses, and the demands placed upon them by their respective systems of government and citizens.

Mature participants in the international community do not deny history. Nor do they use it as a shield against all criticism. They use it as a guide. The history of the United States tells us that there is danger in subordinating or confusing national interest in the name of satisfying the whims of a small, but seemingly indispensable ally, whether in the heart of Europe or in Southeast Asia.

The arrogance of the Israeli government in general, and Netanyahu in particular, of lecturing America while as a guest in the United States is egregious. I do not forget the approval of new settler homes during Joe Biden's visit, an obvious slap in the face to the Obama administration's request that the settlement process be at least temporarily stayed.

The political impossibility of any mainstream political candidate suggesting anything short of unqualified support for Israel reflects, if not direct coercion of US policy by a foreign power, the subduing of American interests through a combination of self-censorship and a powerful domestic lobby. Statements such as this are typically charged as anti-Semitic, even when made by Jewish-Americans with a demonstrated centrist or right-of-center political disposition and a record favorable toward Israel. (See: Joe Klein)

American policy must make it clear that if Israel attacks Iran unilaterally, the United States will immediately stop the estimated $3 billion in annual support presently given to Israel, most of it in the form of military aid. It is an appropriate response to what I can only consider the attempt by a foreign power to draft America into a war.

That I am concluding that a strike against Iran may well be necessary does not take away from the healthy and necessary aversion to American interests and policies being so roughly pushed by an ally.

Both of these would be considered "grim trigger" strategies. They deserve the name. Yet they also do represent a strategy consistent with American interests and limitations. And what is sorely needed, perhaps more than at any time in the post-Cold War era, is a consistent strategy founded on our interests.

A final note: I recognize that, for a range of reasons, one or both of these changes may need to be made secretly, or strategically leaked. They could be linked or not. There are lots of variations. But I would argue that these two policy changes hold the promise of improving the connection between our policies and our interests.

If I have done my job, I've pissed off more people than usual - those on the left and the right. So be it - I am not above changing my mind in the face of superior reasoning or information. I am not privy to all of the information that is germane to this issue. But now, you will need to speak up.

A brief update on Iran

In a previous post, I ran through a brief history of Iran's nuclear program, its current status under international law, and touched very lightly on the economic interests of China and Russia in Iran. This update focuses more on the analysis of Iranian politics and negotiation options for stopping the nuclear weapons program.

Warning:I don't have a lot of insight into the Iranian nuclear conundrum - I'm just a curious guy trying to get a better context for the crisis.

I've been digging through a few online sources and news articles. Here are my key findings:

1. Almost everyone agrees that it's tough to make predictions about the politics of Iran. In a comparatively rare show of modesty, most of the authors/experts said that it's a pretty opaque process, with real power resting in the hands of the Supreme Council and the Revolutionary Guard, and with lesser power held by the President.

2. The recent parliamentary elections overwhelmingly favored Ayatollah Khameini's allies. This could translate into an effort to actually get rid of the presidency, and create a parliamentary edifice for the theocracy. This could be done prior to the next presidential election, scheduled for June, 2013.

3. Khameini actually issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. He reiterated this recently in a comment made late February. He also has criticized Ahmadinejad for "personalizing" the nuclear issue. On the other hand, he was probably the single person best suited to stop the nuclear program if he so desired (note that Khomeini actually did precisely that). Also noteworthy: even moderate reformers like Mousavi have stated that Iran's nuclear program is non-negotiable (although Mousavi said that it should not be used to develop nuclear weapons).

4. Ahmadinejad is actually term-limited, and can't run in 2013, barring a change in Iran's constitution. Like American presidents, his power has been on the decline. Unlike (?) American presidents, he is also handicapped by increasing friction between him and the religious leadership.

5. One expert at the Council on Foreign Relations has an interesting suggestion for the structure of negotiations - use a third-party mediator. The mediator would act as a go-between between the US (or the Permanent members of the UN Security Council+Germany, or P5+1) and Iran. This apparently was the model that worked to free the embassy hostages in Iran in 1981. In the hostage crisis case, the go-between was Algeria (possibly because they were Muslim, but also far away from both the US and Iran, and the critical interests of either party). The expert recommends Turkey for the role. Its role as a NATO member, aspiring member of the EU, and a Muslim secular* democracy helps. What may actually also help, oddly enough, is that it currently has pretty poor relations with Israel. In this case, that would help its credibility in Iranian eyes.

6. Experts are also pessimistic about the odds of a negotiated settlement prior to two major elections - the US  elections in November 2012 and the Iranian elections in June 2013. I can see how a re-elected Obama would maybe have a freer hand vis-a-vis Israel to negotiate with Iran. But I hesitate to think that the Israelis would be willing to wait that long before attempting a strike, given that the Israeli defense minister suggested in February that Iran would enter a "zone of immunity" within six months. Although this was somewhat walked back later, the timing suggests that Israel might not wait for electoral politics to settle.

7. One thing I have NOT found much material on is how Syria's civil war could affect negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. Does it strengthen the hand of those interested in isolating Iran, given that a key regional ally has its own problems? Alternatively, does it make Russia and China even more reluctant to pressure Iran, given that, especially in the case of the former, Syria's long and relatively close relationship?

8. I know next to nothing about internal Israeli politics. Given that it is a multi-party parliamentary system with a presidency that is largely ceremonial in nature, it is arguably more unstable than, say, the American political system. I'm also confused why Avigdor Lieberman is the Foreign Minister - from what I understand of his politics, it would be a bit like making Governor Jan Brewer the Secretary of State. Or John Bolton the UN ambassador. (Oh, wait, the latter actually happened.)

More seriously, this means that John McCain's comments about the need to impose a no-fly zone in Syria might in fact be counterproductive to negotiations with Iran.

What Cordoba really means to me

Olbermann's comments about Park 51:"There is no 'Ground Zero Mosque'"

Until now, I never really read much Olbermann or had reason to quote him. But he's right about this.

I can confirm, from my memories of Medieval History class, that the characterization of "Cordoba" by Newt Gingrich misses the point.

"Cordoba" is, in part, a microcosm of the history of Islam - it's bloody civil wars, its rise under relative prosperity, the stagnation that accompanies a large and diverse empire, and the collapse when the previous regime is seen as decadent, to be replaced by progressively more extreme and reactionary forms of governance. It’s a fascinating history – if nothing else, the journey of Abd ar-Rahman I, the last surviving member of the Umayyad dynasty fleeing Damascus in the face of revolt and murder and flight to Al-Andalus, as the region was known under Muslim rule, is worth reading just for its drama.

Frank Rich as a model 21st century columnist

I'm linking to Frank Rich's most recent Op-Ed piece on the dangers of escalating the war in Afghanistan ("Two Wrongs Make Another Fiasco"). But before going into the content, I wanted to highlight that Mr. Rich, perhaps better than any other Op-Ed contributor at a print publication, makes liberal use of embedded links. I find this an incredibly useful tool to those of us who read the NYTimes online.

How much of an impact is Twitter having in Iran?

This is a story about how I was caught gullible - twice.

Like everyone else who depends upon mass media for a fair amount of my news, I was a bit surprised that Twitter was arguably playing a significant role in the protests in Tehran over the recent presidential election. I mean, this is Twitter, whose model for communication opens itself up to breathtakingly easy parody, as Conan Seize-the-low-hanging-fruit O'Brien illustrates. (I love you Conebone.) Case closed... right?

Pablo Neruda, and the Election Protests in Iran

I'm not saying that Neruda is a voice that makes sense to use for the Mousavi supporters. The poem, like the situation unfolding in Tehran, is complex, and it would be dangerous to underestimate the complexity of either. So here is, what I hope, is a complex enough concatenation of these two forces that tells a story. Whose, I do not know, and all of us wait for the next chapters to be written.

The text is from "Tu Risa" ("Your Laughter") by Pablo Neruda. The photos and captions are of the election protests in Tehran, located at the Boston Globe website.

Your Laughter

All politics is local

International legitimacy matters less (or more) than you think, depending on your professional, personal, and sociohistoricultural background-induced biases.

It matters less than you think, if you think as most intellectuals do, viewing the system-wide interactions of the pilotless, rudderless international system.

Those who use Occam's razor to argue that there is no God would find a similar line of argument that concludes that belief in an "invisible hand" is likewise irrational.

Most of us don't give a flying flip about the international legitimacy. Those who care about it tremendously tend to be in self-imposed intellectual and cultural - if not physical - exile from their countrymen, depending upon some intangible and poorly quantifiable form of recognition and validation from abroad to confirm their superiority (real or imagined). It may also fend off whatever residual nationalism/tribalism that resides in the subconscious, that which whispers in the spaces of the night words like 'fifth column', 'Judas', 'Benedict Arnold', 'traitor to the race', etc.

Stephen Biddle on Iraq - CU-SWAMOS Reception, July 22, 2008

Dr. Stephen Biddle, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Iraq Study Group, addressed the CU-SWAMOS conference this evening. His speech was focused on the state of Iraq, the changes between now and the situation when he last spoke at SWAMOS, and his perspective on what it would take to stabilize the situation.

A few things before I go into what he said.

First, Dr. Biddle was much more optimistic in his assessment than in the summer of 2007, for a number of reasons apparent in his comments.

Second, unlike his talk in 2007, he did not use two stories about his experiences in Iraq to illustrate the situation in Iraq. Rather, he focused on describing the trends and changes that have taken place at the local, national, and regional level. While this may seem less personal, I felt it allowed him to go into more detail about the overall strategic situation.

Enough from me - here are my draft notes from his talk.

*****

Biddle began by pointing out that strategic objectives should define troop counts and withdrawal schedules, not the other way around. Existing political discussions frequently take a contrary approach, starting with a desired troop level and a withdrawal date, and working from there to define objectives that can be met.

His talk was divided into two main sections:
(1) the causal dynamics of the continuing counterinsurgency/peacekeeping in Iraq
(2) achievable goals

He stated clearly that the probability of achieving the chief goal - avoiding persistent, large-scale violence - had improved dramatically since the last time he spoke in 2007. (In 2007, he claimed success probability of 10%, assuming the US did everything perfectly - and this assessment caused him to claim that he was far more optimistic than most. For those at SWAMOS, yes, I've got proof that Dr. Kirschner was wrong, and Biddle was right in his memory. Sorry Jon - not picking on you.)

He did emphasize that the achievable, positive outcome was not "Eden on the Euphrates" - that is, a vibrant, stable liberal democracy. Instead, the US can hope for, at best, a decentralized state or an authoritarian government similar to that under Saddam Hussein.

*****

Biddle said that the United States had two chief war aims, one humanitarian, and the other narrowly strategic.

1. Humanitarian: avert rapid escalation of violence
2. Strategic: ensure that the war does not spread to the rest of the oil-producing Middle East.

Unlike in 2007, Biddle is optimistic about prospects for success, as defined above, in Iraq.

One of the chief reasons is that the underlying strategic landscape is different from a year ago. He mentioned that the decline in violence has not been ephemeral. It is in fact sustained by a change in the self-interested strategic calculus of the principal combatants in Iraq.

Biddle focused on three particular changes - two which the United States did not plan, one of which we would have actively prevented if we could have.

1. Bombing of the Askariyya (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra in 2006.

Prior to the bombing, the Sunni insurgency felt that it was in a superior position to Shiite forces. Consequently, their goals were to facilitate an American withdrawal, then retake control of the country.

However, the bombing and subsequent battle in Baghdad over the next year taught them that the Shiite militias were, in fact, far more powerful than they had predicted. This was facilitated by the fact that, prior to Samarra, the Shiite militias' function had been primarily defensive. After the bombing, Shiite militias successfully cleansed Baghdad of Sunni populations.

At the time, most Americans viewed the yearlong battle in Baghdad as a catastrophe. And, Biddle notes, it was, in humanitarian terms. Neither US ground forces nor the Iraqi Army was able to intervene in the struggle. Both opted to stay largely on the sidelines. But, as a consequence, the Sunni insurgency realized that if the Americans withdrew, Shiite forces alone could defeat them.

Biddle believes that in 5-10 years, when historians look back upon the Iraq War, they will see the "Battle of Baghdad" as a turning point.

2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq brutality to Sunni coreligionists

The second key shift came as a consequence of the defeat of Sunni insurgents by Shiite militias. Al-Qaeda has dealt harshly with its own allies, often providing severed heads of the children of Sunni leaders viewed to be less than enthusiastic in their support of the insurgency. The Sunni population had tolerated such brutality because their only alternative had been to face Shiite death squads.

This calculus changed after the Battle of Baghdad. Even with Al-Qaeda's help, Sunni insurgents were unable to prevent the Shiite takeover of Baghdad. The calculus that had supported the alliance had changed - in Biddle's words, it had become "all pain and no gain".

At this point, Sunni leaders began approaching US forces and attempted to broker a deal. They offered a cease-fire, in which Sunni forces would not engage US forces, Iraqi army, or other Sunni groups. (Biddle rather conspicuously left out Shiite militias; I assume that the agreement permitted self-defense against Shiite forces.) Furthermore, Sunni leaders would provide biometrics (fingerprints) and a contact list of their armed members and the names of their family. In return, the US provided identifying uniforms (polo shirts, baseball caps, chinos) to help identify non-hostile Sunni forces, recognized the Sunni forces as legitimate police authorities over their current zone of control, and provided a payment of $300 per month, per person. Contrary to some reports, they received no ammunition or armaments - as Biddle dryly pointed out, the insurgency hadn't had a problem with procuring ammunition and arms when it was firing at US forces over the last few years.

Consequently, by mid-2007, the Sunni insurgency had largely died out.

3. "The Surge"

Biddle points out that the negotiated settlements with Sunni leaders depended upon the Surge. The additional US forces helped were not sufficient to guarantee security to the nation as a whole - what they were able to do was provide security in regions where the Sunnis had negotiated cease-fires. With these new allies, Al-Qaeda lost the "cover and concealment" that is needed by any insurgency. Sunni allied forces, often referred to as the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq, provided the locations of Al-Qaeda safehouses and bomb-making factories, as well as a list of leadership and operatives.

Al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had facilitated the rise of Shiite militias. These militias, including Jaish al Mahdi, realized that the Shiite population was completely dependent upon them for security. Consequently, the militias began assuming control over necessities and commodities (such as cooking oil) and profiting at the expense of local Shia. Increasingly, they were viewed as predators, not protectors, though the relationship was deemed, as in the Sunni case, as a necessary evil.

The Surge corresponded with the declining popularity of the Jaish al Mahdi, and thus changed the calculus for Shiite militias. In the prior two engagements with US forces, the Shiite militias had met heavy losses. However, the popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders guaranteed that they would be able to make good their losses. But their eroded support, combined with increased US Army presence, caused many Shiite militias to negotiate a cease-fire.

Consequently, in autumn of 2007, the Sunni and Shiite militias had negotiated peace. Al-Qaeda and the remaining Sunni insurgency had retreated to a few areas in Mosul and its environs.

This change precipitated an interesting development in March/April 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Army took the fight to the Jaish al Mahdi in Basra. Ultimately - though only with the support of US and British forces - they were able to defeat al-Sadr's forces in Basra.

*****

Biddle notes that Iraq remains in the grip of an ethnosectarian civil war. Two prerequisites are needed for a sustained reduction in violence:

1. Cease fire participants continue to see peace as in their own self-interest
2. The presence of an outside peacekeeper that locals trust.

Biddle feels that #1 has already been achieved through over 200 negotiated cease-fires with various insurgent groups/militias. As he notes, many of these take the form of explicit contracts.

However, #2 remains a tricky issue. Neither Sunnis nor Shia trust the other with weapons, and both remain fully armed. Right now, the only possible outside force that can serve as effective peacekeepers trusted by each side is the US Army.

This brought the talk to the issue of troop withdrawal and counts. Biddle underlined his assessment that early drawdown would be dangerous - as noted in his 2007 talk, he felt that it could lead to a civil/regional war. He felt US forces needed to remain through two critical events in Iraq:

1. Provincial elections (2008)
2. National parliamentary elections (2009)

Biddle anticipates that both would be targeted for violent disruption, and had the potential to spark renewed conflict, depending upon the results.

The Balkans was held up as an example of what the United States should expect regarding its future commitment - a few years of sustained peacekeeping and stability, followed by a gradual reduction to half the existing force. Biddle suggests that a detailed Pentagon study would be needed to assess what forces are needed - but to provide an idea, Biddle recommends that about 100,000 (plus or minus a couple brigades) would be needed. If Iraq remained largely stable through provincial and national elections, then the United States could expect to reduce its forces by about 50% from 2010-2012.

On Afghanistan:

Biddle disagrees with Obama's emphasis that Afghanistan is the central front on the War on Terror, for two reasons:

First, Iraq is substantially more volatile. He notes that Afghanistan is currently under-resourced. (He quotes a figure of 10-15%, which he seemed to indicate should not be taken too seriously.) However, he felt that while things are getting worse, they would get incrementally worse over the course of 2-3 (maybe even 4!) years without running the risk of catastrophe. On the other hand, Iraq's stability is less certain, with the possibility, given a triggering event, of returning to high levels of violence over a matter of weeks.

Second, US interests in Iraq are more critical than its interests in Afghanistan, since Iraq is adjacent to the chief oil-producing nations in the Middle East. At present, Al-Qaeda has a significant presence in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan - it is currently headquartered in western Pakistan. However, Biddle believes if bin Laden were to choose which of the two countries he would rather have as a headquarters, he would probably choose Iraq because of its greater potential instability and resources.

He concludes with a clear call for an Iraq first strategy, akin to the Europe-first strategy that was outlined (though not always followed) in World War II.

I'll fill in Q&A a bit later - it was fairly extensive.

Q1: Where do the militias get their money?

A1: The Shiite militias get a lot of their money from Iran. The Sunnis get money from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Biddle also notes that a lot of money acquired by Ba'athists while Saddam Hussein was in power left the country. [NB: I don't think he mentioned when] Much of that money is returning to Iraq now. Critically, Iraq's own oil revenue helps the insurgency to be financed from internal resources.

Q2: What is your prediction for the configuration of US forces in the Middle East around 2010?

A2: Biddle focused on what he would like to see. He envisions 100,000 ground troops in 10-12 combat brigades. Some would be distributed among Iraqi army, and others doing peacekeeping. The key is to have American forces in sufficient numbers such that their presence is known and available, should fighting flare up. Currently, a lot of the American ground forces have shifted from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping (e.g. helping local law enforcement/militas track down violators of cease-fires using forensics).

Q3: My experience in Pakistan causes me to believe that it will be indefinitely unstable. Your thoughts?

A3: Biddle agrees that Pakistan is "a mess". He feels that principal-agent theory would play a prominent role in analyzing the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan is already waging a counterinsurgency war within its borders, especially in the West. He said that Pakistan deserved its own talk, and would defer to a Pakistan specialist.

Q4: Jonathan Kirschner pointed out that Biddle's talk a year ago claimed that either extreme (immediate withdrawal or continued, indefinite presence) would be preferable to a slow drawdown (a "middle road"). This year, it sounds like Biddle is actually advocating a "middle road" toward withdrawal. He also offered a realist take on Iraq: the issue is not security or confidence-building, but simply that the interests of the players are fundamentally different and irreconcilable. Wouldn't a withdrawal timetable just lead to the respective parties backward inducting and shifting their plans to incorporate the withdrawal date? Furthermore, you assume that the US peacekeeping effort will go through successfully - even if it did, mistakes might be made that would lead to renewed conflict.

A4: Biddle first noted, with humor, that he was happy realists were alive and well at Cornell. He feels, however, that currently it's in everyone's interest to cooperate. The key is to use the Balkans model of continued presence and a shift to peacekeeping to make sure it continues in everyone's interest to adhere to the 200 or so individual cease-fire agreements that have been negotiated.

Q5: How do you anticipate that your plan, McCain's plan, and Obama's plan would be affected by troop fatigue?

A5: The current level of 15 brigades (140,000 troops) is unsustainable.

One of the problems is that the current level may exist, in part, as a negotiation tactic by the current administration to make sure that troop levels aren't drawn down significantly below the minimum needed to maintain stability. (In his words, the administration would probably draw down to about 12 brigades today if they were certain that Obama wouldn't cut the force to 5 brigades upon taking office.)

Biddle feels that a political solution would be to work out a deal by which Bush and, say, an Obama administration would each help with the drawdown.

Q6: How would this assessment change if Israel attacked the Iran nuclear program?

A6: Biddle thinks this would be a huge disaster to American interests. However, he felt that America could prevent an Israeli raid. Israel would likely need to use Iraqi airspace in order to launch a strike. If the US were to withhold the IFF codes, it's possible that the Israelis would not want to run the risk of either crossing their powerful ally, or, barring that, being shot down by American anti-aircraft defenses.

Biddle says that very senior members of the administration have confirmed that the administration does not want a war with Iran. According to them, they have to pretend that military options are on the table to negotiate with a stronger hand to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. They also note that it may be perceived to be an empty threat, because of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In response to a comment that Dick Cheney might decide we should go to war: "Dick Cheney might pull a gun in the Oval Office and get a war in Iran. Life is probabilistic." (Biddle said "Life is probabilistic" a couple times in his talk, to underline that weird things happen that good theorists might not be able to predict or anticipate.)

The Israelis are another matter - they will definitely seek to attack Iran if it does not give up its nuclear ambitions.


Q7: Could you respond to Prime Minister al-Maliki's comments that indicated support for Obama's plan for withdrawal of US forces?

A7: Biddle believes that this is primarily driven by Iraqi domestic politics. He notes a couple key trends:
(1) Incumbents in Iraq are tremendously unpopular.
(2) Even though the al-Mahdi army and insurgent groups may be less popular then they are now, they are still considerably more popular than incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that they will increase their political representation in the upcoming provincial elections.
(3) The Sunnis will also increase their representation, especially in the form of political alignments built around the Sons of Iraq (note: the Sunnis largely boycotted the last election.)

According to Biddle, al-Maliki does not have a political base. He is Prime Minister because he was "everyone's second choice and no one's tenth choice."

Al-Maliki sees an opportunity to position himself as a Shiite nationalist - he can do this by pushing for a withdrawal of American troops.

Predictably, most Iraqi politicians do not want a withdrawal but will not say so publicly. More interestingly, most of the Iraqi people also do not want a withdrawal, but also blame American troops for a lot of the country's problems.

Anti-American rhetoric had been tolerated by the United States as being politically necessary for Iraqi politicians to campaign successfully. However, since the political debate has bid itself up such that withdrawal is a necessary plank in any candidate's platform, it will be difficult to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits US forces to legitimately remain in the country. However, Biddle thinks there will be a solution - possibly depending on some formula that provides enough flexibility for sufficient ground forces to remain in the country.

Q8: How long can we permit Afghanistan to deteriorate?

A8: Biddle feels that the condition in Afghanistan is not nearly as critical as that in Iraq. This is primarily because of the weakness of support for the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the enemy depends heavily upon ideology and not very much on ethnicity. Furthermore, the Taliban's ideology is itself unpopular with the majority. In Iraq, on the other hand, the prime driver for insurgents is ethnic, not ideological. He reiterated that Afghanistan is under-resourced, and will grow consistently - though steadily - worse, with a crisis occurring in 2-4 years if no additional forces are deployed.


Q9: Is it reasonable to envision UN forces in Iraq?

A9: Yes, but it will take a couple of years. Unlike in most countries, the UN is not very popular (because of the sanctions), and would not be welcomed any more than American troops.

Q10: Where in the world is Moqtada al-Sadr?

A10: He is apparently in Iran studying to be an ayatollah. Biddle claims that he wants to be the new al-Sistani. He is also establishing offices in Europe.

His policies are viewed as inconsistent with the needs and desires of his core constituency - poor Shiites - who seek basic access to necessities and jobs more than global revolution. His eroding political position has made Maliki think he can claim poor Shiites as his political base.

Q11: What could happen domestically that would convince America that your plan is correct? Alternatively, what could happen that would make your plan of 100,000 troops until 2012 impossible?

A11: It's important for negotiations about peacekeeping through 2012 to be distinct from the idea of permanent war. As Biddle pointed out, the Democratic party has been supportive of peacekeeping in the past. He maintains that it is important to recognize that whatever errors were made going into the war, it would be a gross national error to withdraw prematurely and leave an unstable Iraq, where a civil war would extend to a regional war, engulfing most of the oil-producing Middle East.

Epilogue:


Dr. Stephen Biddle is an incredibly impressive person - he's one of the most solid scholars I've met. At Cornell, I've had the privilege of listening to a number of distinguished public figures and academics discuss world affairs. But unlike some of them (Frank Fukuyama comes to mind - not that I'm picking on him), Stephen has a solid delivery, a clear logical structure, and a way of covering just about all the bases in an hour address. Though I've never heard or read any of George Marshall's speeches during World War II, I have heard that a large part of the general's distinctiveness was his ability to think widely and deeply, and articulate that thought in a distilled, concise manner. This is the impression I got today.

I'm also happy to report that, unlike when I greeted General Zinni with a half-chewed Nutter Butter in my mouth, I was able to comport myself with (relative) dignity in this gathering.

As additional evidence of Biddle's solid memory, he remembered that I had sent him an email and given him some astronomy pictures for his daughter, Anna. With a mind like that working on Iraq, I'm sleeping a bit more easily. :)

Judge Ra'id Al-Saedi, Chief Investigative Judge of Iraq High Tribunal

Today I attended a lectured delivered by Judge Ra'id Al-Saedi, Chief Investigative Judge of the Iraqi High Tribunal that tried and convicted Saddam Hussein.

He spoke of the technical and legal challenges of forming the Iraqi High Tribunal and building a case of genocide against Saddam Hussein and his partners.

The Tribunal used the existing Iraqi Penal Law 111 (1969) and the Iraqi Criminal Law 203 (1971). They also drew upon the experiences of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone, and made use of experts that had participated in the war crimes tribunals involving those nations. However, one distinction is that those tribunals were created by an action from the UN Security Council. Given French, Russian, and Chinese opposition to the 2003 invasion, the case fell to domestic courts.

Judge Al-Saedi discussed four challenges in building the case:
1. Establishing the numbers of victims
2. Processing and identifying relevant documents
3. Excavating victims from mass graves
4. Finding witnesses to testify

Victims

He stated approximately 100,000 Kurdish civilians were killed in 1988, and 200,000 Shi'a civilians in 1991 in the uprising following Desert Storm.

Logistics were a nightmare. Initially, the IHT started with one office in Baghdad, at which they received hundreds of survivors and witnesses each day. They decided to create three additional offices, two in the north, and one in the south.

Processing Documents

Some of the documents actually came from the United States. The US acquired some of these documents during Desert Storm, and after 1991 received a stream of files from Kurds in northern Iraq.

The IHT began with 10 tons of documents. Al-Saedi hired 100 individuals and divided them into four groups. The first group separated the documents between legal and non-legal, and kept the former. The second group reviewed the legal documents and retained only the important files. The third group separated evidence from non-evidence, and the fourth group split the evidence across the 14 cases that were in preparation.

With 24 investigative judges and 100 paralegals, the tribunal scanned and examined over 6 million documents using an electronic database.

Mass Graves

While the documents were being processed, another group examined the mass graves. According to him, there were about 250 mass grave sites identified in Iraq. Each site consisted of 10 to 50 graves, and each grave contained about 80-100 victims. Taking these numbers as is, this implies anywhere from 200,000 to 1.25 million victims. Given his earlier comments, the lower of the two seems more reasonable.

The cost to excavate and examine a mass grave ranged from a minimum of $5-10 million to a maximum of $25-50 million. Some of the funding came from the Iraqi government, while many of the logistics were provided by the US and British armed forces. Some human rights organizations also provided assistance. Because of the expense, five graves were chosen for excavation.

These locations were frequently remote, requiring transport by helicopter. Al-Saedi described the process as building "a city in the desert". The graves were surrounded by a security cordon. Each location required residential facilities and communications - presumably by satellite. He mentioned that two sets of refrigerators were needed - one for food, and one for exhumed bodies. The bodies were flown by helicopter to Baghdad, where experts analyzed the remains. (For security and logistical reasons, the experts remained in Baghdad and were not located at the mass graves.)

Witnesses

Witnesses were important, not only for the hearing, but to establish the identity of the victims. If a witness confirmed that a mass grave was created prior to 1990, the victims were likely Kurdish. If it was created after 1990, the victims were likely Shi'a.


In addition to the four technical/legal issues, Judge Al-Saedi mentioned two human complications: the defendants and the politicians.

Anyone who has seen video of Saddam's ranting during the trial knows that the defendants could be defiant and disruptive. Iraqis watching the proceedings may have been nonplussed by the "rule of law". In the end, the tribunal decided that the best way to deal with defendant characteristics was to permit them to ramble and rant, and to inject questions in the middle of their tirades. In so doing, the defendants made mistakes and incriminated themselves. (I thought this was an ingenious tactic.)

In addition, the judges were under pressure from various politicians looking to push and defend their diverse agendas. Al-Saedi did not have much time to go into this, but merely said that the IHT's chief goals were to send the following messages:

1. No one is above the law, and the law serves the citizens of Iraq.
2. Judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals must bear the burden of responsibility for their country's future.
3. Politicians must accept the rule of law if Iraq is to be a real country.

Al-Saedi answered two questions, and clarified some minor points.

He was staunchly opposed to amnesty for Iraqi leaders who had committed international crimes.

Mr. Al-Saedi spoke English fairly well, though with an accent and frequent pauses. However, there was one point at which it was clear that he did not have to reach for words. A student wearing a skullcap commended his courage and character, and asked him what personal trials he endured during this process.

Mr. Al-Saedi graciously and eloquently thanked the student for his kind words, and said, without pause or qualification, that in order to do the job correctly, he and his peers had to put aside personal problems and concerns. Their obligations to their families was dwarfed by the immense responsibility to build a functioning legal system in Iraq. He said that the trials cost much, in money and in blood, and indeed, there was danger for all involved. But he compared his position to the position of the law student's father - "Your father is tremendously proud of you for being here, studying law at Cornell." In a similar way, he felt that his legacy to his children, and how he best stood for them and the people of Iraq, was to focus on building the legal system.

There is something impressive and moving about a man who works with such conviction to help build a new nation.

The task in Iraq looks more daunting than even that faced by the Founding Fathers. I recall Stephen Biddle's lecture here last summer, and wonder whether fear of genocide - perhaps legitimate - would perpetuate the political deadlock, preclude the efforts to secure the country, and destroy the possibility of the rule of law. It is easy to hope, and easier to be pessimistic. But it is hard, hard to do something tangible and concrete, or at least hard because it may be unfamiliar and risky.

But his lesson, and the lesson of the ghosts of history, is to first and foremost do your duty, with courage and candor and deed. A lesson for us all, though our challenges be minor by comparison.

Stephen Biddle on Iraq

Hi,

Recently, Dr. Steve Biddle, adviser to General Petraeus, spoke at the 2007 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) meeting in Ithaca, NY, organized by the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

I'm posting my notes on his comments because you may be in a better position to gather information and influence the debate than I. Either strategic option proposed by Dr. Biddle would have strong long-term economic and political consequences for America and its workforce - even astronomy will not remain unscathed by the expense that this, and social security, will inevitably pose upon the government budgets and the economy as a whole. Should you know of any current research on the economic and political impact of a Middle East regional conflict, please forward that information to me.

Kennedy once said that the greatest challenge facing a democracy is a loss of focus and mission. Our generation has often been criticized for being indecisive, noncommittal. We have been chastised for our pretensions to jadedness and wisdom, though we lack the experience that makes either credible. Perhaps it is in this area we may find purpose and rewarding employment of our talents.

Best wishes, and good luck with everything.

- Ryan


******
Summary of Steven Biddle talk: US Strategy in Iraq

Dr. Steven Biddle began with a recap of Iraq strategy under George Casey. Casey focused on three criteria for success:

1. political reform, in the form of a new Iraqi constitution, representative democracy, and an effective system of courts
2. economic development that provides incentive for individuals to be personally invested in the success of the nascent democracy
3. developing indigenous forces that would provide security and permit the phased withdrawal of US forces.

Stalled progress in these three areas have led to two principle policy changes:
1. increase in troop strength
2. joint campaign plan that focused on clearing operations in Baghdad

Biddle suggests that the perceived problem in Baghdad are conflicts between Sunni and Shiite militias in the city center. In actuality, Baghdad is now Shiite-dominated. Sunni militias are operating from a ring of suburban areas and villages about 10-50 miles outside of the capital, commonly known as the Baghdad belt.

Biddle tells two anecdotes to illustrate his point. The first involves his trip to a marketplace, surrounded by 12-foot concrete blast walls and several checkpoints. Escorted by a squad of heavily armed infantry, Dr. Biddle explored the marketplace and noted that the marketplace, at least, was economically vibrant, with CD players, radios, and other consumer goods readily available. He points this out to demonstrate that given a certain troop density, security infrastructure, and a system of checkpoints, it is possible to stop car bombers and attacks, or at least mitigate them enough to allow the local economy to recover.

His second anecdote tells of a trip in a column of humvees along a road policed by Iraqi forces. After passing the checkpoint controlled by an Iraqi officer, the column proceeded along a road, exchanged a bit of small arms fire from nearby rooftops, and eventually stopped in front of an improvised barricade that had been constructed in the last 12 hours. Observing that they were now surrounded by buildings with high rooftops, covered by swarming militia forces with machine guns, Biddle et al. soon beat a hasty retreat. He feels that the only reason why they did not receive a salvo of RPGs was that the convoy had arrived about 12 hours early, catching the would-be ambushers unawares. As they retreated through the checkpoint, the same Iraqi officer watched the convoy pass by, with the same impassive look on his face.

This story illustrates his point that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by both Sunni and Shiite militias. This has compromised both the efficacy of Iraqi forces to effectively keep the peace, and may even mean that improved training is only improving the combat effectiveness of sectarian militias anticipating the withdrawal of coalition forces and a full-scale civil war.

Biddle described the two main strategic theories underpinning the recent surge around Baghdad.

1. If you build it, they will come
According to this theory, Baghdad is the key to security in Iraq. If security can be guaranteed, then the political leaders of the various factions will be able to meet and, through the new democratic institutions, forge a grand compromise. Such a political settlement will translate into greater peace across the country.

Biddle's problem with this theory is that it assumes the factions want to forge a compromise. In fact, each faction perceives the others as a potential genocide threat. With that much at stake, no faction has an incentive to pursue negotiations with the goal of a final compromise, and instead will use the political process merely to prepare for what is believed to be an inevitable civil war.

2. Inkspot argument
According to this theory, just as an inkspot can slowly spread across a napkin, local stability can translate into regional stability. The strategy envisioned uses US soldiers as assault forces, clearing neighborhoods of sectarian militias. The Iraqi forces, though less well trained and equipped, do possess the competence needed to hold cleared neighborhoods and restore the rule of law.

Biddle notes that this would work if it weren't for the fact that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by sectarian militias. Consequently, when Iraqi forces are placed in command of cleared neighborhoods, these zones revert to sectarian violence. Without an Iraqi army capable of sectarian disinterestedness, there is no possibility for translating the local gains made by tactical actions into long-term strategic success, either locally or regionally.

Biddle then proposes two possible solutions:

1. The Long Shot

The Long Shot envisions a 20-year (generational) occupation of Iraq, with as many forces as possible. Biddle proposes 110,000 combat troops (not including support staff) as economically sustainable and politically feasible. These forces would selectively use military action to acquire and enforce bilateral arrangements with local leaders. Combined with very powerful incentives (patronage), the threat of military reprisal might be enough to maintain a dependence relationship between security forces and local tribal/civic leaders.

The reason why this approach might work is that Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other militias have disrupted the patronage trade that keeps local leaders in power. By exchanging material wealth for cooperation, US forces could help turn the militias into a common security threat, attacking and destroying those that refuse to be bought off or controlled by local leaders.

Biddle does not detail the cost in dollars, though he suggests that the human toll would be about 700 American lives a year. Assuming America does everything right, he places the probability of successfully averting a civil war at at 10%.

2. Complete Withdrawal

Complete Withdrawal could occur at best over 1-2 years. Biddle believes it would take this long because American forces would probably have to fight their way out, and also would need to move a vast amount of materiel in order to withdraw in good order.

This approach runs the risk of catalyzing the onset of a full-scale civil war. While such a war may be inevitable, Biddle believes that the greater problem lies in regionalizing the conflict. He claims that it takes about 10 years for a civil war to burn itself out, for the parties involved to be completely exhausted and materially depleted enough to pursue peace. However, by year 8 or so, it is highly likely that domestic pressures from religious/political groups and the strain of refugees will cause Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and possibly other nations to enter into the conflict on various sides.

Biddle acknowledges that some feel that the potential nation-state belligerents will restrict their participation to monetary and covert logistical support, and will not commit armed forces.

Beyond the obvious humanitarian issues, a regional conflict would severely impact oil production and transportation, driving up global petroleum prices and precipitating economic crises worldwide.

A third alternative which no one mentions is to commit about 500,000 soldiers (plus support staff) to peacekeeping in Iraq. This would likely require a draft.

Biddle also remarked on partition. He notes that while partition might lead to more defensible borders, fundamental problems remain. The Sunni heartland is perceived to not be economically viable. A three-state solution that depends upon a piece of paper for economic guarantees to oil profits would probably be unacceptable, leading to pressure to capture oil fields by force.

Biddle notes that neither option is popular in Congress. The most popular options involve a compromise between the two, which he feels would be doomed to failure and a waste of resources. Furthermore, the US military is currently forbidden from working on a withdrawal plan, particularly because it would be met by howls of derision from current pro-war Republicans that are staking their political lives on support for the president and the military. Biddle suggests that the White House might be able to manage the political fallout if it openly pushed drafting withdrawal plans out of prudence and responsibility to the American strategic position.

Finally, Biddle notes that no one in Europe has a plan in the event of a regional war. His conversations with his German counterparts suggest that they are unwilling or unable to shift away from the politically salient priorities of environmental security, narcoterrorism, democratization in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union states, and other domestic concerns and focus on the dire impact should Iraq fail. In fact, according to Biddle, an economic analysis of the impact of war in the Middle East is a severe gap in current scholarship and policy analysis, and could serve to better cast the debate and discussion.

Death of Hrant Dink

I have created this blog to discuss and refine my conceptions of the world, to "see the world as it is" as astronomer/international policy expert Chris Chyba once pleaded at a Cornell colloquium.

This may be an odd first post for my blog, but I think the death of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink is a worthy one. A brief bio appears on wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrant_Dink) and armeniapedia (http://www.armeniapedia.org/index.php?title=Hrant_Dink). There is also a facebook group discussing Mr. Dink's death (http://cornell.facebook.com/group.php?gid=2228814238&ref=nf).

I am neither Armenian nor Turkish. I am simply a man who by circumstance and education came to learn about Europe and appreciate the vision that took a continent asunder and built something more peaceful and humane.

I have been studying speeches for Toastmasters. In recognition of Martin Luther King's birthday, I read his sermon "I've Been To The Mountaintop", given the night before he was assassinated. In it he says that if the Almighty gave him the opportunity to live at any time, he would choose to live in his present, a few years past the midpoint of the 20th century.

"Now that's a strange statement to make because the world is all messed up. The nation is sick, trouble is in the land, confusion all around. That's a strange statement. But I know, somehow, that only when it is dark enough can you see the stars."

Even astronomers seek the end of night and greet dawn with passion.

The next day, Robert Kennedy was on his way to a political rally in Indianapolis when he heard about MLK's assassination. He ignored the warnings of his staffers and continued to the rally. When he looked out at the crowd of mostly poor urban African-Americans, he realized that they did not yet know that King was dead. He broke the news to them in halting, pained, impromptu remarks: (http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/rfkonmlkdeath.html; the linked page plays a piece of "Mad World" performed by Sacre for the Donnie Darko soundtrack.
). At one point he quotes Aeschylus, a Greek poet, by saying,

Even in our sleep, pain which cannot forget
falls drop by drop upon the heart,
until, in our own despair,
against our will,
comes wisdom
through the awful grace of God.

I doubt Robert was thinking about the relevance of Aeschylus to this particular audience. I think that he forgot politics for a brief moment and betrayed his privileged upbringing. Yet he also revealed to that crowd his grief, his anguish, for a man with whom his relationship evolved from mutual distrust to deep friendship and shared vision.

This speech inevitably leads to an examination of the eulogy for Robert F. Kennedy, read by his brother Ted, but largely in his own words. The phrase from his speech to South African students on the Day of Affirmation is inscribed as his epitaph: "Every time a man strikes out against injustice, he brings forth a tiny ripple of hope..."

Hrant Dink was such a man. My knowledge of him started this evening, but in the coming days, through conversations and readings, I will come to know a man who studied science, then studied literature to find his calling, his voice, his mission in newsprint and nonviolent resistance to the burial of past unmourned, or rights promised, but unrealized.

In the coming days I may learn of his personal failing, of errors in judgment, of a lack of objectivity (though by all accounts it was his balanced editorials and deep desire for reconciliation, not retribution or reparation, for nations and peoples.

In the coming days analysts will explore the impact of his death on the prospects of the accession of Turkey to the European Union. Politicians within the European Parliament may well use this to further their own domestic agendas by using his death to reinforce reasons - reasonable and outlandish - why Turkey should not join Europe. In the coming days some will compare his assassination to that of Rafik Hariri, and pontificate on whether the event will similarly lead to the promise of democratic reforms and a peaceful revolution within Turkey, and to the extent that such a revolution would realize ultimate success.

I have neither the professional competence nor the appetite to speculate on the political and economic consequences of the death of one man. I will content myself with listening to more learned individuals, here and around the world, who grapple with greater grief and torment that I may share, much diluted, but can never fully understand.

I hope that the Turkish state, in recognition of his service to the people - if not the country - will permit Dink to be interred on Turkish soil, not to lay claim to him as the ruling elite's own, but instead to recognize that he belongs to the people, that out of his death - and especially his life - should come symbol and substance of contemplation and reform. It is one of many blessings of America that there is no law against insulting "Americanness" - our jails, I fear, are crowded enough. Those of us who love the freedom of the newsprint, who have had our hands dirtied by its filmy ink, who have defended the freedom of the press, even if only in the context of a high school paper, can perhaps appreciate this man and his heart, if not his politics.

My prayers to his family, to the Turkish and Armenian nations and peoples, and to others around the world who are touched by his death or life.