(from The Nine, by Jeffrey Toobin)
The Bush legal team, led by Ted Olson, the solicitor general, brought the same moral certainty to the Supreme Court that the Republican political operation put forth to voters. The issues were straightforward, the choices binary: the United States or the terrorists, right or wrong. Standing up to argue in Rasul, Olson laid the same kind of choice before the Court. "Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The United States is at war," Olson began with heavy portent. "It is in that context that petitioners ask this Court to assert jurisdiction that is not authorized by Congress, does not arise from the Constitution, has never been exercised by this Court."
But if this kind of talk was intended to intimidate the justices, as it cowed so many others, the tactic did not work. Indeed, it backfired. "Mr. Olson, supposing the war has ended," Stevens jumped in, "could you continue to detain these people on Guantanamo?" Of course we could, Olson said. In other words, the military could detain Rasul and the others whether or not there was a war.
"The existence of the war is really irrelevant to the legal issue," Stevens said.
"It is not irrelevant because it is in this context that that question is raised," Olson replied weakly.
"But your position does not depend on the existence of a war," Stevens insisted, and Olson had to concede it did not. So in just the first moments of the argument, Stevens had shown that the Bush administration was claiming not some temporary accommodation but rather a permanent expansion of its power for all time, in war or peace. And Stevens was showing further that Olson's rhetorical flourish--"The United States is at war"-- was nothing more than posturing. (p. 231)
...
So, it turned out, was the preposterousness of the administration's key argument in Rasul. Olson had maintained that the navy base in Guantanamo was really Cuban soil and to allow a lawsuit there was inviting litigation on a foreign battlefield. But as Stevens put it in his opinion, "By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control' over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses." The entire reason that the military took the detainees to such a remote outpost was because the base offered total freedom from outside interference. Allowing lawyers to visit prisoners in Guantanamo and letting them conduct litigation offered no risk at all of escape or disruption--something that could not be said for many prisons within the United States. (p. 235)
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Friday, April 15, 2016
Thursday, April 12, 2012
No Ordinary Time: The Greer and The Tonkin Incident (and Iraq)
From No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II by Doris Kearns Goodwin (p.277-278). This passage covers the Greer incident, which happened on September 4, 1941.
*****
While Eleanor attended her dying brother, Franklin was readying a major speech for delivery to the nation on September 11. He had committed the United States to convoys at the Atlantic Conference, but he had not yet revealed the new policy to the American people. A submarine attack on the U.S.S. Greer gave him the incident he needed to mobilize public support behind convoys.
The events surrounding the Greer attack were not quite as the president described in his nationwide radio address. He said the German submarine had "fired first upon the American destroyer"; he claimed the Greer's identity as an American ship was "unmistakable." In fact, the Greer had deliberately stalked the German sub, having been alerted to its presence by a British plane. The British plane had attacked the U-boat with depth charges while the Greer continued in pursuit. The sub fired a few torpedoes, the Greer responded with a few depth charges, and the chase came to an uneventful end. There was no positive evidence, the navy told the president, that the sub knew the nationality of the ship at which it was firing.
But the fact that German torpedoes had been fired on an American ship was all Roosevelt needed to reassert the principle of freedom of the seas. "No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs," the president warned the Axis powers, "We will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.... Let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.... When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submariners and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic."
To implement this warning, the president announced the final decision of the government to convoy British supplies, and a new policy by which the navy would shoot on sight any German raiders that came into our defensive zones. "It was," Stimson wrote, "the firmest statement and the most forward position yet taken by the President." Churchill was exultant. The shooting war in the North Atlantic had begun.
The president's "shoot on sight" policy won the solid support of 62 percent of the American people. "Sentiment on Capitol Hill has changed almost overnight," Washington correspondent David Lawrence reported. The news of the attack led "many a Congressman to say that the American people will not have their ships fired on and that defense of the freedom of the seas will once again command substantial support in both houses."
Yet, for all the positive results that the president's depiction of the Greer attack produced, an unfortunate precedent was set that would return in later years to haunt the American republic. "Roosevelt's deviousness in a good cause," Senator William Fulbright said after the Gulf of Tonkin incident helped propel escalation in Vietnam, "made it easier for Lyndon Johnson to practice the same kind of deviousness in a bad cause."
*****
Notes:
The Maine was sunk in Havana harbor in 1898
The Greer incident occurred in 1941.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred in 1964.
This book was written in 1994, nine years prior to the invasion of Iraq.
While Eleanor attended her dying brother, Franklin was readying a major speech for delivery to the nation on September 11. He had committed the United States to convoys at the Atlantic Conference, but he had not yet revealed the new policy to the American people. A submarine attack on the U.S.S. Greer gave him the incident he needed to mobilize public support behind convoys.
The events surrounding the Greer attack were not quite as the president described in his nationwide radio address. He said the German submarine had "fired first upon the American destroyer"; he claimed the Greer's identity as an American ship was "unmistakable." In fact, the Greer had deliberately stalked the German sub, having been alerted to its presence by a British plane. The British plane had attacked the U-boat with depth charges while the Greer continued in pursuit. The sub fired a few torpedoes, the Greer responded with a few depth charges, and the chase came to an uneventful end. There was no positive evidence, the navy told the president, that the sub knew the nationality of the ship at which it was firing.
But the fact that German torpedoes had been fired on an American ship was all Roosevelt needed to reassert the principle of freedom of the seas. "No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs," the president warned the Axis powers, "We will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.... Let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.... When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submariners and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic."
To implement this warning, the president announced the final decision of the government to convoy British supplies, and a new policy by which the navy would shoot on sight any German raiders that came into our defensive zones. "It was," Stimson wrote, "the firmest statement and the most forward position yet taken by the President." Churchill was exultant. The shooting war in the North Atlantic had begun.
The president's "shoot on sight" policy won the solid support of 62 percent of the American people. "Sentiment on Capitol Hill has changed almost overnight," Washington correspondent David Lawrence reported. The news of the attack led "many a Congressman to say that the American people will not have their ships fired on and that defense of the freedom of the seas will once again command substantial support in both houses."
Yet, for all the positive results that the president's depiction of the Greer attack produced, an unfortunate precedent was set that would return in later years to haunt the American republic. "Roosevelt's deviousness in a good cause," Senator William Fulbright said after the Gulf of Tonkin incident helped propel escalation in Vietnam, "made it easier for Lyndon Johnson to practice the same kind of deviousness in a bad cause."
*****
Notes:
The Maine was sunk in Havana harbor in 1898
The Greer incident occurred in 1941.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred in 1964.
This book was written in 1994, nine years prior to the invasion of Iraq.
Saturday, April 3, 2010
The Taliban are Very, Very Smart
NYTimes article on new Taliban tactics
This is very, very smart. As Stephen Biddle at CFR noted in 2008, the Anbar Awakening happened, in part, because the local tribal leaders were fed up with Al-Qaeda in Iraq interfering with their traditional system of patronage.
This approach -- using existing systems of patronage -- appears to be harder in Afghanistan, in part, because those preexisting systems might involve the drug trade. Setting up a new system can work, but it's more vulnerable, especially to the tactics described in the article (intimidation and misappropriation).
This is very, very smart. As Stephen Biddle at CFR noted in 2008, the Anbar Awakening happened, in part, because the local tribal leaders were fed up with Al-Qaeda in Iraq interfering with their traditional system of patronage.
This approach -- using existing systems of patronage -- appears to be harder in Afghanistan, in part, because those preexisting systems might involve the drug trade. Setting up a new system can work, but it's more vulnerable, especially to the tactics described in the article (intimidation and misappropriation).
Monday, October 12, 2009
Frank Rich as a model 21st century columnist
I'm linking to Frank Rich's most recent Op-Ed piece on the dangers of escalating the war in Afghanistan ("Two Wrongs Make Another Fiasco"). But before going into the content, I wanted to highlight that Mr. Rich, perhaps better than any other Op-Ed contributor at a print publication, makes liberal use of embedded links. I find this an incredibly useful tool to those of us who read the NYTimes online.
Friday, July 25, 2008
Stephen Biddle on Iraq - CU-SWAMOS Reception, July 22, 2008
Dr. Stephen Biddle, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Iraq Study Group, addressed the CU-SWAMOS conference this evening. His speech was focused on the state of Iraq, the changes between now and the situation when he last spoke at SWAMOS, and his perspective on what it would take to stabilize the situation.
A few things before I go into what he said.
First, Dr. Biddle was much more optimistic in his assessment than in the summer of 2007, for a number of reasons apparent in his comments.
Second, unlike his talk in 2007, he did not use two stories about his experiences in Iraq to illustrate the situation in Iraq. Rather, he focused on describing the trends and changes that have taken place at the local, national, and regional level. While this may seem less personal, I felt it allowed him to go into more detail about the overall strategic situation.
Enough from me - here are my draft notes from his talk.
*****
Biddle began by pointing out that strategic objectives should define troop counts and withdrawal schedules, not the other way around. Existing political discussions frequently take a contrary approach, starting with a desired troop level and a withdrawal date, and working from there to define objectives that can be met.
His talk was divided into two main sections:
(1) the causal dynamics of the continuing counterinsurgency/peacekeeping in Iraq
(2) achievable goals
He stated clearly that the probability of achieving the chief goal - avoiding persistent, large-scale violence - had improved dramatically since the last time he spoke in 2007. (In 2007, he claimed success probability of 10%, assuming the US did everything perfectly - and this assessment caused him to claim that he was far more optimistic than most. For those at SWAMOS, yes, I've got proof that Dr. Kirschner was wrong, and Biddle was right in his memory. Sorry Jon - not picking on you.)
He did emphasize that the achievable, positive outcome was not "Eden on the Euphrates" - that is, a vibrant, stable liberal democracy. Instead, the US can hope for, at best, a decentralized state or an authoritarian government similar to that under Saddam Hussein.
*****
Biddle said that the United States had two chief war aims, one humanitarian, and the other narrowly strategic.
1. Humanitarian: avert rapid escalation of violence
2. Strategic: ensure that the war does not spread to the rest of the oil-producing Middle East.
Unlike in 2007, Biddle is optimistic about prospects for success, as defined above, in Iraq.
One of the chief reasons is that the underlying strategic landscape is different from a year ago. He mentioned that the decline in violence has not been ephemeral. It is in fact sustained by a change in the self-interested strategic calculus of the principal combatants in Iraq.
Biddle focused on three particular changes - two which the United States did not plan, one of which we would have actively prevented if we could have.
1. Bombing of the Askariyya (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra in 2006.
Prior to the bombing, the Sunni insurgency felt that it was in a superior position to Shiite forces. Consequently, their goals were to facilitate an American withdrawal, then retake control of the country.
However, the bombing and subsequent battle in Baghdad over the next year taught them that the Shiite militias were, in fact, far more powerful than they had predicted. This was facilitated by the fact that, prior to Samarra, the Shiite militias' function had been primarily defensive. After the bombing, Shiite militias successfully cleansed Baghdad of Sunni populations.
At the time, most Americans viewed the yearlong battle in Baghdad as a catastrophe. And, Biddle notes, it was, in humanitarian terms. Neither US ground forces nor the Iraqi Army was able to intervene in the struggle. Both opted to stay largely on the sidelines. But, as a consequence, the Sunni insurgency realized that if the Americans withdrew, Shiite forces alone could defeat them.
Biddle believes that in 5-10 years, when historians look back upon the Iraq War, they will see the "Battle of Baghdad" as a turning point.
2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq brutality to Sunni coreligionists
The second key shift came as a consequence of the defeat of Sunni insurgents by Shiite militias. Al-Qaeda has dealt harshly with its own allies, often providing severed heads of the children of Sunni leaders viewed to be less than enthusiastic in their support of the insurgency. The Sunni population had tolerated such brutality because their only alternative had been to face Shiite death squads.
This calculus changed after the Battle of Baghdad. Even with Al-Qaeda's help, Sunni insurgents were unable to prevent the Shiite takeover of Baghdad. The calculus that had supported the alliance had changed - in Biddle's words, it had become "all pain and no gain".
At this point, Sunni leaders began approaching US forces and attempted to broker a deal. They offered a cease-fire, in which Sunni forces would not engage US forces, Iraqi army, or other Sunni groups. (Biddle rather conspicuously left out Shiite militias; I assume that the agreement permitted self-defense against Shiite forces.) Furthermore, Sunni leaders would provide biometrics (fingerprints) and a contact list of their armed members and the names of their family. In return, the US provided identifying uniforms (polo shirts, baseball caps, chinos) to help identify non-hostile Sunni forces, recognized the Sunni forces as legitimate police authorities over their current zone of control, and provided a payment of $300 per month, per person. Contrary to some reports, they received no ammunition or armaments - as Biddle dryly pointed out, the insurgency hadn't had a problem with procuring ammunition and arms when it was firing at US forces over the last few years.
Consequently, by mid-2007, the Sunni insurgency had largely died out.
3. "The Surge"
Biddle points out that the negotiated settlements with Sunni leaders depended upon the Surge. The additional US forces helped were not sufficient to guarantee security to the nation as a whole - what they were able to do was provide security in regions where the Sunnis had negotiated cease-fires. With these new allies, Al-Qaeda lost the "cover and concealment" that is needed by any insurgency. Sunni allied forces, often referred to as the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq, provided the locations of Al-Qaeda safehouses and bomb-making factories, as well as a list of leadership and operatives.
Al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had facilitated the rise of Shiite militias. These militias, including Jaish al Mahdi, realized that the Shiite population was completely dependent upon them for security. Consequently, the militias began assuming control over necessities and commodities (such as cooking oil) and profiting at the expense of local Shia. Increasingly, they were viewed as predators, not protectors, though the relationship was deemed, as in the Sunni case, as a necessary evil.
The Surge corresponded with the declining popularity of the Jaish al Mahdi, and thus changed the calculus for Shiite militias. In the prior two engagements with US forces, the Shiite militias had met heavy losses. However, the popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders guaranteed that they would be able to make good their losses. But their eroded support, combined with increased US Army presence, caused many Shiite militias to negotiate a cease-fire.
Consequently, in autumn of 2007, the Sunni and Shiite militias had negotiated peace. Al-Qaeda and the remaining Sunni insurgency had retreated to a few areas in Mosul and its environs.
This change precipitated an interesting development in March/April 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Army took the fight to the Jaish al Mahdi in Basra. Ultimately - though only with the support of US and British forces - they were able to defeat al-Sadr's forces in Basra.
*****
Biddle notes that Iraq remains in the grip of an ethnosectarian civil war. Two prerequisites are needed for a sustained reduction in violence:
1. Cease fire participants continue to see peace as in their own self-interest
2. The presence of an outside peacekeeper that locals trust.
Biddle feels that #1 has already been achieved through over 200 negotiated cease-fires with various insurgent groups/militias. As he notes, many of these take the form of explicit contracts.
However, #2 remains a tricky issue. Neither Sunnis nor Shia trust the other with weapons, and both remain fully armed. Right now, the only possible outside force that can serve as effective peacekeepers trusted by each side is the US Army.
This brought the talk to the issue of troop withdrawal and counts. Biddle underlined his assessment that early drawdown would be dangerous - as noted in his 2007 talk, he felt that it could lead to a civil/regional war. He felt US forces needed to remain through two critical events in Iraq:
1. Provincial elections (2008)
2. National parliamentary elections (2009)
Biddle anticipates that both would be targeted for violent disruption, and had the potential to spark renewed conflict, depending upon the results.
The Balkans was held up as an example of what the United States should expect regarding its future commitment - a few years of sustained peacekeeping and stability, followed by a gradual reduction to half the existing force. Biddle suggests that a detailed Pentagon study would be needed to assess what forces are needed - but to provide an idea, Biddle recommends that about 100,000 (plus or minus a couple brigades) would be needed. If Iraq remained largely stable through provincial and national elections, then the United States could expect to reduce its forces by about 50% from 2010-2012.
On Afghanistan:
Biddle disagrees with Obama's emphasis that Afghanistan is the central front on the War on Terror, for two reasons:
First, Iraq is substantially more volatile. He notes that Afghanistan is currently under-resourced. (He quotes a figure of 10-15%, which he seemed to indicate should not be taken too seriously.) However, he felt that while things are getting worse, they would get incrementally worse over the course of 2-3 (maybe even 4!) years without running the risk of catastrophe. On the other hand, Iraq's stability is less certain, with the possibility, given a triggering event, of returning to high levels of violence over a matter of weeks.
Second, US interests in Iraq are more critical than its interests in Afghanistan, since Iraq is adjacent to the chief oil-producing nations in the Middle East. At present, Al-Qaeda has a significant presence in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan - it is currently headquartered in western Pakistan. However, Biddle believes if bin Laden were to choose which of the two countries he would rather have as a headquarters, he would probably choose Iraq because of its greater potential instability and resources.
He concludes with a clear call for an Iraq first strategy, akin to the Europe-first strategy that was outlined (though not always followed) in World War II.
I'll fill in Q&A a bit later - it was fairly extensive.
Q1: Where do the militias get their money?
A1: The Shiite militias get a lot of their money from Iran. The Sunnis get money from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Biddle also notes that a lot of money acquired by Ba'athists while Saddam Hussein was in power left the country. [NB: I don't think he mentioned when] Much of that money is returning to Iraq now. Critically, Iraq's own oil revenue helps the insurgency to be financed from internal resources.
Q2: What is your prediction for the configuration of US forces in the Middle East around 2010?
A2: Biddle focused on what he would like to see. He envisions 100,000 ground troops in 10-12 combat brigades. Some would be distributed among Iraqi army, and others doing peacekeeping. The key is to have American forces in sufficient numbers such that their presence is known and available, should fighting flare up. Currently, a lot of the American ground forces have shifted from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping (e.g. helping local law enforcement/militas track down violators of cease-fires using forensics).
Q3: My experience in Pakistan causes me to believe that it will be indefinitely unstable. Your thoughts?
A3: Biddle agrees that Pakistan is "a mess". He feels that principal-agent theory would play a prominent role in analyzing the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan is already waging a counterinsurgency war within its borders, especially in the West. He said that Pakistan deserved its own talk, and would defer to a Pakistan specialist.
Q4: Jonathan Kirschner pointed out that Biddle's talk a year ago claimed that either extreme (immediate withdrawal or continued, indefinite presence) would be preferable to a slow drawdown (a "middle road"). This year, it sounds like Biddle is actually advocating a "middle road" toward withdrawal. He also offered a realist take on Iraq: the issue is not security or confidence-building, but simply that the interests of the players are fundamentally different and irreconcilable. Wouldn't a withdrawal timetable just lead to the respective parties backward inducting and shifting their plans to incorporate the withdrawal date? Furthermore, you assume that the US peacekeeping effort will go through successfully - even if it did, mistakes might be made that would lead to renewed conflict.
A4: Biddle first noted, with humor, that he was happy realists were alive and well at Cornell. He feels, however, that currently it's in everyone's interest to cooperate. The key is to use the Balkans model of continued presence and a shift to peacekeeping to make sure it continues in everyone's interest to adhere to the 200 or so individual cease-fire agreements that have been negotiated.
Q5: How do you anticipate that your plan, McCain's plan, and Obama's plan would be affected by troop fatigue?
A5: The current level of 15 brigades (140,000 troops) is unsustainable.
One of the problems is that the current level may exist, in part, as a negotiation tactic by the current administration to make sure that troop levels aren't drawn down significantly below the minimum needed to maintain stability. (In his words, the administration would probably draw down to about 12 brigades today if they were certain that Obama wouldn't cut the force to 5 brigades upon taking office.)
Biddle feels that a political solution would be to work out a deal by which Bush and, say, an Obama administration would each help with the drawdown.
Q6: How would this assessment change if Israel attacked the Iran nuclear program?
A6: Biddle thinks this would be a huge disaster to American interests. However, he felt that America could prevent an Israeli raid. Israel would likely need to use Iraqi airspace in order to launch a strike. If the US were to withhold the IFF codes, it's possible that the Israelis would not want to run the risk of either crossing their powerful ally, or, barring that, being shot down by American anti-aircraft defenses.
Biddle says that very senior members of the administration have confirmed that the administration does not want a war with Iran. According to them, they have to pretend that military options are on the table to negotiate with a stronger hand to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. They also note that it may be perceived to be an empty threat, because of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In response to a comment that Dick Cheney might decide we should go to war: "Dick Cheney might pull a gun in the Oval Office and get a war in Iran. Life is probabilistic." (Biddle said "Life is probabilistic" a couple times in his talk, to underline that weird things happen that good theorists might not be able to predict or anticipate.)
The Israelis are another matter - they will definitely seek to attack Iran if it does not give up its nuclear ambitions.
Q7: Could you respond to Prime Minister al-Maliki's comments that indicated support for Obama's plan for withdrawal of US forces?
A7: Biddle believes that this is primarily driven by Iraqi domestic politics. He notes a couple key trends:
(1) Incumbents in Iraq are tremendously unpopular.
(2) Even though the al-Mahdi army and insurgent groups may be less popular then they are now, they are still considerably more popular than incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that they will increase their political representation in the upcoming provincial elections.
(3) The Sunnis will also increase their representation, especially in the form of political alignments built around the Sons of Iraq (note: the Sunnis largely boycotted the last election.)
According to Biddle, al-Maliki does not have a political base. He is Prime Minister because he was "everyone's second choice and no one's tenth choice."
Al-Maliki sees an opportunity to position himself as a Shiite nationalist - he can do this by pushing for a withdrawal of American troops.
Predictably, most Iraqi politicians do not want a withdrawal but will not say so publicly. More interestingly, most of the Iraqi people also do not want a withdrawal, but also blame American troops for a lot of the country's problems.
Anti-American rhetoric had been tolerated by the United States as being politically necessary for Iraqi politicians to campaign successfully. However, since the political debate has bid itself up such that withdrawal is a necessary plank in any candidate's platform, it will be difficult to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits US forces to legitimately remain in the country. However, Biddle thinks there will be a solution - possibly depending on some formula that provides enough flexibility for sufficient ground forces to remain in the country.
Q8: How long can we permit Afghanistan to deteriorate?
A8: Biddle feels that the condition in Afghanistan is not nearly as critical as that in Iraq. This is primarily because of the weakness of support for the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the enemy depends heavily upon ideology and not very much on ethnicity. Furthermore, the Taliban's ideology is itself unpopular with the majority. In Iraq, on the other hand, the prime driver for insurgents is ethnic, not ideological. He reiterated that Afghanistan is under-resourced, and will grow consistently - though steadily - worse, with a crisis occurring in 2-4 years if no additional forces are deployed.
Q9: Is it reasonable to envision UN forces in Iraq?
A9: Yes, but it will take a couple of years. Unlike in most countries, the UN is not very popular (because of the sanctions), and would not be welcomed any more than American troops.
Q10: Where in the world is Moqtada al-Sadr?
A10: He is apparently in Iran studying to be an ayatollah. Biddle claims that he wants to be the new al-Sistani. He is also establishing offices in Europe.
His policies are viewed as inconsistent with the needs and desires of his core constituency - poor Shiites - who seek basic access to necessities and jobs more than global revolution. His eroding political position has made Maliki think he can claim poor Shiites as his political base.
Q11: What could happen domestically that would convince America that your plan is correct? Alternatively, what could happen that would make your plan of 100,000 troops until 2012 impossible?
A11: It's important for negotiations about peacekeeping through 2012 to be distinct from the idea of permanent war. As Biddle pointed out, the Democratic party has been supportive of peacekeeping in the past. He maintains that it is important to recognize that whatever errors were made going into the war, it would be a gross national error to withdraw prematurely and leave an unstable Iraq, where a civil war would extend to a regional war, engulfing most of the oil-producing Middle East.
Epilogue:
Dr. Stephen Biddle is an incredibly impressive person - he's one of the most solid scholars I've met. At Cornell, I've had the privilege of listening to a number of distinguished public figures and academics discuss world affairs. But unlike some of them (Frank Fukuyama comes to mind - not that I'm picking on him), Stephen has a solid delivery, a clear logical structure, and a way of covering just about all the bases in an hour address. Though I've never heard or read any of George Marshall's speeches during World War II, I have heard that a large part of the general's distinctiveness was his ability to think widely and deeply, and articulate that thought in a distilled, concise manner. This is the impression I got today.
I'm also happy to report that, unlike when I greeted General Zinni with a half-chewed Nutter Butter in my mouth, I was able to comport myself with (relative) dignity in this gathering.
As additional evidence of Biddle's solid memory, he remembered that I had sent him an email and given him some astronomy pictures for his daughter, Anna. With a mind like that working on Iraq, I'm sleeping a bit more easily. :)
A few things before I go into what he said.
First, Dr. Biddle was much more optimistic in his assessment than in the summer of 2007, for a number of reasons apparent in his comments.
Second, unlike his talk in 2007, he did not use two stories about his experiences in Iraq to illustrate the situation in Iraq. Rather, he focused on describing the trends and changes that have taken place at the local, national, and regional level. While this may seem less personal, I felt it allowed him to go into more detail about the overall strategic situation.
Enough from me - here are my draft notes from his talk.
*****
Biddle began by pointing out that strategic objectives should define troop counts and withdrawal schedules, not the other way around. Existing political discussions frequently take a contrary approach, starting with a desired troop level and a withdrawal date, and working from there to define objectives that can be met.
His talk was divided into two main sections:
(1) the causal dynamics of the continuing counterinsurgency/peacekeeping in Iraq
(2) achievable goals
He stated clearly that the probability of achieving the chief goal - avoiding persistent, large-scale violence - had improved dramatically since the last time he spoke in 2007. (In 2007, he claimed success probability of 10%, assuming the US did everything perfectly - and this assessment caused him to claim that he was far more optimistic than most. For those at SWAMOS, yes, I've got proof that Dr. Kirschner was wrong, and Biddle was right in his memory. Sorry Jon - not picking on you.)
He did emphasize that the achievable, positive outcome was not "Eden on the Euphrates" - that is, a vibrant, stable liberal democracy. Instead, the US can hope for, at best, a decentralized state or an authoritarian government similar to that under Saddam Hussein.
*****
Biddle said that the United States had two chief war aims, one humanitarian, and the other narrowly strategic.
1. Humanitarian: avert rapid escalation of violence
2. Strategic: ensure that the war does not spread to the rest of the oil-producing Middle East.
Unlike in 2007, Biddle is optimistic about prospects for success, as defined above, in Iraq.
One of the chief reasons is that the underlying strategic landscape is different from a year ago. He mentioned that the decline in violence has not been ephemeral. It is in fact sustained by a change in the self-interested strategic calculus of the principal combatants in Iraq.
Biddle focused on three particular changes - two which the United States did not plan, one of which we would have actively prevented if we could have.
1. Bombing of the Askariyya (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra in 2006.
Prior to the bombing, the Sunni insurgency felt that it was in a superior position to Shiite forces. Consequently, their goals were to facilitate an American withdrawal, then retake control of the country.
However, the bombing and subsequent battle in Baghdad over the next year taught them that the Shiite militias were, in fact, far more powerful than they had predicted. This was facilitated by the fact that, prior to Samarra, the Shiite militias' function had been primarily defensive. After the bombing, Shiite militias successfully cleansed Baghdad of Sunni populations.
At the time, most Americans viewed the yearlong battle in Baghdad as a catastrophe. And, Biddle notes, it was, in humanitarian terms. Neither US ground forces nor the Iraqi Army was able to intervene in the struggle. Both opted to stay largely on the sidelines. But, as a consequence, the Sunni insurgency realized that if the Americans withdrew, Shiite forces alone could defeat them.
Biddle believes that in 5-10 years, when historians look back upon the Iraq War, they will see the "Battle of Baghdad" as a turning point.
2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq brutality to Sunni coreligionists
The second key shift came as a consequence of the defeat of Sunni insurgents by Shiite militias. Al-Qaeda has dealt harshly with its own allies, often providing severed heads of the children of Sunni leaders viewed to be less than enthusiastic in their support of the insurgency. The Sunni population had tolerated such brutality because their only alternative had been to face Shiite death squads.
This calculus changed after the Battle of Baghdad. Even with Al-Qaeda's help, Sunni insurgents were unable to prevent the Shiite takeover of Baghdad. The calculus that had supported the alliance had changed - in Biddle's words, it had become "all pain and no gain".
At this point, Sunni leaders began approaching US forces and attempted to broker a deal. They offered a cease-fire, in which Sunni forces would not engage US forces, Iraqi army, or other Sunni groups. (Biddle rather conspicuously left out Shiite militias; I assume that the agreement permitted self-defense against Shiite forces.) Furthermore, Sunni leaders would provide biometrics (fingerprints) and a contact list of their armed members and the names of their family. In return, the US provided identifying uniforms (polo shirts, baseball caps, chinos) to help identify non-hostile Sunni forces, recognized the Sunni forces as legitimate police authorities over their current zone of control, and provided a payment of $300 per month, per person. Contrary to some reports, they received no ammunition or armaments - as Biddle dryly pointed out, the insurgency hadn't had a problem with procuring ammunition and arms when it was firing at US forces over the last few years.
Consequently, by mid-2007, the Sunni insurgency had largely died out.
3. "The Surge"
Biddle points out that the negotiated settlements with Sunni leaders depended upon the Surge. The additional US forces helped were not sufficient to guarantee security to the nation as a whole - what they were able to do was provide security in regions where the Sunnis had negotiated cease-fires. With these new allies, Al-Qaeda lost the "cover and concealment" that is needed by any insurgency. Sunni allied forces, often referred to as the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq, provided the locations of Al-Qaeda safehouses and bomb-making factories, as well as a list of leadership and operatives.
Al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had facilitated the rise of Shiite militias. These militias, including Jaish al Mahdi, realized that the Shiite population was completely dependent upon them for security. Consequently, the militias began assuming control over necessities and commodities (such as cooking oil) and profiting at the expense of local Shia. Increasingly, they were viewed as predators, not protectors, though the relationship was deemed, as in the Sunni case, as a necessary evil.
The Surge corresponded with the declining popularity of the Jaish al Mahdi, and thus changed the calculus for Shiite militias. In the prior two engagements with US forces, the Shiite militias had met heavy losses. However, the popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders guaranteed that they would be able to make good their losses. But their eroded support, combined with increased US Army presence, caused many Shiite militias to negotiate a cease-fire.
Consequently, in autumn of 2007, the Sunni and Shiite militias had negotiated peace. Al-Qaeda and the remaining Sunni insurgency had retreated to a few areas in Mosul and its environs.
This change precipitated an interesting development in March/April 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Army took the fight to the Jaish al Mahdi in Basra. Ultimately - though only with the support of US and British forces - they were able to defeat al-Sadr's forces in Basra.
*****
Biddle notes that Iraq remains in the grip of an ethnosectarian civil war. Two prerequisites are needed for a sustained reduction in violence:
1. Cease fire participants continue to see peace as in their own self-interest
2. The presence of an outside peacekeeper that locals trust.
Biddle feels that #1 has already been achieved through over 200 negotiated cease-fires with various insurgent groups/militias. As he notes, many of these take the form of explicit contracts.
However, #2 remains a tricky issue. Neither Sunnis nor Shia trust the other with weapons, and both remain fully armed. Right now, the only possible outside force that can serve as effective peacekeepers trusted by each side is the US Army.
This brought the talk to the issue of troop withdrawal and counts. Biddle underlined his assessment that early drawdown would be dangerous - as noted in his 2007 talk, he felt that it could lead to a civil/regional war. He felt US forces needed to remain through two critical events in Iraq:
1. Provincial elections (2008)
2. National parliamentary elections (2009)
Biddle anticipates that both would be targeted for violent disruption, and had the potential to spark renewed conflict, depending upon the results.
The Balkans was held up as an example of what the United States should expect regarding its future commitment - a few years of sustained peacekeeping and stability, followed by a gradual reduction to half the existing force. Biddle suggests that a detailed Pentagon study would be needed to assess what forces are needed - but to provide an idea, Biddle recommends that about 100,000 (plus or minus a couple brigades) would be needed. If Iraq remained largely stable through provincial and national elections, then the United States could expect to reduce its forces by about 50% from 2010-2012.
On Afghanistan:
Biddle disagrees with Obama's emphasis that Afghanistan is the central front on the War on Terror, for two reasons:
First, Iraq is substantially more volatile. He notes that Afghanistan is currently under-resourced. (He quotes a figure of 10-15%, which he seemed to indicate should not be taken too seriously.) However, he felt that while things are getting worse, they would get incrementally worse over the course of 2-3 (maybe even 4!) years without running the risk of catastrophe. On the other hand, Iraq's stability is less certain, with the possibility, given a triggering event, of returning to high levels of violence over a matter of weeks.
Second, US interests in Iraq are more critical than its interests in Afghanistan, since Iraq is adjacent to the chief oil-producing nations in the Middle East. At present, Al-Qaeda has a significant presence in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan - it is currently headquartered in western Pakistan. However, Biddle believes if bin Laden were to choose which of the two countries he would rather have as a headquarters, he would probably choose Iraq because of its greater potential instability and resources.
He concludes with a clear call for an Iraq first strategy, akin to the Europe-first strategy that was outlined (though not always followed) in World War II.
I'll fill in Q&A a bit later - it was fairly extensive.
Q1: Where do the militias get their money?
A1: The Shiite militias get a lot of their money from Iran. The Sunnis get money from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Biddle also notes that a lot of money acquired by Ba'athists while Saddam Hussein was in power left the country. [NB: I don't think he mentioned when] Much of that money is returning to Iraq now. Critically, Iraq's own oil revenue helps the insurgency to be financed from internal resources.
Q2: What is your prediction for the configuration of US forces in the Middle East around 2010?
A2: Biddle focused on what he would like to see. He envisions 100,000 ground troops in 10-12 combat brigades. Some would be distributed among Iraqi army, and others doing peacekeeping. The key is to have American forces in sufficient numbers such that their presence is known and available, should fighting flare up. Currently, a lot of the American ground forces have shifted from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping (e.g. helping local law enforcement/militas track down violators of cease-fires using forensics).
Q3: My experience in Pakistan causes me to believe that it will be indefinitely unstable. Your thoughts?
A3: Biddle agrees that Pakistan is "a mess". He feels that principal-agent theory would play a prominent role in analyzing the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan is already waging a counterinsurgency war within its borders, especially in the West. He said that Pakistan deserved its own talk, and would defer to a Pakistan specialist.
Q4: Jonathan Kirschner pointed out that Biddle's talk a year ago claimed that either extreme (immediate withdrawal or continued, indefinite presence) would be preferable to a slow drawdown (a "middle road"). This year, it sounds like Biddle is actually advocating a "middle road" toward withdrawal. He also offered a realist take on Iraq: the issue is not security or confidence-building, but simply that the interests of the players are fundamentally different and irreconcilable. Wouldn't a withdrawal timetable just lead to the respective parties backward inducting and shifting their plans to incorporate the withdrawal date? Furthermore, you assume that the US peacekeeping effort will go through successfully - even if it did, mistakes might be made that would lead to renewed conflict.
A4: Biddle first noted, with humor, that he was happy realists were alive and well at Cornell. He feels, however, that currently it's in everyone's interest to cooperate. The key is to use the Balkans model of continued presence and a shift to peacekeeping to make sure it continues in everyone's interest to adhere to the 200 or so individual cease-fire agreements that have been negotiated.
Q5: How do you anticipate that your plan, McCain's plan, and Obama's plan would be affected by troop fatigue?
A5: The current level of 15 brigades (140,000 troops) is unsustainable.
One of the problems is that the current level may exist, in part, as a negotiation tactic by the current administration to make sure that troop levels aren't drawn down significantly below the minimum needed to maintain stability. (In his words, the administration would probably draw down to about 12 brigades today if they were certain that Obama wouldn't cut the force to 5 brigades upon taking office.)
Biddle feels that a political solution would be to work out a deal by which Bush and, say, an Obama administration would each help with the drawdown.
Q6: How would this assessment change if Israel attacked the Iran nuclear program?
A6: Biddle thinks this would be a huge disaster to American interests. However, he felt that America could prevent an Israeli raid. Israel would likely need to use Iraqi airspace in order to launch a strike. If the US were to withhold the IFF codes, it's possible that the Israelis would not want to run the risk of either crossing their powerful ally, or, barring that, being shot down by American anti-aircraft defenses.
Biddle says that very senior members of the administration have confirmed that the administration does not want a war with Iran. According to them, they have to pretend that military options are on the table to negotiate with a stronger hand to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. They also note that it may be perceived to be an empty threat, because of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In response to a comment that Dick Cheney might decide we should go to war: "Dick Cheney might pull a gun in the Oval Office and get a war in Iran. Life is probabilistic." (Biddle said "Life is probabilistic" a couple times in his talk, to underline that weird things happen that good theorists might not be able to predict or anticipate.)
The Israelis are another matter - they will definitely seek to attack Iran if it does not give up its nuclear ambitions.
Q7: Could you respond to Prime Minister al-Maliki's comments that indicated support for Obama's plan for withdrawal of US forces?
A7: Biddle believes that this is primarily driven by Iraqi domestic politics. He notes a couple key trends:
(1) Incumbents in Iraq are tremendously unpopular.
(2) Even though the al-Mahdi army and insurgent groups may be less popular then they are now, they are still considerably more popular than incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that they will increase their political representation in the upcoming provincial elections.
(3) The Sunnis will also increase their representation, especially in the form of political alignments built around the Sons of Iraq (note: the Sunnis largely boycotted the last election.)
According to Biddle, al-Maliki does not have a political base. He is Prime Minister because he was "everyone's second choice and no one's tenth choice."
Al-Maliki sees an opportunity to position himself as a Shiite nationalist - he can do this by pushing for a withdrawal of American troops.
Predictably, most Iraqi politicians do not want a withdrawal but will not say so publicly. More interestingly, most of the Iraqi people also do not want a withdrawal, but also blame American troops for a lot of the country's problems.
Anti-American rhetoric had been tolerated by the United States as being politically necessary for Iraqi politicians to campaign successfully. However, since the political debate has bid itself up such that withdrawal is a necessary plank in any candidate's platform, it will be difficult to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits US forces to legitimately remain in the country. However, Biddle thinks there will be a solution - possibly depending on some formula that provides enough flexibility for sufficient ground forces to remain in the country.
Q8: How long can we permit Afghanistan to deteriorate?
A8: Biddle feels that the condition in Afghanistan is not nearly as critical as that in Iraq. This is primarily because of the weakness of support for the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the enemy depends heavily upon ideology and not very much on ethnicity. Furthermore, the Taliban's ideology is itself unpopular with the majority. In Iraq, on the other hand, the prime driver for insurgents is ethnic, not ideological. He reiterated that Afghanistan is under-resourced, and will grow consistently - though steadily - worse, with a crisis occurring in 2-4 years if no additional forces are deployed.
Q9: Is it reasonable to envision UN forces in Iraq?
A9: Yes, but it will take a couple of years. Unlike in most countries, the UN is not very popular (because of the sanctions), and would not be welcomed any more than American troops.
Q10: Where in the world is Moqtada al-Sadr?
A10: He is apparently in Iran studying to be an ayatollah. Biddle claims that he wants to be the new al-Sistani. He is also establishing offices in Europe.
His policies are viewed as inconsistent with the needs and desires of his core constituency - poor Shiites - who seek basic access to necessities and jobs more than global revolution. His eroding political position has made Maliki think he can claim poor Shiites as his political base.
Q11: What could happen domestically that would convince America that your plan is correct? Alternatively, what could happen that would make your plan of 100,000 troops until 2012 impossible?
A11: It's important for negotiations about peacekeeping through 2012 to be distinct from the idea of permanent war. As Biddle pointed out, the Democratic party has been supportive of peacekeeping in the past. He maintains that it is important to recognize that whatever errors were made going into the war, it would be a gross national error to withdraw prematurely and leave an unstable Iraq, where a civil war would extend to a regional war, engulfing most of the oil-producing Middle East.
Epilogue:
Dr. Stephen Biddle is an incredibly impressive person - he's one of the most solid scholars I've met. At Cornell, I've had the privilege of listening to a number of distinguished public figures and academics discuss world affairs. But unlike some of them (Frank Fukuyama comes to mind - not that I'm picking on him), Stephen has a solid delivery, a clear logical structure, and a way of covering just about all the bases in an hour address. Though I've never heard or read any of George Marshall's speeches during World War II, I have heard that a large part of the general's distinctiveness was his ability to think widely and deeply, and articulate that thought in a distilled, concise manner. This is the impression I got today.
I'm also happy to report that, unlike when I greeted General Zinni with a half-chewed Nutter Butter in my mouth, I was able to comport myself with (relative) dignity in this gathering.
As additional evidence of Biddle's solid memory, he remembered that I had sent him an email and given him some astronomy pictures for his daughter, Anna. With a mind like that working on Iraq, I'm sleeping a bit more easily. :)
Monday, March 24, 2008
Judge Ra'id Al-Saedi, Chief Investigative Judge of Iraq High Tribunal
Today I attended a lectured delivered by Judge Ra'id Al-Saedi, Chief Investigative Judge of the Iraqi High Tribunal that tried and convicted Saddam Hussein.
He spoke of the technical and legal challenges of forming the Iraqi High Tribunal and building a case of genocide against Saddam Hussein and his partners.
The Tribunal used the existing Iraqi Penal Law 111 (1969) and the Iraqi Criminal Law 203 (1971). They also drew upon the experiences of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone, and made use of experts that had participated in the war crimes tribunals involving those nations. However, one distinction is that those tribunals were created by an action from the UN Security Council. Given French, Russian, and Chinese opposition to the 2003 invasion, the case fell to domestic courts.
Judge Al-Saedi discussed four challenges in building the case:
1. Establishing the numbers of victims
2. Processing and identifying relevant documents
3. Excavating victims from mass graves
4. Finding witnesses to testify
Victims
He stated approximately 100,000 Kurdish civilians were killed in 1988, and 200,000 Shi'a civilians in 1991 in the uprising following Desert Storm.
Logistics were a nightmare. Initially, the IHT started with one office in Baghdad, at which they received hundreds of survivors and witnesses each day. They decided to create three additional offices, two in the north, and one in the south.
Processing Documents
Some of the documents actually came from the United States. The US acquired some of these documents during Desert Storm, and after 1991 received a stream of files from Kurds in northern Iraq.
The IHT began with 10 tons of documents. Al-Saedi hired 100 individuals and divided them into four groups. The first group separated the documents between legal and non-legal, and kept the former. The second group reviewed the legal documents and retained only the important files. The third group separated evidence from non-evidence, and the fourth group split the evidence across the 14 cases that were in preparation.
With 24 investigative judges and 100 paralegals, the tribunal scanned and examined over 6 million documents using an electronic database.
Mass Graves
While the documents were being processed, another group examined the mass graves. According to him, there were about 250 mass grave sites identified in Iraq. Each site consisted of 10 to 50 graves, and each grave contained about 80-100 victims. Taking these numbers as is, this implies anywhere from 200,000 to 1.25 million victims. Given his earlier comments, the lower of the two seems more reasonable.
The cost to excavate and examine a mass grave ranged from a minimum of $5-10 million to a maximum of $25-50 million. Some of the funding came from the Iraqi government, while many of the logistics were provided by the US and British armed forces. Some human rights organizations also provided assistance. Because of the expense, five graves were chosen for excavation.
These locations were frequently remote, requiring transport by helicopter. Al-Saedi described the process as building "a city in the desert". The graves were surrounded by a security cordon. Each location required residential facilities and communications - presumably by satellite. He mentioned that two sets of refrigerators were needed - one for food, and one for exhumed bodies. The bodies were flown by helicopter to Baghdad, where experts analyzed the remains. (For security and logistical reasons, the experts remained in Baghdad and were not located at the mass graves.)
Witnesses
Witnesses were important, not only for the hearing, but to establish the identity of the victims. If a witness confirmed that a mass grave was created prior to 1990, the victims were likely Kurdish. If it was created after 1990, the victims were likely Shi'a.
In addition to the four technical/legal issues, Judge Al-Saedi mentioned two human complications: the defendants and the politicians.
Anyone who has seen video of Saddam's ranting during the trial knows that the defendants could be defiant and disruptive. Iraqis watching the proceedings may have been nonplussed by the "rule of law". In the end, the tribunal decided that the best way to deal with defendant characteristics was to permit them to ramble and rant, and to inject questions in the middle of their tirades. In so doing, the defendants made mistakes and incriminated themselves. (I thought this was an ingenious tactic.)
In addition, the judges were under pressure from various politicians looking to push and defend their diverse agendas. Al-Saedi did not have much time to go into this, but merely said that the IHT's chief goals were to send the following messages:
1. No one is above the law, and the law serves the citizens of Iraq.
2. Judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals must bear the burden of responsibility for their country's future.
3. Politicians must accept the rule of law if Iraq is to be a real country.
Al-Saedi answered two questions, and clarified some minor points.
He was staunchly opposed to amnesty for Iraqi leaders who had committed international crimes.
Mr. Al-Saedi spoke English fairly well, though with an accent and frequent pauses. However, there was one point at which it was clear that he did not have to reach for words. A student wearing a skullcap commended his courage and character, and asked him what personal trials he endured during this process.
Mr. Al-Saedi graciously and eloquently thanked the student for his kind words, and said, without pause or qualification, that in order to do the job correctly, he and his peers had to put aside personal problems and concerns. Their obligations to their families was dwarfed by the immense responsibility to build a functioning legal system in Iraq. He said that the trials cost much, in money and in blood, and indeed, there was danger for all involved. But he compared his position to the position of the law student's father - "Your father is tremendously proud of you for being here, studying law at Cornell." In a similar way, he felt that his legacy to his children, and how he best stood for them and the people of Iraq, was to focus on building the legal system.
There is something impressive and moving about a man who works with such conviction to help build a new nation.
The task in Iraq looks more daunting than even that faced by the Founding Fathers. I recall Stephen Biddle's lecture here last summer, and wonder whether fear of genocide - perhaps legitimate - would perpetuate the political deadlock, preclude the efforts to secure the country, and destroy the possibility of the rule of law. It is easy to hope, and easier to be pessimistic. But it is hard, hard to do something tangible and concrete, or at least hard because it may be unfamiliar and risky.
But his lesson, and the lesson of the ghosts of history, is to first and foremost do your duty, with courage and candor and deed. A lesson for us all, though our challenges be minor by comparison.
He spoke of the technical and legal challenges of forming the Iraqi High Tribunal and building a case of genocide against Saddam Hussein and his partners.
The Tribunal used the existing Iraqi Penal Law 111 (1969) and the Iraqi Criminal Law 203 (1971). They also drew upon the experiences of Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone, and made use of experts that had participated in the war crimes tribunals involving those nations. However, one distinction is that those tribunals were created by an action from the UN Security Council. Given French, Russian, and Chinese opposition to the 2003 invasion, the case fell to domestic courts.
Judge Al-Saedi discussed four challenges in building the case:
1. Establishing the numbers of victims
2. Processing and identifying relevant documents
3. Excavating victims from mass graves
4. Finding witnesses to testify
Victims
He stated approximately 100,000 Kurdish civilians were killed in 1988, and 200,000 Shi'a civilians in 1991 in the uprising following Desert Storm.
Logistics were a nightmare. Initially, the IHT started with one office in Baghdad, at which they received hundreds of survivors and witnesses each day. They decided to create three additional offices, two in the north, and one in the south.
Processing Documents
Some of the documents actually came from the United States. The US acquired some of these documents during Desert Storm, and after 1991 received a stream of files from Kurds in northern Iraq.
The IHT began with 10 tons of documents. Al-Saedi hired 100 individuals and divided them into four groups. The first group separated the documents between legal and non-legal, and kept the former. The second group reviewed the legal documents and retained only the important files. The third group separated evidence from non-evidence, and the fourth group split the evidence across the 14 cases that were in preparation.
With 24 investigative judges and 100 paralegals, the tribunal scanned and examined over 6 million documents using an electronic database.
Mass Graves
While the documents were being processed, another group examined the mass graves. According to him, there were about 250 mass grave sites identified in Iraq. Each site consisted of 10 to 50 graves, and each grave contained about 80-100 victims. Taking these numbers as is, this implies anywhere from 200,000 to 1.25 million victims. Given his earlier comments, the lower of the two seems more reasonable.
The cost to excavate and examine a mass grave ranged from a minimum of $5-10 million to a maximum of $25-50 million. Some of the funding came from the Iraqi government, while many of the logistics were provided by the US and British armed forces. Some human rights organizations also provided assistance. Because of the expense, five graves were chosen for excavation.
These locations were frequently remote, requiring transport by helicopter. Al-Saedi described the process as building "a city in the desert". The graves were surrounded by a security cordon. Each location required residential facilities and communications - presumably by satellite. He mentioned that two sets of refrigerators were needed - one for food, and one for exhumed bodies. The bodies were flown by helicopter to Baghdad, where experts analyzed the remains. (For security and logistical reasons, the experts remained in Baghdad and were not located at the mass graves.)
Witnesses
Witnesses were important, not only for the hearing, but to establish the identity of the victims. If a witness confirmed that a mass grave was created prior to 1990, the victims were likely Kurdish. If it was created after 1990, the victims were likely Shi'a.
In addition to the four technical/legal issues, Judge Al-Saedi mentioned two human complications: the defendants and the politicians.
Anyone who has seen video of Saddam's ranting during the trial knows that the defendants could be defiant and disruptive. Iraqis watching the proceedings may have been nonplussed by the "rule of law". In the end, the tribunal decided that the best way to deal with defendant characteristics was to permit them to ramble and rant, and to inject questions in the middle of their tirades. In so doing, the defendants made mistakes and incriminated themselves. (I thought this was an ingenious tactic.)
In addition, the judges were under pressure from various politicians looking to push and defend their diverse agendas. Al-Saedi did not have much time to go into this, but merely said that the IHT's chief goals were to send the following messages:
1. No one is above the law, and the law serves the citizens of Iraq.
2. Judges, lawyers, and other legal professionals must bear the burden of responsibility for their country's future.
3. Politicians must accept the rule of law if Iraq is to be a real country.
Al-Saedi answered two questions, and clarified some minor points.
He was staunchly opposed to amnesty for Iraqi leaders who had committed international crimes.
Mr. Al-Saedi spoke English fairly well, though with an accent and frequent pauses. However, there was one point at which it was clear that he did not have to reach for words. A student wearing a skullcap commended his courage and character, and asked him what personal trials he endured during this process.
Mr. Al-Saedi graciously and eloquently thanked the student for his kind words, and said, without pause or qualification, that in order to do the job correctly, he and his peers had to put aside personal problems and concerns. Their obligations to their families was dwarfed by the immense responsibility to build a functioning legal system in Iraq. He said that the trials cost much, in money and in blood, and indeed, there was danger for all involved. But he compared his position to the position of the law student's father - "Your father is tremendously proud of you for being here, studying law at Cornell." In a similar way, he felt that his legacy to his children, and how he best stood for them and the people of Iraq, was to focus on building the legal system.
There is something impressive and moving about a man who works with such conviction to help build a new nation.
The task in Iraq looks more daunting than even that faced by the Founding Fathers. I recall Stephen Biddle's lecture here last summer, and wonder whether fear of genocide - perhaps legitimate - would perpetuate the political deadlock, preclude the efforts to secure the country, and destroy the possibility of the rule of law. It is easy to hope, and easier to be pessimistic. But it is hard, hard to do something tangible and concrete, or at least hard because it may be unfamiliar and risky.
But his lesson, and the lesson of the ghosts of history, is to first and foremost do your duty, with courage and candor and deed. A lesson for us all, though our challenges be minor by comparison.
Saturday, July 21, 2007
Stephen Biddle on Iraq
Hi,
Recently, Dr. Steve Biddle, adviser to General Petraeus, spoke at the 2007 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) meeting in Ithaca, NY, organized by the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.
I'm posting my notes on his comments because you may be in a better position to gather information and influence the debate than I. Either strategic option proposed by Dr. Biddle would have strong long-term economic and political consequences for America and its workforce - even astronomy will not remain unscathed by the expense that this, and social security, will inevitably pose upon the government budgets and the economy as a whole. Should you know of any current research on the economic and political impact of a Middle East regional conflict, please forward that information to me.
Kennedy once said that the greatest challenge facing a democracy is a loss of focus and mission. Our generation has often been criticized for being indecisive, noncommittal. We have been chastised for our pretensions to jadedness and wisdom, though we lack the experience that makes either credible. Perhaps it is in this area we may find purpose and rewarding employment of our talents.
Best wishes, and good luck with everything.
- Ryan
******
Summary of Steven Biddle talk: US Strategy in Iraq
Dr. Steven Biddle began with a recap of Iraq strategy under George Casey. Casey focused on three criteria for success:
1. political reform, in the form of a new Iraqi constitution, representative democracy, and an effective system of courts
2. economic development that provides incentive for individuals to be personally invested in the success of the nascent democracy
3. developing indigenous forces that would provide security and permit the phased withdrawal of US forces.
Stalled progress in these three areas have led to two principle policy changes:
1. increase in troop strength
2. joint campaign plan that focused on clearing operations in Baghdad
Biddle suggests that the perceived problem in Baghdad are conflicts between Sunni and Shiite militias in the city center. In actuality, Baghdad is now Shiite-dominated. Sunni militias are operating from a ring of suburban areas and villages about 10-50 miles outside of the capital, commonly known as the Baghdad belt.
Biddle tells two anecdotes to illustrate his point. The first involves his trip to a marketplace, surrounded by 12-foot concrete blast walls and several checkpoints. Escorted by a squad of heavily armed infantry, Dr. Biddle explored the marketplace and noted that the marketplace, at least, was economically vibrant, with CD players, radios, and other consumer goods readily available. He points this out to demonstrate that given a certain troop density, security infrastructure, and a system of checkpoints, it is possible to stop car bombers and attacks, or at least mitigate them enough to allow the local economy to recover.
His second anecdote tells of a trip in a column of humvees along a road policed by Iraqi forces. After passing the checkpoint controlled by an Iraqi officer, the column proceeded along a road, exchanged a bit of small arms fire from nearby rooftops, and eventually stopped in front of an improvised barricade that had been constructed in the last 12 hours. Observing that they were now surrounded by buildings with high rooftops, covered by swarming militia forces with machine guns, Biddle et al. soon beat a hasty retreat. He feels that the only reason why they did not receive a salvo of RPGs was that the convoy had arrived about 12 hours early, catching the would-be ambushers unawares. As they retreated through the checkpoint, the same Iraqi officer watched the convoy pass by, with the same impassive look on his face.
This story illustrates his point that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by both Sunni and Shiite militias. This has compromised both the efficacy of Iraqi forces to effectively keep the peace, and may even mean that improved training is only improving the combat effectiveness of sectarian militias anticipating the withdrawal of coalition forces and a full-scale civil war.
Biddle described the two main strategic theories underpinning the recent surge around Baghdad.
1. If you build it, they will come
According to this theory, Baghdad is the key to security in Iraq. If security can be guaranteed, then the political leaders of the various factions will be able to meet and, through the new democratic institutions, forge a grand compromise. Such a political settlement will translate into greater peace across the country.
Biddle's problem with this theory is that it assumes the factions want to forge a compromise. In fact, each faction perceives the others as a potential genocide threat. With that much at stake, no faction has an incentive to pursue negotiations with the goal of a final compromise, and instead will use the political process merely to prepare for what is believed to be an inevitable civil war.
2. Inkspot argument
According to this theory, just as an inkspot can slowly spread across a napkin, local stability can translate into regional stability. The strategy envisioned uses US soldiers as assault forces, clearing neighborhoods of sectarian militias. The Iraqi forces, though less well trained and equipped, do possess the competence needed to hold cleared neighborhoods and restore the rule of law.
Biddle notes that this would work if it weren't for the fact that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by sectarian militias. Consequently, when Iraqi forces are placed in command of cleared neighborhoods, these zones revert to sectarian violence. Without an Iraqi army capable of sectarian disinterestedness, there is no possibility for translating the local gains made by tactical actions into long-term strategic success, either locally or regionally.
Biddle then proposes two possible solutions:
1. The Long Shot
The Long Shot envisions a 20-year (generational) occupation of Iraq, with as many forces as possible. Biddle proposes 110,000 combat troops (not including support staff) as economically sustainable and politically feasible. These forces would selectively use military action to acquire and enforce bilateral arrangements with local leaders. Combined with very powerful incentives (patronage), the threat of military reprisal might be enough to maintain a dependence relationship between security forces and local tribal/civic leaders.
The reason why this approach might work is that Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other militias have disrupted the patronage trade that keeps local leaders in power. By exchanging material wealth for cooperation, US forces could help turn the militias into a common security threat, attacking and destroying those that refuse to be bought off or controlled by local leaders.
Biddle does not detail the cost in dollars, though he suggests that the human toll would be about 700 American lives a year. Assuming America does everything right, he places the probability of successfully averting a civil war at at 10%.
2. Complete Withdrawal
Complete Withdrawal could occur at best over 1-2 years. Biddle believes it would take this long because American forces would probably have to fight their way out, and also would need to move a vast amount of materiel in order to withdraw in good order.
This approach runs the risk of catalyzing the onset of a full-scale civil war. While such a war may be inevitable, Biddle believes that the greater problem lies in regionalizing the conflict. He claims that it takes about 10 years for a civil war to burn itself out, for the parties involved to be completely exhausted and materially depleted enough to pursue peace. However, by year 8 or so, it is highly likely that domestic pressures from religious/political groups and the strain of refugees will cause Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and possibly other nations to enter into the conflict on various sides.
Biddle acknowledges that some feel that the potential nation-state belligerents will restrict their participation to monetary and covert logistical support, and will not commit armed forces.
Beyond the obvious humanitarian issues, a regional conflict would severely impact oil production and transportation, driving up global petroleum prices and precipitating economic crises worldwide.
A third alternative which no one mentions is to commit about 500,000 soldiers (plus support staff) to peacekeeping in Iraq. This would likely require a draft.
Biddle also remarked on partition. He notes that while partition might lead to more defensible borders, fundamental problems remain. The Sunni heartland is perceived to not be economically viable. A three-state solution that depends upon a piece of paper for economic guarantees to oil profits would probably be unacceptable, leading to pressure to capture oil fields by force.
Biddle notes that neither option is popular in Congress. The most popular options involve a compromise between the two, which he feels would be doomed to failure and a waste of resources. Furthermore, the US military is currently forbidden from working on a withdrawal plan, particularly because it would be met by howls of derision from current pro-war Republicans that are staking their political lives on support for the president and the military. Biddle suggests that the White House might be able to manage the political fallout if it openly pushed drafting withdrawal plans out of prudence and responsibility to the American strategic position.
Finally, Biddle notes that no one in Europe has a plan in the event of a regional war. His conversations with his German counterparts suggest that they are unwilling or unable to shift away from the politically salient priorities of environmental security, narcoterrorism, democratization in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union states, and other domestic concerns and focus on the dire impact should Iraq fail. In fact, according to Biddle, an economic analysis of the impact of war in the Middle East is a severe gap in current scholarship and policy analysis, and could serve to better cast the debate and discussion.
Recently, Dr. Steve Biddle, adviser to General Petraeus, spoke at the 2007 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) meeting in Ithaca, NY, organized by the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.
I'm posting my notes on his comments because you may be in a better position to gather information and influence the debate than I. Either strategic option proposed by Dr. Biddle would have strong long-term economic and political consequences for America and its workforce - even astronomy will not remain unscathed by the expense that this, and social security, will inevitably pose upon the government budgets and the economy as a whole. Should you know of any current research on the economic and political impact of a Middle East regional conflict, please forward that information to me.
Kennedy once said that the greatest challenge facing a democracy is a loss of focus and mission. Our generation has often been criticized for being indecisive, noncommittal. We have been chastised for our pretensions to jadedness and wisdom, though we lack the experience that makes either credible. Perhaps it is in this area we may find purpose and rewarding employment of our talents.
Best wishes, and good luck with everything.
- Ryan
******
Summary of Steven Biddle talk: US Strategy in Iraq
Dr. Steven Biddle began with a recap of Iraq strategy under George Casey. Casey focused on three criteria for success:
1. political reform, in the form of a new Iraqi constitution, representative democracy, and an effective system of courts
2. economic development that provides incentive for individuals to be personally invested in the success of the nascent democracy
3. developing indigenous forces that would provide security and permit the phased withdrawal of US forces.
Stalled progress in these three areas have led to two principle policy changes:
1. increase in troop strength
2. joint campaign plan that focused on clearing operations in Baghdad
Biddle suggests that the perceived problem in Baghdad are conflicts between Sunni and Shiite militias in the city center. In actuality, Baghdad is now Shiite-dominated. Sunni militias are operating from a ring of suburban areas and villages about 10-50 miles outside of the capital, commonly known as the Baghdad belt.
Biddle tells two anecdotes to illustrate his point. The first involves his trip to a marketplace, surrounded by 12-foot concrete blast walls and several checkpoints. Escorted by a squad of heavily armed infantry, Dr. Biddle explored the marketplace and noted that the marketplace, at least, was economically vibrant, with CD players, radios, and other consumer goods readily available. He points this out to demonstrate that given a certain troop density, security infrastructure, and a system of checkpoints, it is possible to stop car bombers and attacks, or at least mitigate them enough to allow the local economy to recover.
His second anecdote tells of a trip in a column of humvees along a road policed by Iraqi forces. After passing the checkpoint controlled by an Iraqi officer, the column proceeded along a road, exchanged a bit of small arms fire from nearby rooftops, and eventually stopped in front of an improvised barricade that had been constructed in the last 12 hours. Observing that they were now surrounded by buildings with high rooftops, covered by swarming militia forces with machine guns, Biddle et al. soon beat a hasty retreat. He feels that the only reason why they did not receive a salvo of RPGs was that the convoy had arrived about 12 hours early, catching the would-be ambushers unawares. As they retreated through the checkpoint, the same Iraqi officer watched the convoy pass by, with the same impassive look on his face.
This story illustrates his point that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by both Sunni and Shiite militias. This has compromised both the efficacy of Iraqi forces to effectively keep the peace, and may even mean that improved training is only improving the combat effectiveness of sectarian militias anticipating the withdrawal of coalition forces and a full-scale civil war.
Biddle described the two main strategic theories underpinning the recent surge around Baghdad.
1. If you build it, they will come
According to this theory, Baghdad is the key to security in Iraq. If security can be guaranteed, then the political leaders of the various factions will be able to meet and, through the new democratic institutions, forge a grand compromise. Such a political settlement will translate into greater peace across the country.
Biddle's problem with this theory is that it assumes the factions want to forge a compromise. In fact, each faction perceives the others as a potential genocide threat. With that much at stake, no faction has an incentive to pursue negotiations with the goal of a final compromise, and instead will use the political process merely to prepare for what is believed to be an inevitable civil war.
2. Inkspot argument
According to this theory, just as an inkspot can slowly spread across a napkin, local stability can translate into regional stability. The strategy envisioned uses US soldiers as assault forces, clearing neighborhoods of sectarian militias. The Iraqi forces, though less well trained and equipped, do possess the competence needed to hold cleared neighborhoods and restore the rule of law.
Biddle notes that this would work if it weren't for the fact that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by sectarian militias. Consequently, when Iraqi forces are placed in command of cleared neighborhoods, these zones revert to sectarian violence. Without an Iraqi army capable of sectarian disinterestedness, there is no possibility for translating the local gains made by tactical actions into long-term strategic success, either locally or regionally.
Biddle then proposes two possible solutions:
1. The Long Shot
The Long Shot envisions a 20-year (generational) occupation of Iraq, with as many forces as possible. Biddle proposes 110,000 combat troops (not including support staff) as economically sustainable and politically feasible. These forces would selectively use military action to acquire and enforce bilateral arrangements with local leaders. Combined with very powerful incentives (patronage), the threat of military reprisal might be enough to maintain a dependence relationship between security forces and local tribal/civic leaders.
The reason why this approach might work is that Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other militias have disrupted the patronage trade that keeps local leaders in power. By exchanging material wealth for cooperation, US forces could help turn the militias into a common security threat, attacking and destroying those that refuse to be bought off or controlled by local leaders.
Biddle does not detail the cost in dollars, though he suggests that the human toll would be about 700 American lives a year. Assuming America does everything right, he places the probability of successfully averting a civil war at at 10%.
2. Complete Withdrawal
Complete Withdrawal could occur at best over 1-2 years. Biddle believes it would take this long because American forces would probably have to fight their way out, and also would need to move a vast amount of materiel in order to withdraw in good order.
This approach runs the risk of catalyzing the onset of a full-scale civil war. While such a war may be inevitable, Biddle believes that the greater problem lies in regionalizing the conflict. He claims that it takes about 10 years for a civil war to burn itself out, for the parties involved to be completely exhausted and materially depleted enough to pursue peace. However, by year 8 or so, it is highly likely that domestic pressures from religious/political groups and the strain of refugees will cause Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and possibly other nations to enter into the conflict on various sides.
Biddle acknowledges that some feel that the potential nation-state belligerents will restrict their participation to monetary and covert logistical support, and will not commit armed forces.
Beyond the obvious humanitarian issues, a regional conflict would severely impact oil production and transportation, driving up global petroleum prices and precipitating economic crises worldwide.
A third alternative which no one mentions is to commit about 500,000 soldiers (plus support staff) to peacekeeping in Iraq. This would likely require a draft.
Biddle also remarked on partition. He notes that while partition might lead to more defensible borders, fundamental problems remain. The Sunni heartland is perceived to not be economically viable. A three-state solution that depends upon a piece of paper for economic guarantees to oil profits would probably be unacceptable, leading to pressure to capture oil fields by force.
Biddle notes that neither option is popular in Congress. The most popular options involve a compromise between the two, which he feels would be doomed to failure and a waste of resources. Furthermore, the US military is currently forbidden from working on a withdrawal plan, particularly because it would be met by howls of derision from current pro-war Republicans that are staking their political lives on support for the president and the military. Biddle suggests that the White House might be able to manage the political fallout if it openly pushed drafting withdrawal plans out of prudence and responsibility to the American strategic position.
Finally, Biddle notes that no one in Europe has a plan in the event of a regional war. His conversations with his German counterparts suggest that they are unwilling or unable to shift away from the politically salient priorities of environmental security, narcoterrorism, democratization in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union states, and other domestic concerns and focus on the dire impact should Iraq fail. In fact, according to Biddle, an economic analysis of the impact of war in the Middle East is a severe gap in current scholarship and policy analysis, and could serve to better cast the debate and discussion.
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