Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Friday, September 28, 2012

The Red Line: US jobs programs do not cover Binyamin Netanyahu


Despite claims to the contrary, Netanyahu is directly injecting himself into the US elections. He enjoys a closer relationship with Mitt Romney, and probably would be happier with a Romney victory. But regardless of his specific preference in the US Presidential election, he correctly senses that this US election gives him the maximum amount of influence, and is using it to push a more hawkish and explicit plan of attack against Iran's nuclear program.

Netanyahu is right about one thing - there is a red line approaching. But it's not the point of no return for Iran's nuclear weapons program. It is the point at which it becomes politically possible in the United States to question the nature and depth of the partnership with Israel.

I'm not exactly a dove regarding Iran. In the past I have tried summarizing the history of Iran's nuclear program with an addendum, and also considered a grim trigger strategy for Iran (and vented a bit about Netanyahu's rudeness at that time).

I don't think King Abdullah II of Jordan was correct during his extended Daily Show interview that Iranian nuclear ambitions would be curbed once the Israelis and Palestinians reached a peace settlement. It would help - Arab leaders could bring to bear pressure against Iran with less domestic political risk. But I don't think the most die-hard optimist thinks that is even possible, much less probable, before Iran develops a nuclear weapon.

But there's a difference between developing plans for surgical strikes and committing to them publicly. The former can meet the national security requirements of Israel. The latter meets the political requirements of the Israeli government in general, and Netanyahu in particular.

Some voices in Israel realize that Netanyahu may be putting the relationship between Israel and the US, undermining the long-term security of the latter. (Sadly, I was unable to find a free version of the full text of the Haaretz opinion piece - if anyone finds it, it will be much appreciated.)

But I think Netanyahu has already been demanding and rude on many occasions in the past - remember VP Joe Biden's visit to Israel, during which the government just happened to unveil plans for new settlements?

Sometimes I wish I understood more about Israeli domestic politics. It would give me a handle on whether Netanyahu represents mainstream thought (which I doubt), and to what extent the Iranian threat is seen as both imminent and existential (more interesting, and possibly mainstream). So maybe Netanyahu is responding to his constituency.

Or, maybe he's also playing domestic politics and is pursuing policies, and pursuing them in a way, that will help Likud, and by extension, himself. Last time I checked, Likud is the party of the right -- it sure sounds like it under Netanyahu.

Look, the United States is Israel's most powerful and most loyal ally, to the point where I think it has significantly hurt American interests. So it is seen as our job to ensure the safety of our ally. But it is not our job to make sure Netanyahu has a job. That's his. As he's been part of the Israeli government for an awful long time, he must be somewhat good at that, at least.

Israel prides itself on being the only democracy in the Middle East. Putting aside challenges to that, that means the Israeli people are responsible for his persistence in politics. Like it or not, leaders in democracies are mirrors of us. We had George W. Bush for eight years, and rightly had our balls busted on that one. Israel has a parliamentary government, and can change leadership somewhat more frequently than we can, should they desire.

So I can thus infer that Israel has a sizable population that really is jingoistic and feels entitled to US protection.

Someone, please remind me why we're allies again.



PS: this graphic was a poor choice.


If the issue really is as serious and imminent as is claimed, why use such a crappy, ridiculous graphic? Who is Netanyahu's communications director?

In his defense, an extensive search of the Internets reveal that this isn't a Wile E. Coyote bomb. The closest he comes is his trademark Acme rocket.


Here's hoping the Iranian weapons delivery systems prove equally defective.

Saturday, March 17, 2012

A Grim Trigger Strategy for Israel and Iran

One of the blessings of being an unknown, unimportant voice in the blogosphere is that my opinion matters so little, even to my own family and friends, that I can make a statement without fear of retribution or consequences. I do not expect those in power or responsibility or reputations worth defending to speak as plainly as I intend to now. But, one vainly hopes that plain words can, indirectly, promote reevaluation among those who do not have the luxury of that personal indulgence.

In an era of more limited resources and domestic inflexibility, American foreign policy may need to clarify its interests and reevaluate any commitments in which neither interests nor values are served.

For these reasons, I suggest two "grim trigger" strategies to modify existing American policy:

1. An ultimatum to Iran to suspend its entire nuclear program and submit to IAEA inspections within nine months, or face military reprisals.

2. A clear statement to Israel that if they attack unilaterally, all aid will be immediately suspended.

Iran:

Iran has demonstrated its inability to cooperate within the guidelines of the global community. Perhaps even more tragically, it has brutally demonstrated that reasonable voices of dissent are both unwelcome and powerless within the Iranian state. No one should wish ill upon the people of Iran for the folly of their leadership. But we also must recognize the limits of our power, diplomatically, economically, and militarily, to effect regime change anywhere, especially Iran.

Unfortunately, this means that the Iranian people are largely on their own. God willing, we will not attempt  nation-building in a country with over twice the population and four times the land area of Iraq, a nation that, religiously, linguistically, and historically, has found itself at mortal odds with most of its neighbors. Such an invasion and occupation would make the folly of Iraq look like Grenada.

At the same time, one should be pessimistic about the outcome of diplomatic efforts. Both Russia and China are not subject to the rules of either liberal democracy or a self-identity founded upon liberalism. Russia, in particular, has demonstrated a particularly brash willingness to support Syria to provide it strategic access to the Mediterranean. Both nations, because of their geography and demography, also have a vital interest in crushing self-determination movements of any form. They are, in short, not reliable partners in containing Iran, and cannot be trusted to adhere to sanctions. I pray that our national leadership never becomes so populated with fools that we would ever trust our national security to the whims of these two international actors.

Furthermore, Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon would severely damage the power of the United States to effectively negotiate. The North Korean experience indicates that containment is possible only given the conditions of (1) powerful, proximate allies, (2) powerful, proximate adversaries who, because of their own interests, serve to restrain the regime, and (3) a weak enough technological and military capacity that major shipping lanes are not affected. The Iranian situation has none of these, leading to the conclusion that containment would be impossible, and long-term disruption of American interests inevitable, should Iran possess a nuclear weapon.

Sadly, inevitably, America is left with the option to do its best to, again, disrupt and destroy the Iranian nuclear weapons program. This means continued covert operations directed toward sabotage, which has already postponed the Iranian nuclear weapons program by at least a decade. But it will also mean an ultimatum to Iran: open up all sites to IAEA inspections and turn over nuclear refinement to an external party (Russia if necessary, but ideally someone else) by January 1, or the US will  direct strikes against Iranian nuclear installations, military as well as civilian, and associated anti-air defenses.

Israel:

That I am now reluctantly inclined to think that a strike against Iran may be necessary does not, in any way, moderate my frustration with Israel's efforts to push the issue in America. Although intended for a separate post, I have decided to address Israel in this statement as well.

 Lord Palmerston once famously said, "Nations have no permanent friends or allies. They only have permanent interests." (Nearly as famous was the requotation by Gorbachev to Thatcher, following the US-UK schism over the Falkland Islands schism).

A secret: America is not an exceptional nation. Neither is Israel. Both are subject to restrictions, natural and cultivated advantages and weaknesses, and the demands placed upon them by their respective systems of government and citizens.

Mature participants in the international community do not deny history. Nor do they use it as a shield against all criticism. They use it as a guide. The history of the United States tells us that there is danger in subordinating or confusing national interest in the name of satisfying the whims of a small, but seemingly indispensable ally, whether in the heart of Europe or in Southeast Asia.

The arrogance of the Israeli government in general, and Netanyahu in particular, of lecturing America while as a guest in the United States is egregious. I do not forget the approval of new settler homes during Joe Biden's visit, an obvious slap in the face to the Obama administration's request that the settlement process be at least temporarily stayed.

The political impossibility of any mainstream political candidate suggesting anything short of unqualified support for Israel reflects, if not direct coercion of US policy by a foreign power, the subduing of American interests through a combination of self-censorship and a powerful domestic lobby. Statements such as this are typically charged as anti-Semitic, even when made by Jewish-Americans with a demonstrated centrist or right-of-center political disposition and a record favorable toward Israel. (See: Joe Klein)

American policy must make it clear that if Israel attacks Iran unilaterally, the United States will immediately stop the estimated $3 billion in annual support presently given to Israel, most of it in the form of military aid. It is an appropriate response to what I can only consider the attempt by a foreign power to draft America into a war.

That I am concluding that a strike against Iran may well be necessary does not take away from the healthy and necessary aversion to American interests and policies being so roughly pushed by an ally.

Both of these would be considered "grim trigger" strategies. They deserve the name. Yet they also do represent a strategy consistent with American interests and limitations. And what is sorely needed, perhaps more than at any time in the post-Cold War era, is a consistent strategy founded on our interests.

A final note: I recognize that, for a range of reasons, one or both of these changes may need to be made secretly, or strategically leaked. They could be linked or not. There are lots of variations. But I would argue that these two policy changes hold the promise of improving the connection between our policies and our interests.

If I have done my job, I've pissed off more people than usual - those on the left and the right. So be it - I am not above changing my mind in the face of superior reasoning or information. I am not privy to all of the information that is germane to this issue. But now, you will need to speak up.

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

A brief update on Iran

In a previous post, I ran through a brief history of Iran's nuclear program, its current status under international law, and touched very lightly on the economic interests of China and Russia in Iran. This update focuses more on the analysis of Iranian politics and negotiation options for stopping the nuclear weapons program.

Warning:I don't have a lot of insight into the Iranian nuclear conundrum - I'm just a curious guy trying to get a better context for the crisis.

I've been digging through a few online sources and news articles. Here are my key findings:

1. Almost everyone agrees that it's tough to make predictions about the politics of Iran. In a comparatively rare show of modesty, most of the authors/experts said that it's a pretty opaque process, with real power resting in the hands of the Supreme Council and the Revolutionary Guard, and with lesser power held by the President.

2. The recent parliamentary elections overwhelmingly favored Ayatollah Khameini's allies. This could translate into an effort to actually get rid of the presidency, and create a parliamentary edifice for the theocracy. This could be done prior to the next presidential election, scheduled for June, 2013.

3. Khameini actually issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons on August 9, 2005. He reiterated this recently in a comment made late February. He also has criticized Ahmadinejad for "personalizing" the nuclear issue. On the other hand, he was probably the single person best suited to stop the nuclear program if he so desired (note that Khomeini actually did precisely that). Also noteworthy: even moderate reformers like Mousavi have stated that Iran's nuclear program is non-negotiable (although Mousavi said that it should not be used to develop nuclear weapons).

4. Ahmadinejad is actually term-limited, and can't run in 2013, barring a change in Iran's constitution. Like American presidents, his power has been on the decline. Unlike (?) American presidents, he is also handicapped by increasing friction between him and the religious leadership.

5. One expert at the Council on Foreign Relations has an interesting suggestion for the structure of negotiations - use a third-party mediator. The mediator would act as a go-between between the US (or the Permanent members of the UN Security Council+Germany, or P5+1) and Iran. This apparently was the model that worked to free the embassy hostages in Iran in 1981. In the hostage crisis case, the go-between was Algeria (possibly because they were Muslim, but also far away from both the US and Iran, and the critical interests of either party). The expert recommends Turkey for the role. Its role as a NATO member, aspiring member of the EU, and a Muslim secular* democracy helps. What may actually also help, oddly enough, is that it currently has pretty poor relations with Israel. In this case, that would help its credibility in Iranian eyes.

6. Experts are also pessimistic about the odds of a negotiated settlement prior to two major elections - the US  elections in November 2012 and the Iranian elections in June 2013. I can see how a re-elected Obama would maybe have a freer hand vis-a-vis Israel to negotiate with Iran. But I hesitate to think that the Israelis would be willing to wait that long before attempting a strike, given that the Israeli defense minister suggested in February that Iran would enter a "zone of immunity" within six months. Although this was somewhat walked back later, the timing suggests that Israel might not wait for electoral politics to settle.

7. One thing I have NOT found much material on is how Syria's civil war could affect negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran. Does it strengthen the hand of those interested in isolating Iran, given that a key regional ally has its own problems? Alternatively, does it make Russia and China even more reluctant to pressure Iran, given that, especially in the case of the former, Syria's long and relatively close relationship?

8. I know next to nothing about internal Israeli politics. Given that it is a multi-party parliamentary system with a presidency that is largely ceremonial in nature, it is arguably more unstable than, say, the American political system. I'm also confused why Avigdor Lieberman is the Foreign Minister - from what I understand of his politics, it would be a bit like making Governor Jan Brewer the Secretary of State. Or John Bolton the UN ambassador. (Oh, wait, the latter actually happened.)

More seriously, this means that John McCain's comments about the need to impose a no-fly zone in Syria might in fact be counterproductive to negotiations with Iran.

Sunday, March 4, 2012

A brief summary of Iran's Nuclear Program and its status under the NPT

I decided to post this because I'm currently having an extended conversation with a friend about military intervention in Iran. I wrote this brief summary and analysis of Iran's nuclear program a few months ago. It was designed to sort of keep my writing and research skills up, but I was disappointed that it still reads like an undergrad paper. It contains a brief history of Iran's nuclear program, recent information concerning both Iran's economy and leaks about its nuclear capabilities, and its connection to China and Russia. Comments and corrections welcome.


An update was posted in early March. You can find it here.

Looking for the Silver Lining in the Mushroom Cloud
Introduction:
The most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear program indicates that it has continued to refine uranium and is developing an implosion-type detonation device. The most recent US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program also reverses claims previously made in the 2007 NIE, which claimed that Iran was not actively pursuing nuclear weapons. The 2011 NIE is secret, but rumors indicate that Iran is actively pursuing a weapons program and will have the capability to develop a weapon within a few years.

History of Iran's Nuclear Program
A brief review of the history of Iran’s nuclear program is in order. Iran’s nuclear program began in 1957. Under the auspices of US President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, Iran received fuel, small reactors, expertise, and low-enriched uranium (LEU). In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and completed its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. France and Germany also worked with Iran in the 1970s. A 1974 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) determined that the Shah was likely to attempt a nuclear weapons program; that same year, India detonated its first nuclear weapon. Nonproliferation concerns caused France and Germany to abandon their nuclear reactor projects in Iran.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Western powers cut off most diplomatic and economic relations, with the US personally blocking bilateral agreements for nuclear power and fuel between Iran and Argentina, China, and Russia. Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities in 1981, but the program was rebuilt, in part, by help from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. After Khomeini’s death, his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reprioritized technological development and research, including the nuclear weapons program. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 may have led the Iranians to place a moratorium on their nuclear weapons program, as reported in a 2007 NIE. (Bruno, 2010) However, recent evidence, summarized in the Nov. 8 IAEA report, indicate that Iran has continued to make progress refining uranium to weapons-grade and is working on the detonation device that will make it a practical weapon.
         
Iran and the NPT
            Iran had previously been cited for violations of the NPT, specifically Article III, which requires signatories to comply with the IAEA to implement safeguards and inspections. (NPT Treaty, 1968) Iran has refused to provide the IAEA access or information to all of its nuclear facilities on numerous occasions. The most recent report claims that Iran is now in violation of Article II as well, as it is developing a mechanism for detonating a nuclear weapon.
     
China, Russia, and Iran's Economy:
       Unfortunately for the parties worried about a nuclear-armed Iran, neither the Chinese nor the Russians appear to be willing to turn against their ally of sorts. The Chinese import the vast majority of Iranian oil, and, with the withdrawal of most Western business, constitute a large share of the foreign investment and trade with Iran. China has invested over $40 billion in energy projects in Iran and is the regime’s largest trading partner, with over $20 billion in trade each year. (Alwatan Daily, 2010) For its part, Russia has agreed to $1-2 billion of projects with Iran to develop nuclear power plants at Bushehr, with the promise of more cooperation down the road. (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011) Therefore, while recent news reports from the White House indicated agreement between the US, Russia, and China on Iran’s nuclear program, it is unclear whether that means a new round of UN sanctions would not be vetoed by either party.

            It is worth noting that while sanctions have not stopped the nuclear program, they have hurt the Iranian economy, leading to increasing amounts of unrest, most recently culminating in the failed Green Revolution of 2009-2010. Some optimists hold out the hope of internal regime change in Iran, one that would bring a pro-Western government to power that would disarm. However, the Arab Spring has left Iran relatively untouched, and the case of Syria – Iran’s close ally – indicates that regime change will not happen while a majority of the army remains loyal to the government.

            The global recession also caused oil prices to plunge, which have severely limited Iran’s ability to raise foreign currency. Note that its break-even point for crude prices for Iran was at $90/bbl as of 2008, well above oil prices for most of the last three years. (Gulf Times, 2008). Consequently, the Iranian government, which has limited opportunity for borrowing abroad, has likely reduced domestic oil subsidies, probably leading to greater economic hardship and social instability. Note that the Arab Spring happened when it did in part because of a spike in food prices.While this suggests that regime change could solve the problem for the world, most analysts anticipate that it would take a few years – longer than the time it would take for Iran to successfully produce a nuclear weapon.
  
Military Intervention in Iran:
            This leaves the option of military intervention. The most likely scenarios involve either the United States or Israel bombing the known and suspected nuclear facilities. It is unclear, however, what percentage of the weapons facilities are known and vulnerable to airstrikes.

            Another, less likely but intriguing scenario, would have an Arab nation or coalition attack Iran’s nuclear program. This prospect seems somewhat less far-fetched when one considers the historically strained relationship between the Arab states and Iran, born of religious and ethnic differences as well as concerns that its population and resources could overrun small (Jordan) or sparsely populated (Saudi Arabia) Arab states. The recent Wikileaks release indicates that Arab diplomats are very concerned about a nuclear Iran. (Zirulnick, 2010). If the Arab states will not attack Iran directly, they may be willing to offer public support for a military option.

            The next six months will be critical. Israel has indicated that it believes that Iran will have a weapon within a year. Given that it views an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat (and Iran itself has done little to dissuade them of that idea), then it is likely that Israel or the United States will act within that time period.

References:

Bruno, Greg. (2010). “Iran’s Nuclear Program”. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p16811.

Zirulnick, Ariel. (Nov. 29, 2010) “WikiLeaks reveals 5 Arab countries concerned about Iran”. Christian Science Monitor. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1129/WikiLeaks-reveals-5-Arab-countries-concerned-about-Iran/Saudi-Arabia.

(Nov. 8, 2011) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency. GOV/2011/65.  Available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/bog112011-65.pdf.

(1967) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  United Nations. Available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml

(2011) “WMDs: Bushehr”. Globalsecurity.org. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm.

(August 1, 2010) “China invests $40 billion in energy, gas”. Alwatan Daily. Available at http://alwatandaily.kuwait.tt/resources/pdf/802/12.pdf.

(Sept. 21, 2008). “Saudi needs oil above $49 to avoid deficit; Qatar break-even $24: IMF”. Gulf Times. Available at http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=242775&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28

Sunday, September 27, 2009

Wedding

Today was a good day. I went to Irina and Brian's wedding, and had a wonderful time. It was good to see them again, but of course, I had to share them with the rest of the eager visitors and wellwishers.

It was wonderful to discover that the people there were bright, charismatic, and wonderfully conversant on a number of topics. I was sandwiched between two people - a blast from the past - back when I was a neophyte Europhile (or Eurosceptic, depending on the day of the week). Inbetween comments on how the four-year old boy was having more success meeting women than me, I had a couple great discussions on the financial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe and nuclear nonproliferation.

It was like water to a thirsty man in the desert.

Sunday, June 21, 2009

How much of an impact is Twitter having in Iran?

This is a story about how I was caught gullible - twice.

Like everyone else who depends upon mass media for a fair amount of my news, I was a bit surprised that Twitter was arguably playing a significant role in the protests in Tehran over the recent presidential election. I mean, this is Twitter, whose model for communication opens itself up to breathtakingly easy parody, as Conan Seize-the-low-hanging-fruit O'Brien illustrates. (I love you Conebone.) Case closed... right?

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Pablo Neruda, and the Election Protests in Iran

I'm not saying that Neruda is a voice that makes sense to use for the Mousavi supporters. The poem, like the situation unfolding in Tehran, is complex, and it would be dangerous to underestimate the complexity of either. So here is, what I hope, is a complex enough concatenation of these two forces that tells a story. Whose, I do not know, and all of us wait for the next chapters to be written.

The text is from "Tu Risa" ("Your Laughter") by Pablo Neruda. The photos and captions are of the election protests in Tehran, located at the Boston Globe website.

Your Laughter