Silent Warriors

On my last day in Maui, I noticed a dusty framed certificate in the living room. 

I doubt it had been looked at for years.

I knew that Grandpa Yamada had had a brother who served in World War II in the US Army, and who had died in France. I knew his name was Hideo. I also knew that his family did not want him to go, but he did. His family wasn't interned -- Japanese-Americans in Hawaii were largely exempt.

I remember finding his name on the monument to Japanese-American WWII servicemen in Little Tokyo, Los Angeles. I remember making a pencil etching of his name, paying the recommended donation, and hesitating to send it home. Someone suggested that it was unwise to bring him up to Grandpa.

And so, like so many things in my family, it was discarded and unspoken, and the opportunity to hear the story died. How ironic that we would be so cowardly when it came to discussing frankly the brave and honorable death of a relative.

And so here was an artifact from that past. Here was the thing I kept in mind every time I heard a Jap joke, the thing that I thought about every time a Korean or Chinese client or stranger grew slightly brittle upon learning that I am of Japanese ancestry. I have been told that in Asia, a conception of nationality distinct from race is challenging. My exposure was limited, so I can't say if that's the case. But if it is, it is one more reason I am grateful to have been born on this side of the ocean.

But here was new information. I assumed, being Hawaiian, Hideo served in the 100th Battalion. But it appears he served in the storied 442nd Regimental Combat Team, in F Company -- a distinguished company within a legendary regiment.

In high school, I read Silent Warriors: A Memoir of America's 442nd Regimental Combat Team. The author, Jack Wakamatsu, served in F Company.

I think Hideo was mentioned in passing -- just a sentence. At the time I wasn't sure if it was my great-uncle... Hideo is a common enough name.

The certificate indicates he died October 15, 1944, which would put it at the beginning of the attack on Bruyères.  So he died before the regiment rescued the "Lost Battalion".

My father claimed that he was killed by a sniper. But my father had a terrible habit of embellishing stories -- it would be a shame if he chose to embellish this one, for surely it doesn't need artificial drama.

His awards, and brief mention in Silent Warriors, perhaps suggests that he wasn't an exemplary member of the unit. But I'm not sure that means much if the unit itself is the most decorated, for its size and duration of service, in the history of American warfare.

I know nothing else about the man. I can't claim any pride for his service. But I do hope to keep his service in mind as I try to be a more decent man.

Law 5: So Much Depends On Reputation--Guard It With Your Life

OBSERVANCE OF THE LAW I

During China's War of the Three Kingdoms (A.D. 207-265), the greate general Chuko Liang, leading the forces of the Shu Kingdom, dispatched his vast army to a distant camp while he rested in a small town with a handful of soldiers. Suddenly sentinels hurried in with the alarming news that an enemy force of over 150,000 troops under Sima Yi was approaching. With only a hundred men to defend him, Chuko Liang's situation was hopeless. The enemy would finally capture this renowned leader.

Without lameting his fate, or wasting time trying to figure out how he had been caught, Liang ordered his troops to take down their flags, throw open the city gates, and hide. He himself then took a seat on the most visible part of teh city's wall, wearing a Taoist robe. He lit some incense, strummed his lute, and began to chant. Minutes later he could see the vast enemy army approaching, an endless phalanx of soldiers. Pretending not to notice them, he continued to sing and play the lute.

Soon the army stood at the town gates. At its head was Sima Yi, who instantly recognized the man on the wall.

Even so, as his soldiers itched to enter the unguarded town through its open gates, Sima Yi hesitated, held them back, and studied Liang on the wall. Then, he ordered an immediate and speedy retreat.

Interpretation

Chuko Liang was commonly known as the "Sleeping Dragon." ...The Sleeping Dragon carefully cultivated his reputation of being the cleverest man in China, one who always had a trick up his sleeve. As powerful as any weapon, this reputation struck fear into his enemy.

Sima Yi had fought against Chuko Liang dozens of times and knew him well. When he came on the empty city, with Liang praying on the wall, he was stunned. The Taoist robes, the chanting, the incense--this had to be a game of intimidation. The man was obviously taunting him, daring him to walk into a trap. The game was so obvious that for one moment it crossed Yi's mind that Liang actually was alone, and desperate. But so great was his fear of Liang that he dared not risk finding out. Such is the power of reputation. It can put a vast army on the defensive, even force them into retreat, without a single arrow being fired.

(from The 48 Laws of Power, by Robert Greene)

Science fiction, Ender's Game, and the nature of art

An excellent article:

Before he became a voice of the American right, Orson Scott Card wrote a really good book.

I wasn't aware of the controversy surrounding Orson Scott Card when he gave the 2003 commencement speech at Harvey Mudd. At the time, I hadn't even read Ender's Game. But I did read it, eventually, and loved it -- it rivals Dune as my favorite science fiction book of all time. (Sorry Foundation, but I think you'll be stuck with third billing.) It even made my 15 most influential books list. (Dune is absent.)

I am a firm believer that all good science fiction illuminates something about us as human beings. Often, it tricks us into thinking about psychology, or philosophy, or justice. It dazzles with an exotic setting or technology, or even different rules of physics, to get us to suspend our disbelief. And with that belief suspended, with our defenses lowered, we can more honestly look at ourselves, our societies, and our past than in any other art form.

Disarmed, we learn, even as we are treated to a fantastic story.

So it is with Ender's Game. How else could we view children as potential murderers? When I read A Long Way Gone: Memories of a Child Soldier, I brought along all my mental baggage and assumptions about Africa, foreign conflict, resource wars, and recent world history. And as well-written and powerful as it was, I wasn't fully able to immerse myself into the world of war-torn Sierra Leone, as seen through the eyes of a child. It was still a bit alien to me, because it was real.

But in Ender's Game, it seems more plausible, almost natural that the selection process and jealousy inspired by Ender's rise would lead to murderous impulses. And it seems equally natural that Ender, a fundamentally good boy, would kill, twice, to protect himself. It also seems plausible that adults would manipulate the circumstances to force this test of his mettle -- because we knew, as children, how adults manipulated us all the time, and not always for our own benefit.

So it's tragic, but it's true: I can better empathize with this boy in a science fiction novel than a real boy in the real world telling me about the real horrors of war.

Ender's Game treats children as equal to adults. The children are bright; sometimes, they are brighter than the adults. They learn, adapt, and strategize. They engage in war games, and, as we find out, real warfare. They feel emotions that are sometimes as sophisticated as those of an adult.

The sci-fi elements also help break down that wall between child and adult. In zero-g, standard measures of strength and size matter less, and a child can be the equal of an adult in combat. Those of us who read the book remember vividly the scene where Ender shouts triumphantly at Graff in the zero-g room. "I beat you! I beat you!"

But Graff held the wand that unfroze Ender. It was impossible to beat the adults.

And that is how they remain children. Unlike a lot of lesser children's literature, it doesn't make kids adults, or make the adults kids. The children of Ender's Game are capable and brilliant. But they are still subject to the control of adults. The adults determine their lives, even as those same adults place the fate of humanity in the hands of those same children.

***

So what about the politics of Orson Scott Card? Should that color how we view this book? How can we enjoy it fully if we know that this man campaigns actively against the identity of some of the same children who find, in his book, some strength and security from the complexity and hostility of real life?

For this the tragedy of Ender's Game. Or, it is the triumph of that book to transcend its author and become something else.

Ender's Game means a whole lot to precocious, nerdy children. I didn't have the privilege of finding this in my youth. But a lot of my Mudd friends did read it as children and young adults, and credit it for being both entertaining and inspirational. Some said it helped them deal with the ways adults usually treat children, especially bright, precocious ones.

And, yes, some were gay.

How ironic that it helped gay men and women, bright as hell, deal with misunderstanding long enough to break out and become who they were meant to be!

Except that it's not ironic at all: that's how art works.

Sometimes, a book (including That One), can become agents of change in ways directly contrary to the author's intent. That's what happens when art is created. It no longer belongs to the artist -- it belongs to us. All of us. (Especially That One.)

Ender's Game now belongs to my gay friends, and there's not a damn thing Orson Scott Card can do about it.

How to change the world

There is a pattern for organizational change that seemed to work for major changes in military doctrine, and can probably be extended elsewhere.

Note that many organizations, or society as a whole, might not be able to apply this. Society is more diffuse, with fewer sources of broadly accepted legitimacy. Also, for more flexible organizations, change can happen more quickly with hiring and firing, and may require more of a consensus.

With those caveats, let me begin.

I learned this about the American switch from a battleship-centered naval doctrine to a carrier-centered one, and use it as a case study to illustrate the points. The analysis is borrowed from the history mentioned in Knox and Murray, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050.

Step 1: Create a vision consistent with the mission of the organization.

Someone's got to have an idea of how things could be different, and why. It has to be an idea, not necessarily novel, but perhaps novel in application, and different enough to substantially change things. That idea has to be wedded with a need, or mission, and is often triggered by changes in technology or society that transforms it from fantasy to possibility.

Case study: sometime around or after World War I, someone had the idea of taking the relatively new aircraft and making it an attack craft based on a ship. Aircraft could provide reconnaissance of the surrounding waters and launch attacks at greater range and less risk than ship-to-ship combat. This was, of course, probably prompted by the preliminary use of aircraft in a combat role during the end of World War I coupled with advances in explosives, making it more feasible for an aircraft to carry effective bombs.

Step 2: Find a patron.

Even the greatest idea needs to be recognized as great by someone who matters. Specifically, the ideal patron has high rank/influence within the existing hierarchy, but enough creativity/humility/wisdom to recognize a good idea that has the potential to supplant existing doctrine but will improve the organization's capacity to fulfill it's mission.

This must be stressed: it is usually someone who has unquestioned credentials within the existing hierarchy. It is very, very difficult to change an organization completely from without -- such events truly are revolutions, and often lead to the destruction of the organization.

Case study: There was one battleship admiral in the entire US Navy that recognized the potential of aircraft to change the structure of naval warfare. His was a distinctly minority view. But he embraced the proposed idea, and was willing to undertake effort and risk on its behalf.

Step 3: Disguise or rebrand the change to minimize institutional resistance.

Most good innovations are resisted by the existing power structure. Why is that? It could be because the leadership feels that all the good ideas have already been adopted. It could be that they feel their position is threatened by the changes. It could be they don't understand it. It's not always the case that stability and familiarity are preferred -- presumably, some of these leaders got there by contributing innovative ideas themselves -- and so the reasons for resistance are often more varied than is often appreciated.

Nevertheless, it exists, and has to be overcome. All good insurgencies resist the temptation to match strengths -- if the minority upstarts had power, they wouldn't be minority upstarts.

One of the best ways to do this is to tweak the packaging, and even the secondary substance, enough to make it palatable to the existing leadership. Sometimes this requires outright lying, or some sacrifice of capabilities or scope.

The goal is to trade away some of these things for getting the Thing built. Once it's built, it's easier to change the parameters or scope of it. But all the principled statements in the world won't help if the Thing isn't built.

Case study: Recognizing the resistance of the leadership, as well as the technological testing and development period required to make the vision a reality, the admiral pitched carrier-based aircraft as support for battleships, used primarily for recon. Given that this was a pre-radar era, even the battleship admirals recognized this value, and reluctantly supported a modest carrier program.

Step 4: Create an incentive structure and promotion path built around the new doctrine.

A funded project founded on a good idea is worthless if no one wants to participate. If something is new, it's often not well understood. Most individuals won't want to risk their career on something that could be a huge waste of time. Plus, like the older leadership, it's easier just to buy into the existing system. The path has already been blazed, and the results more predictable, if not always glamorous.

By creating an alternate promotion path, the leadership, led by the patron, provides more security and stability to the new project by building in some structure. It's a tangible commitment of resources and will. Equally important, it shows that someone has put enough energy into the vision to understand how it would work in practice -- the new roles, the new skills, the new platforms and technologies that would be integrated into operations.

The alternate promotion path is critical because the technologies or the processes are new, and require specialized training. But it's also important because young, flexible newcomers will become indoctrinated into a new system, and not beholden to ideas or powers of organizations past.

Creating insurgent cells within an organization is easier if the organization itself gives you money and resources to do so.

Case study: After more general training, officers and enlisted men could specialize in carrier operations by attending special schools and programs designed to train crews how to operate and fight from these new platforms.

Step 5: Train, promote, improve, and do your mission. Wait about 20 years.

Why 20 years? Why so long? Basically, it's about the fact that old people die and retire.

It's a pessimistic view of human nature, one that suggests we are, in general, not very flexible in our beliefs and capacities. But it may be accurate. Even if, ideologically, we can change, often our training and abilities can't change quickly enough, or effectively enough, for us to remain relevant in the new era. It seems a bit sad, but it's the story of human existence.

For large organizations, like the military, or society itself, attrition doesn't happen on a large enough basis for any strategy other than a demographic long game to be reliably effective. Smaller organizations with more flexible hiring and firing policies can change things more quickly, though that has to be balanced by the costs of losing "good" institutional memory.

Case study: It worked. As the officers and enlisted personnel received training and assignments, they gained experience, promotions, and passed their lessons on. Designers integrated newer technologies into carriers, making them progressively more modern. Strategists refined doctrines, often through the crucible of warfare. Instructors grew in number and quality, as did the recruits. By the time of Midway and Coral Sea, only the most die-hard traditionalist could ignore the fact that naval warfare had revolutionized into carrier-centered missions.

Step 6: Repeat.

No generation has a monopoly on good ideas. (Or bad ones.) Each generation is destined to become the stodgy, inflexible elders, tempering the least productive impulses of a younger generation that feels it knows better and isn't willing to wait for change. (Keeping with the theme: "We want eight and we won't wait!") Ideally, any organization large and significant enough is reinventing itself at some low level constantly. This doesn't mean changing the job of everyone frequently, though certain organizations staffed with particularly flexible and capable individuals can do just that. It means simultaneously recognizing the desire for humans to take years to become proficient in specific, complicated tasks and the reality of a changing world. This can be accomplished by training individuals well to do specific tasks, but making sure that at least some new individuals are being trained in newer doctrines and principles.

Case study: The modern US Navy is still heavily based on carriers, but is also developing new, smaller ships with the goal of littoral combat. In the future, rail guns might replace larger weapons platforms completely. Nuclear power extended both the range and the mission of carriers. Nuclear submarines provided strike capabilities less vulnerable to surface attack. And STOVL aircraft provide a capability that permits carrier redesigns and somewhat less dependence on the carrier as both starting and ending point of all flights.

Benghazi in context

I have the luxury of being unimportant; therefore, I'll say something probably offensive.

Am I missing something? As I reexamine the foreign policy record of President Obama, I see a number of successes. Failures may depend upon your beliefs about "just wars", and perhaps less visible concerns regarding trade. (It's unclear what the long-term effects will be with fights with China over tires and other issues.)

From what I have read, the assault on the consulate at Benghazi appears to have been an intelligence failure. I don't know, and I may never know, precisely how, or why, additional security was not provided. These intelligence failures have existed before - does anyone remember the attacks against US Embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in 1998? These attacks killed many more people. September 11 was a tremendous intelligence failure -- but I don't recall people calling for the resignation of the President.

Can we wait for the investigation to conclude? If there was such an egregious miscarriage of justice involving the President and senior officials, I'm certain Congress will be happy to embark upon yet another impeachment hearing.

The Benghazi attack was a tragedy. It also led to the death of four people. These were four good people; but they were four. A sane nation cannot afford to make reckless claims about policy reversals and even war for four citizens. Even a great nation cannot afford to be so reckless.

Some perspective: the US and its allies saved thousands of lives, and, depending on how things go, Libyan democracy. It did so without a single American casualty. It did so with Britain and France exercising, at least in recent memory, unprecedented leadership in resources and risk. It may go down as a textbook case of how American interests, ideals, and capacity align, and how measured commitment can produce better (though not perfect) results.

It took thousands of lives, hundreds of billions of dollars, and many years for the majority of Americans to even begin to start questioning the justice of the Iraq War. Now, the intervention in Libya, and the overall approach of measured foreign policy of the last years, is seen as illegitimate because of four deaths in Benghazi?

How is this at all proportional?

I accept judgment that to count American lives reeks of the worst of armchair generalship. I accept that the United States has a responsibility to its citizens, and that its diplomatic corps is especially vulnerable and especially valuable.

But it just isn't computing for me -- unless I consider one possibility.

Benghazi has been amplified and magnified because it's difficult to assail the foreign policy record of this administration. Libertarians that believe in zero military intervention, or Niebuhrians/humanitarian interventionists that believe action was merited in Syria (and perhaps Iran in 2009).

Drone strikes are a more valid critique. But they aren't being criticized and magnified because, quite frankly, the killing of civilians in Pakistan by American drone strikes don't matter to the vast majority of constituents in either party, except in the abstract. At best, they are seen as the necessary price of waging a war against Al-Qaeda and terrorism in a state increasingly incapable of providing security to itself or its neighbors.

And there remain issues in Iran. But I don't see how Shane Bauer, Josh Fattal, and Sarah Shroud would be alive if Tehran had been bombed. Remember them? Was their release after years of incarceration a failure or a success of US diplomacy?

Remember Somali pirates? Remember Osama Bin Laden? Remember the release of hostages in North Korea?

What about the soft power coordination with the European Central Bank to stave off the recession?

Benghazi matters, but not for the reasons so many think.

It matters because it reveals how little effective criticism can be laid against the administration by its GOP opponents, possibly because it is indistinguishable from a realist GOP foreign policy. (It is quite distinguishable from a neoconservative foreign policy; some of the rhetoric suggests a Romney administration would have a chance of exhibiting the former, but the constituency of his foreign policy advisors suggests the latter.)

And it matters especially because it has revealed the tremendous gulf between me and others I know and respect. Their emphasis on Benghazi, ignoring the wider context of Libya, much less four years of foreign policy, makes me question their judgment and objectivity, at least in analyzing these issues.

If someone can explain, reasonably and coherently, how Benghazi invalidates an approach of scaling military responses to a situation and depending upon soft power wherever possible, I will gladly listen, and possibly even change my vote. You can refer me to an article or video, but I'll be far more likely to take your argument seriously if you articulate it yourself.

A note: I'd ask those who feel that military intervention is never justified, or are arguing from a primarily humanitarian interventionist position (esp. re: Syria) to alert me to such in the beginning. I'm not addressing this to you - our assumptions and metrics for acceptable vs. unacceptable intervention may just be too far apart for any fruitful discussion. Just letting you know ahead of time that I may not invest time to deflect those critiques. In all cases, please make sure your assumptions about the ethical nature of the use of force are clearly outlined so I can follow your chain of logic, even if I don't agree with your starting point.

Preliminary lessons from No Ordinary Time

I have finally finished No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II. It was a great read, filled with amusing stories as well as gripping drama. The book is too long and too interesting for me to feel comfortable summarizing it. However, it's also too important for me to not at least try to capture a bit of the lessons learned.

1. A mask of charm is both an invaluable political tool and incredibly hollowing. Both FDR and Reagan had a charm that seemed effortless. But both had been characterized by those closest to them as individuals for whom there remained a wide gulf between their essential self and the outside world. That gulf could not be bridged even by those closest to them. It seems a hard way to live, but I suppose being President is not easy.

I can't speak for Reagan, but FDR's pattern of charm and distance was established well before he contracted polio. It appears to stem from the early death of his father, his demanding (even domineering) mother, his status as a sheltered only child, and perhaps his social difficulties at Harvard.

I have been told by those somewhat close to me that they are surprised when I am honest with them about my past, about my feelings, and about my despair. Evidently I also use charm as a way of distancing myself, although obviously with considerably less facility than FDR.

2. It is important to have both a hammer and an anvil to effect social change. The anvil is sedentary and patient. The anvil waits for things to come to it. The hammer is impatient, restless, relentless. The hammer seeks to achieve through sheer determination a changed world. But the anvil knows that, with the hammer's help, good things will ultimately be forged.

Eleanor Roosevelt could accurately be characterized as a battleaxe, but for this analogy, she is the hammer. For her own personal reasons, and personal tragedies, she had a restless, relentless drive. This often led to a lack of focus - and in the case of Japanese-American internment, perhaps a critical level of diffusion that prevented an eleventh hour rescue from internment. But she was incredibly consistent, and very aggressive about pushing everyone, especially her husband, for change.

FDR, on the other hand, was a careful student of polls, and often moved very slowly on issues of social justice, economic restructuring, or other policy changes he knew were not widely supported. It is perhaps his genius, as well as a stain on his legacy, that he did not lead on issues of African-American rights, labor's struggle with crony capitalism, or war mobilization.

But it is fair to say that he depended upon Eleanor as a way of saying and doing things he could not, by virtue of his twin handicaps - one physical, and one vocational. Often, the President can't lead, and it's not because he lacks courage. It is because, by coming from the President, things that should be broadly supported, or self-evident in their justice, become immediately contentious. Recent history illustrates this.

It's also fair to say that Eleanor alone could not have done what she did without FDR's backing. Even though he was called upon repeatedly to rein her in, he refused. FDR trained Eleanor to really investigate things - to ask specific and incisive questions, to observe and remember. His gifts of memory are legendary; what I did not know was how he literally taught and trained his wife to become such a keen judge of organizations and individual character.

It's worth noting that they were aided tremendously by a press that regulated itself regarding the president, his wife, and the president's relationship with women. This probably will never be possible again - the press was, by and large, very deferential to the office and to the man. Even as his powers were failing in his fourth term, the press, his staff, and even members of Congress would do their best to conceal his lapses.

Eleanor also benefited by having a weekly column. She got plenty of hate mail over it, especially from the South over her support of African-American civil rights. Still, I wonder whether any first lady would, or could, write a weekly column appearing in newspapers across the nation, and the extent to which that could be a bully pulpit for change.

Catt needed Paul in Women's Suffrage. King needed X in Civil Rights. FDR needed Eleanor to preserve the home front, even as foreign affairs consumed him.

3. The story of race relations is intimately tied to the story of the American labor movement. I did not realize how little I knew about American Labor, nor about its role in the advancement of African-Americans. Even with the existential threat of world war, the fight for manufacturing jobs and combat roles for blacks was a brutal one. Perhaps less dramatically violent, but equally powerful, was the struggle to allow women to do factory work. Eleanor later realized that the war did more for the poor and the oppressed than the New Deal ever did, or perhaps could.

This period saw the increased militancy of African-American groups and American labor, including some incredibly unpopular mine strikes during the war. Fortunately for everyone, they were resolved more or less peacefully, with the president exercising some wisdom on the matter (of course supported by Eleanor's field reports).

4. Great individuals often depend upon several people to give them what they need to be great. FDR fed voraciously among various men and women for social company and relaxation. It wasn't parasitic, but it was a very aggressive symbiosis that often threatened the ability of others to enjoy basic levels of independence. Few gave more to the President than Harry Hopkins, but Roosevelt resented that Hopkins' marriage would eventually lead his key social and intellectual partner to move out of the White House.

Eleanor, similarly, depended upon Joe Lash, Lorena Hickok, her daughter Anna, and a number of people as sounding boards, foils, and, ultimately, sources of love. I'd say each of them demanded, and got, almost the entirety of the lives of ten individuals.

It's teaching me to be both more giving and more demanding of the people I would have close to me. Each of us has to find the handful of people -- rarely biologically related -- that make time and make a difference.

5. FDR overruled his military in key strategic decisions, and was right. But he did not try to fight the war himself, and he did not interfere at levels below grand strategy. To do this required tremendous confidence in one's self. In fact, it was Roosevelt's ability to remain calm even in the darkest days of the war that stunned, even creeped out, many who observed him.

This was a surprise to me, as I had previously read Partners in Command: George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace. In it, it appeared that the American general staff in general, and Marshall in particular, possessed unusually clear insight into the strategic aspects of the war. However, as No Ordinary Time reveals, Marshall himself admits he was wrong about a number of things - notably the need to support Britain and the Soviet Union early in the war, at the expense of US readiness. Also, both books acknowledge that American combat forces were too green, and would have been slaughtered had a premature European invasion taken place. Rather than a sideshow, the African and Italian campaigns helped harden American ground troops, and prepared them for success in Normandy and the Battle of the Bulge.

After Korea and MacArthur, civilian leaders were especially wary of military overreach. After Vietnam, civilian leaders were unnerved by the use of force. One hopes America is only now finally emerging from an unhealthy period where both military and civilian leadership lacked the self-confidence, tempered by the wisdom of restraint, to exercise effective leadership.

6. One can be in love with someone and mostly live separate lives. In many ways, FDR and Eleanor's relationship has strong parallels to Bill and Hillary Clinton. Both couples loved each other, and drew upon each other's strengths. Both wives were betrayed by their husbands, and in important ways, never forgave them. But both women also used the experiences as proof that they had to develop their own separate lives.

The American Experience: Clinton (one of a fantastic set of documentaries about American presidents, including FDR) mentions that Hillary Clinton actually moved back to Arkansas during one of Bill's early campaigns, and looked as if she was going to become a housewife, albeit one who worked outside of the home.

FDR and Eleanor redefined their love, what it was to be in love, even as they both needed emotional support and got it from people other than their spouse. Even more than the case with the Clintons, one gets the sense that something is keeping them together that is larger than either political necessity nor the mores of the time. It's fair that both were in love with each other, but both were also exasperated by each other. They depended upon key intermediaries to know how to manage them, singly and together. Most couples are not so lucky.

7. Sometimes, we can be surprised by the simplicity of the needs and desires of people far form home.

I'll mention briefly that one poignant vignette concerned Eleanor's visits to field hospitals in the Pacific. She was initially worried that the troops were going to be disappointed, as security procedures only announced that "a woman" was coming to visit. Eleanor, ever conscious of not living up to her mother's beauty, was worried the men would be expecting a pinup girl. But she found that they appreciated her visits, because she was something they hadn't seen in a year of service - an American mother.

Of all the things that tug at the heart in this book, this seemed a particularly touching insight.


There are many other lessons. But this is a good starting point.

No Ordinary Time: The Greer and The Tonkin Incident (and Iraq)

From No Ordinary Time: Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II by Doris Kearns Goodwin (p.277-278). This passage covers the Greer incident, which happened on September 4, 1941.

*****

While Eleanor attended her dying brother, Franklin was readying a major speech for delivery to the nation on September 11. He had committed the United States to convoys at the Atlantic Conference, but he had not yet revealed the new policy to the American people. A submarine attack on the U.S.S. Greer gave him the incident he needed to mobilize public support behind convoys.

The events surrounding the Greer attack were not quite as the president described in his nationwide radio address. He said the German submarine had "fired first upon the American destroyer"; he claimed the Greer's identity as an American ship was "unmistakable." In fact, the Greer had deliberately stalked the German sub, having been alerted to its presence by a British plane. The British plane had attacked the U-boat with depth charges while the Greer continued in pursuit. The sub fired a few torpedoes, the Greer responded with a few depth charges, and the chase came to an uneventful end. There was no positive evidence, the navy told the president, that the sub knew the nationality of the ship at which it was firing.

But the fact that German torpedoes had been fired on an American ship was all Roosevelt needed to reassert the principle of freedom of the seas. "No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs," the president warned the Axis powers, "We will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.... Let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril.... When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him. These Nazi submariners and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic."

To implement this warning, the president announced the final decision of the government to convoy British supplies, and a new policy by which the navy would shoot on sight any German raiders that came into our defensive zones. "It was," Stimson wrote, "the firmest statement and the most forward position yet taken by the President." Churchill was exultant. The shooting war in the North Atlantic had begun.

The president's "shoot on sight" policy won the solid support of 62 percent of the American people. "Sentiment on Capitol Hill has changed almost overnight," Washington correspondent David Lawrence reported. The news of the attack led "many a Congressman to say that the American people will not have their ships fired on and that defense of the freedom of the seas will once again command substantial support in both houses."

Yet, for all the positive results that the president's depiction of the Greer attack produced, an unfortunate precedent was set that would return in later years to haunt the American republic. "Roosevelt's deviousness in a good cause," Senator William Fulbright said after the Gulf of Tonkin incident helped propel escalation in Vietnam, "made it easier for Lyndon Johnson to practice the same kind of deviousness in a bad cause."

*****

Notes:
The Maine was sunk in Havana harbor in 1898
The Greer incident occurred in 1941.
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred in 1964.
This book was written in 1994, nine years prior to the invasion of Iraq.

Art imitates life, or, How George Orwell Plagiarized from American History

I am currently reading Doris Kearns Goodwin's wonderful book, No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II, I am consistently amazed at how much stuff I just don't know about this time period. The actual War overwhelms the history books, crowding out any domestic events in these decidedly crowded years. Many, many passages are absolutely wonderful to read. They also uncomfortably underline how little real history I know and comprehend.

One passage reminds me of George Orwell's masterpiece, Nineteen Eighty-Four, definitely one of my favorite books of all time. I had always thought Nineteen Eighty-Four was brilliant because it portrays a futuristic dystopian world in breathtaking detail. It does do this, and does it in a way that should make it the envy of all fiction. But its real, insidious genius is to warn about the potential future in a way that is subtly, but definitively, a mirror of the present times. As I found out from No Ordinary Time, one way Orwell did this was to lift directly from what was, for him, recent history.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, there is an amazing scene in which Oceania switches sides in the war, declaring war against its former ally, Eastasia, and allying with its former foe, Eurasia. It happens during a rally, and the conditioned hatred of the population is such that it is accepted without puzzlement or question. The signs held at the rally, now directed against the wrong nation, are attributed to spies and saboteurs, and are hastily torn down.

What a puzzling scene! How could a people be so immersed in doublethink?

From No Ordinary Time:

On the political left, confusion reigned. FOr months, following the Nazi-Soviet pact, communist-leaning organizations had been busily engaged in marching for peace, provoking strikes, and opposing aid to England. With Russia under attack, however, these same forces began to cry out for immediate intervention and massive aid for Russia. Robert Sherwood recalled attending an interventionist rally in Harlem on the Sunday afternoon of the Russian invasion. When he entered the Golden Gate Ballroom, there was a communist picket line in front with placards condemning the Fight for Freedom supporters as "tools of British and U.S. Imperialism." By the end of the rally, the picket line had totally disappeared. "Within that short space of time," Sherwood marveled, "the Communist party line had reached all the way from Moscow to Harlem and had completely reversed itself."

That same day, in a different part of the city, Michael Quill, the left-leaning head fo the Transport Workers of New York, was delivering an angry speech denouncing the imperialist war, arguing that the American worker should have absolutely nothing to do with it. In the middle of his speech, he was handed a note informing him that the Nazis had invaded the Soviet Union. Without missing a beat, Quill totally changed direction, arguing that "we must all unite and fight for democracy."

A brief summary of Iran's Nuclear Program and its status under the NPT

I decided to post this because I'm currently having an extended conversation with a friend about military intervention in Iran. I wrote this brief summary and analysis of Iran's nuclear program a few months ago. It was designed to sort of keep my writing and research skills up, but I was disappointed that it still reads like an undergrad paper. It contains a brief history of Iran's nuclear program, recent information concerning both Iran's economy and leaks about its nuclear capabilities, and its connection to China and Russia. Comments and corrections welcome.


An update was posted in early March. You can find it here.

Looking for the Silver Lining in the Mushroom Cloud

Introduction:

The most recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear program indicates that it has continued to refine uranium and is developing an implosion-type detonation device. The most recent US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program also reverses claims previously made in the 2007 NIE, which claimed that Iran was not actively pursuing nuclear weapons. The 2011 NIE is secret, but rumors indicate that Iran is actively pursuing a weapons program and will have the capability to develop a weapon within a few years.

History of Iran's Nuclear Program

A brief review of the history of Iran’s nuclear program is in order. Iran’s nuclear program began in 1957. Under the auspices of US President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, Iran received fuel, small reactors, expertise, and low-enriched uranium (LEU). In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and completed its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. France and Germany also worked with Iran in the 1970s. A 1974 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) determined that the Shah was likely to attempt a nuclear weapons program; that same year, India detonated its first nuclear weapon. Nonproliferation concerns caused France and Germany to abandon their nuclear reactor projects in Iran.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Western powers cut off most diplomatic and economic relations, with the US personally blocking bilateral agreements for nuclear power and fuel between Iran and Argentina, China, and Russia. Israel attacked Iranian nuclear facilities in 1981, but the program was rebuilt, in part, by help from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. After Khomeini’s death, his successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reprioritized technological development and research, including the nuclear weapons program. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 may have led the Iranians to place a moratorium on their nuclear weapons program, as reported in a 2007 NIE. (Bruno, 2010) However, recent evidence, summarized in the Nov. 8 IAEA report, indicate that Iran has continued to make progress refining uranium to weapons-grade and is working on the detonation device that will make it a practical weapon.

         

Iran and the NPT

            Iran had previously been cited for violations of the NPT, specifically Article III, which requires signatories to comply with the IAEA to implement safeguards and inspections. (NPT Treaty, 1968) Iran has refused to provide the IAEA access or information to all of its nuclear facilities on numerous occasions. The most recent report claims that Iran is now in violation of Article II as well, as it is developing a mechanism for detonating a nuclear weapon.

     

China, Russia, and Iran's Economy:

       Unfortunately for the parties worried about a nuclear-armed Iran, neither the Chinese nor the Russians appear to be willing to turn against their ally of sorts. The Chinese import the vast majority of Iranian oil, and, with the withdrawal of most Western business, constitute a large share of the foreign investment and trade with Iran. China has invested over $40 billion in energy projects in Iran and is the regime’s largest trading partner, with over $20 billion in trade each year. (Alwatan Daily, 2010) For its part, Russia has agreed to $1-2 billion of projects with Iran to develop nuclear power plants at Bushehr, with the promise of more cooperation down the road. (GlobalSecurity.org, 2011) Therefore, while recent news reports from the White House indicated agreement between the US, Russia, and China on Iran’s nuclear program, it is unclear whether that means a new round of UN sanctions would not be vetoed by either party.

            It is worth noting that while sanctions have not stopped the nuclear program, they have hurt the Iranian economy, leading to increasing amounts of unrest, most recently culminating in the failed Green Revolution of 2009-2010. Some optimists hold out the hope of internal regime change in Iran, one that would bring a pro-Western government to power that would disarm. However, the Arab Spring has left Iran relatively untouched, and the case of Syria – Iran’s close ally – indicates that regime change will not happen while a majority of the army remains loyal to the government.

            The global recession also caused oil prices to plunge, which have severely limited Iran’s ability to raise foreign currency. Note that its break-even point for crude prices for Iran was at $90/bbl as of 2008, well above oil prices for most of the last three years. (Gulf Times, 2008). Consequently, the Iranian government, which has limited opportunity for borrowing abroad, has likely reduced domestic oil subsidies, probably leading to greater economic hardship and social instability. Note that the Arab Spring happened when it did in part because of a spike in food prices.While this suggests that regime change could solve the problem for the world, most analysts anticipate that it would take a few years – longer than the time it would take for Iran to successfully produce a nuclear weapon.

  

Military Intervention in Iran:

            This leaves the option of military intervention. The most likely scenarios involve either the United States or Israel bombing the known and suspected nuclear facilities. It is unclear, however, what percentage of the weapons facilities are known and vulnerable to airstrikes.

            Another, less likely but intriguing scenario, would have an Arab nation or coalition attack Iran’s nuclear program. This prospect seems somewhat less far-fetched when one considers the historically strained relationship between the Arab states and Iran, born of religious and ethnic differences as well as concerns that its population and resources could overrun small (Jordan) or sparsely populated (Saudi Arabia) Arab states. The recent Wikileaks release indicates that Arab diplomats are very concerned about a nuclear Iran. (Zirulnick, 2010). If the Arab states will not attack Iran directly, they may be willing to offer public support for a military option.

            The next six months will be critical. Israel has indicated that it believes that Iran will have a weapon within a year. Given that it views an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat (and Iran itself has done little to dissuade them of that idea), then it is likely that Israel or the United States will act within that time period.

References:

Bruno, Greg. (2010). “Iran’s Nuclear Program”. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-nuclear-program/p16811.

Zirulnick, Ariel. (Nov. 29, 2010) “WikiLeaks reveals 5 Arab countries concerned about Iran”. Christian Science Monitor. Available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1129/WikiLeaks-reveals-5-Arab-countries-concerned-about-Iran/Saudi-Arabia.

(Nov. 8, 2011) Implementation of the NPT Safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. International Atomic Energy Agency. GOV/2011/65.  Available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/bog112011-65.pdf.

(1967) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).  United Nations. Available at http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/npttext.shtml

(2011) “WMDs: Bushehr”. Globalsecurity.org. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm.

(August 1, 2010) “China invests $40 billion in energy, gas”. Alwatan Daily. Available at http://alwatandaily.kuwait.tt/resources/pdf/802/12.pdf.

(Sept. 21, 2008). “Saudi needs oil above $49 to avoid deficit; Qatar break-even $24: IMF”. Gulf Times. Available at http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=242775&version=1&template_id=48&parent_id=28

Thought Experiment: Warfare in a warm, energy-starved world

Continuing the theme of "ultra-heavy Sunday", I'm considering a grim possible future outcome of the energy crisis. This, I admit, is inspired by the Discovery Channel special on global energy consumption: Powering the Future. This is going to be a lazy, "for-fun" analysis - don't expect numbers or a lot of research.

Imagine a world where energy costs have become a high, and possibly primary, cost of input. Imagine further that the economic and environmental stresses have led to shooting wars over remaining energy resources in the Middle East, the Arctic Ocean, the East China Sea, and the Niger delta. The conflict has also made deployment of a number of large-scale solar power arrays (photovoltaic or concentrated solar) and wind farms prohibitive, as their geographic and technical requirements mean they are particularly vulnerable to attack.

The Taliban are Very, Very Smart

NYTimes article on new Taliban tactics

This is very, very smart. As Stephen Biddle at CFR noted in 2008, the Anbar Awakening happened, in part, because the local tribal leaders were fed up with Al-Qaeda in Iraq interfering with their traditional system of patronage.

This approach -- using existing systems of patronage -- appears to be harder in Afghanistan, in part, because those preexisting systems might involve the drug trade. Setting up a new system can work, but it's more vulnerable, especially to the tactics described in the article (intimidation and misappropriation).

Frank Rich as a model 21st century columnist

I'm linking to Frank Rich's most recent Op-Ed piece on the dangers of escalating the war in Afghanistan ("Two Wrongs Make Another Fiasco"). But before going into the content, I wanted to highlight that Mr. Rich, perhaps better than any other Op-Ed contributor at a print publication, makes liberal use of embedded links. I find this an incredibly useful tool to those of us who read the NYTimes online.

Mumbai

It should be no surprise that we stand with the people of India and Pakistan during this crisis. Good and decent individuals everywhere were horrified. And for all our faults, I believe the people of the United States still believe, and will yet sacrifice, for the right of individuals everywhere to be free and safe from tyranny. To our friends in the most distant parts of the globe, we offer our prayers, and our support.

But we must not substitute passion for policy, and bold words for substance. Both are needed. Though diminished by policy blunders foreign and domestic, the word, confidence, support, and - it is true - military might of the United States still speaks strongly, if not always convincingly, across the wide world. Yet it is precisely now, when the need for multilateral coordination of policy is greatest, that we find ourselves most vulnerable and least able to play a strong role.

This is not to say that the United States should or will retreat into isolation. The temptation is great, but the dangers are greater. We hope that the current necessary process of deleveraging, recapitalization, and rectifying trade imbalances will provide a more stable and transparent international financial system. In the meantime, balancing moral hazard, limited resources, and systemic risk, and mindful of the politically possible, we labor to manage expectations of many, many stakeholders. The time has not come for the United States to cede its leadership in many of the international institutions that it created and dominated in the post-WWII era; but it is long overdue for us to begin transmuting these institutions into something that can work in a multipolar world, a world where we welcome a stronger, richer, and ever more democratic India. Our experience teaches us the value of a democratic nation endowed with the talents of its people, its rich cultural heritage, its natural beauty, and, most importantly, good relations with stable neighbors. We wish the same destiny for India, distinct and improved by attention to history and its own distinctive heritage and values.

We stand with the people who grieve in Mumbai and every corner of the world. But we also pray, fervently, that the desire to do good does not lead us to settle for doing something. The goal may well be deteriorating relations between India and Pakistan. The emotional backlash and subsequent actions taken by all parties may result in just that.

Those in positions of power need no lecture from people like me; as is usually the case, those who know better need no reminder, and those who don't need no responsibility. For the rest of us, we must have the courage to read, think, and analyze, as we respect and appreciate the honesty and right for high emotions from all concerned. We should never deny the validity of emotions - but we must always, always question the judgment that comes from acting solely on them.

shantih
shantih
shantih

The Bear, the Eagle, and the Gap

Who controls low-earth orbit controls near-earth space. Who controls near-earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind.

- Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics for the Space Age


"The (Russian) Empire Strikes Back" was already used by the Time leader article on Aug. 12. On the subject of space...

On Tuesday and Wednesday, I attended the Cornell Workshop on Space Security. It was a great conference, with lots of interesting discussions about issues in space security. Particular attention was given to China's anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test in 2007 and the US ballistic missile defense program. I will write notes and thoughts about the conference later this weekend.

For now, I want to broach the issue of what the Russia-Georgia conflict and cooling relations with the Kremlin may mean for the US manned space program. In particular, what will happen when the Shuttle is retired in 2010, with no foreseeable replacement until Ares-I/Orion goes online in 2016 (2018? 2020?)

With so much happening on Earth in the financial and political arenas, I'm finding that I'm a bit rusty on space politics. However, Jeff Foust's blog, spacepolitics.org, remains a useful source for quick bits of space-related news.

An August 13 entry mentions that a planned extension of NASA's exemption of the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) is probably dead. That exemption permits NASA to buy Progress and Soyuz flight services from Russia, which, in the absence of a working Shuttle program, are the only way for US astronauts to get to and from the International Space Station, as well as perform manned repairs of space assets.

Read the comments - there's one indicating some fighting between the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and NASA over the testimony of the AIAA director to Congress, suggesting that additional resources be devoted to a near-term human-qualified capsule for low Earth orbit access, rather than to an acceleration of Constellation.

The United States has already paid for Soyuz flights in 2010-2011.
Michael Griffin has indicated that Soyuz flights to cover 2011-2016 would be in excess of $2 billion.

I'm still processing this information, but this could become politically salient. After all, if Florida's electoral votes (I'm discounting the online space community's impact) convinced Obama to reverse his position on delaying Constellation to fund federal science education programs, the threat of sending additional money to a revanchist Russia might lead to an increase in funding to NASA (and the contractor who wins the bid).

The Devil Went Down to Georgia

To be fair, I'm still sorting out the causal reasons and contributions of the belligerent parties in the current war in South Ossetia. But it was a clever title for a serious topic. Right now the facts are still unclear enough that it's not wise to lay blame completely on any party.

Tensions between Russia and Georgia spiked when a Georgian drone was shot down by a Russian fighter, allegedly taking off from Abkhazia.

But why now? Why would Russia launch airstrikes and move into South Ossetia now?

A couple possibly related factors:

1. Foreign firms are presently finding it harder to do business in Russia

Foreign companies have found it increasingly frustrating to do business in Russia. In particular, the experiences of Mechel and BP suggest that foreign multinationals face the risk of nationalization or interference from the Kremlin on joint projects.

On July 24, Putin criticized Mechel's CEO and accused it of selling resources to Russia at higher prices than those charged to other countries. This caused the stock to plunge 38 percent.

TNK-BP, the joint partnership between energy multinational BP and Russian assets, also faced trouble that month. On July 6, BP sued its Russian partners (four billionaires) in the High Court of London for the equivalent of US$360 million over a tax claim lodged on June 30. The CEO has faced a lot of visa problems, and left Russia on July 25, claiming "harassment".

Some are drawing parallels between the fate of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Yukos in 2003, but the circumstances concerning Mechel are a bit different. A war in Georgia could distract from issues internal to Russia.

Other than those two high-profile cases, I don't know what is going on internally in Russia right now. Someone who does should comment on whether or not there is a current power struggle going on between Putin and his allies and other Russian elites.

2. Oil is off 22% from its record highs in July.

The price of oil has fallen from a peak of $147.02 per barrel on July 11, 2008 to Friday's close at $115.20 on the NYMEX.

Georgia contains part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which was expected by 2009 to transport approximately 1 million barrels of oil per day from Azerbaijan's Caspian Sea oil fields. Evidently Georgia is entitled to transit fees of about US $62.5 million per year (Wikipedia)

Georgia also contains part of the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which can transport up to 145,000 barrels per day (though current capacity may be lower). Apparently Russian strikes have attacked the port of Poti, close to the Supsa oil terminal.

The Baku-Novorrossiysk pipeline, which bypasses Georgia and runs from Azerbaijan to Russia, has stopped transporting oil as of February 2008 because fo disputes between Russia and Azerbaijan about natural gas supplies. (Wikipedia)

An attack/invasion of Georgia would have the near-term effect of increasing oil prices, with possibly the long-term effect of extending Russian influence over the Caspian oil fields. Interestingly, Georgia reports that approximately 30 Russian missiles or bombs were launched at the pipeline, but none had hit. If true, this might suggest a desire to highlight the threat of a shock to oil supplies while preserving the existing infrastructure.

Also note that BP is the largest shareholder (30.1%).

3. The Olympic Games

Opening ceremonies for the 2008 Olympics took place on Friday. The timing is odd, to say the least. It may be that someone decided that the Olympics would provide enough of a distraction to deflect attention away from an attack - hopefully delaying the international community's response long enough to make regime change - if that is the goal - a fait accompli.

Though it seems a bridge too far to say it's planned, at the very least, if there's an attack within China, it will seem miniscule by comparison to a full-blown war in South Ossetia/Abkhazia.

So what happens now? Vague predictions:

1. The price of oil jumps on Monday. Global oil consumption is about 80-85 million barrels per day. Right now, I can only guess as to the magnitude of the jump, though I plan on updating this post later with historical indications of what taking 1 million barrels per day off the global market might do.

2. Ukraine decides whether or not to provoke a Russian response by restricting portage of Russian naval vessels. It's already given some indications that this is a possibility, although there's nothing solid.

3. Stock markets around the world drop in response to the jump in oil.

4. The US will talk to the Czech Republic about using the withdrawal of the theater missile defense to be deployed in the CR as a bargaining chip to mitigate Russia's actions in Georgia, and to retain an agenda on Iran.

5. Someone mentions switching positions on Kosovo, causing another diplomatic incident (whether it's official or not).

Thoughts?

Stephen Biddle on Iraq - CU-SWAMOS Reception, July 22, 2008

Dr. Stephen Biddle, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Iraq Study Group, addressed the CU-SWAMOS conference this evening. His speech was focused on the state of Iraq, the changes between now and the situation when he last spoke at SWAMOS, and his perspective on what it would take to stabilize the situation.

A few things before I go into what he said.

First, Dr. Biddle was much more optimistic in his assessment than in the summer of 2007, for a number of reasons apparent in his comments.

Second, unlike his talk in 2007, he did not use two stories about his experiences in Iraq to illustrate the situation in Iraq. Rather, he focused on describing the trends and changes that have taken place at the local, national, and regional level. While this may seem less personal, I felt it allowed him to go into more detail about the overall strategic situation.

Enough from me - here are my draft notes from his talk.

*****

Biddle began by pointing out that strategic objectives should define troop counts and withdrawal schedules, not the other way around. Existing political discussions frequently take a contrary approach, starting with a desired troop level and a withdrawal date, and working from there to define objectives that can be met.

His talk was divided into two main sections:
(1) the causal dynamics of the continuing counterinsurgency/peacekeeping in Iraq
(2) achievable goals

He stated clearly that the probability of achieving the chief goal - avoiding persistent, large-scale violence - had improved dramatically since the last time he spoke in 2007. (In 2007, he claimed success probability of 10%, assuming the US did everything perfectly - and this assessment caused him to claim that he was far more optimistic than most. For those at SWAMOS, yes, I've got proof that Dr. Kirschner was wrong, and Biddle was right in his memory. Sorry Jon - not picking on you.)

He did emphasize that the achievable, positive outcome was not "Eden on the Euphrates" - that is, a vibrant, stable liberal democracy. Instead, the US can hope for, at best, a decentralized state or an authoritarian government similar to that under Saddam Hussein.

*****

Biddle said that the United States had two chief war aims, one humanitarian, and the other narrowly strategic.

1. Humanitarian: avert rapid escalation of violence
2. Strategic: ensure that the war does not spread to the rest of the oil-producing Middle East.

Unlike in 2007, Biddle is optimistic about prospects for success, as defined above, in Iraq.

One of the chief reasons is that the underlying strategic landscape is different from a year ago. He mentioned that the decline in violence has not been ephemeral. It is in fact sustained by a change in the self-interested strategic calculus of the principal combatants in Iraq.

Biddle focused on three particular changes - two which the United States did not plan, one of which we would have actively prevented if we could have.

1. Bombing of the Askariyya (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra in 2006.

Prior to the bombing, the Sunni insurgency felt that it was in a superior position to Shiite forces. Consequently, their goals were to facilitate an American withdrawal, then retake control of the country.

However, the bombing and subsequent battle in Baghdad over the next year taught them that the Shiite militias were, in fact, far more powerful than they had predicted. This was facilitated by the fact that, prior to Samarra, the Shiite militias' function had been primarily defensive. After the bombing, Shiite militias successfully cleansed Baghdad of Sunni populations.

At the time, most Americans viewed the yearlong battle in Baghdad as a catastrophe. And, Biddle notes, it was, in humanitarian terms. Neither US ground forces nor the Iraqi Army was able to intervene in the struggle. Both opted to stay largely on the sidelines. But, as a consequence, the Sunni insurgency realized that if the Americans withdrew, Shiite forces alone could defeat them.

Biddle believes that in 5-10 years, when historians look back upon the Iraq War, they will see the "Battle of Baghdad" as a turning point.

2. Al-Qaeda in Iraq brutality to Sunni coreligionists

The second key shift came as a consequence of the defeat of Sunni insurgents by Shiite militias. Al-Qaeda has dealt harshly with its own allies, often providing severed heads of the children of Sunni leaders viewed to be less than enthusiastic in their support of the insurgency. The Sunni population had tolerated such brutality because their only alternative had been to face Shiite death squads.

This calculus changed after the Battle of Baghdad. Even with Al-Qaeda's help, Sunni insurgents were unable to prevent the Shiite takeover of Baghdad. The calculus that had supported the alliance had changed - in Biddle's words, it had become "all pain and no gain".

At this point, Sunni leaders began approaching US forces and attempted to broker a deal. They offered a cease-fire, in which Sunni forces would not engage US forces, Iraqi army, or other Sunni groups. (Biddle rather conspicuously left out Shiite militias; I assume that the agreement permitted self-defense against Shiite forces.) Furthermore, Sunni leaders would provide biometrics (fingerprints) and a contact list of their armed members and the names of their family. In return, the US provided identifying uniforms (polo shirts, baseball caps, chinos) to help identify non-hostile Sunni forces, recognized the Sunni forces as legitimate police authorities over their current zone of control, and provided a payment of $300 per month, per person. Contrary to some reports, they received no ammunition or armaments - as Biddle dryly pointed out, the insurgency hadn't had a problem with procuring ammunition and arms when it was firing at US forces over the last few years.

Consequently, by mid-2007, the Sunni insurgency had largely died out.

3. "The Surge"

Biddle points out that the negotiated settlements with Sunni leaders depended upon the Surge. The additional US forces helped were not sufficient to guarantee security to the nation as a whole - what they were able to do was provide security in regions where the Sunnis had negotiated cease-fires. With these new allies, Al-Qaeda lost the "cover and concealment" that is needed by any insurgency. Sunni allied forces, often referred to as the Sunni Awakening/Concerned Local Citizens/Sons of Iraq, provided the locations of Al-Qaeda safehouses and bomb-making factories, as well as a list of leadership and operatives.

Al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency had facilitated the rise of Shiite militias. These militias, including Jaish al Mahdi, realized that the Shiite population was completely dependent upon them for security. Consequently, the militias began assuming control over necessities and commodities (such as cooking oil) and profiting at the expense of local Shia. Increasingly, they were viewed as predators, not protectors, though the relationship was deemed, as in the Sunni case, as a necessary evil.

The Surge corresponded with the declining popularity of the Jaish al Mahdi, and thus changed the calculus for Shiite militias. In the prior two engagements with US forces, the Shiite militias had met heavy losses. However, the popularity of Moqtada al-Sadr and other militia leaders guaranteed that they would be able to make good their losses. But their eroded support, combined with increased US Army presence, caused many Shiite militias to negotiate a cease-fire.

Consequently, in autumn of 2007, the Sunni and Shiite militias had negotiated peace. Al-Qaeda and the remaining Sunni insurgency had retreated to a few areas in Mosul and its environs.

This change precipitated an interesting development in March/April 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Iraqi Army took the fight to the Jaish al Mahdi in Basra. Ultimately - though only with the support of US and British forces - they were able to defeat al-Sadr's forces in Basra.

*****

Biddle notes that Iraq remains in the grip of an ethnosectarian civil war. Two prerequisites are needed for a sustained reduction in violence:

1. Cease fire participants continue to see peace as in their own self-interest
2. The presence of an outside peacekeeper that locals trust.

Biddle feels that #1 has already been achieved through over 200 negotiated cease-fires with various insurgent groups/militias. As he notes, many of these take the form of explicit contracts.

However, #2 remains a tricky issue. Neither Sunnis nor Shia trust the other with weapons, and both remain fully armed. Right now, the only possible outside force that can serve as effective peacekeepers trusted by each side is the US Army.

This brought the talk to the issue of troop withdrawal and counts. Biddle underlined his assessment that early drawdown would be dangerous - as noted in his 2007 talk, he felt that it could lead to a civil/regional war. He felt US forces needed to remain through two critical events in Iraq:

1. Provincial elections (2008)
2. National parliamentary elections (2009)

Biddle anticipates that both would be targeted for violent disruption, and had the potential to spark renewed conflict, depending upon the results.

The Balkans was held up as an example of what the United States should expect regarding its future commitment - a few years of sustained peacekeeping and stability, followed by a gradual reduction to half the existing force. Biddle suggests that a detailed Pentagon study would be needed to assess what forces are needed - but to provide an idea, Biddle recommends that about 100,000 (plus or minus a couple brigades) would be needed. If Iraq remained largely stable through provincial and national elections, then the United States could expect to reduce its forces by about 50% from 2010-2012.

On Afghanistan:

Biddle disagrees with Obama's emphasis that Afghanistan is the central front on the War on Terror, for two reasons:

First, Iraq is substantially more volatile. He notes that Afghanistan is currently under-resourced. (He quotes a figure of 10-15%, which he seemed to indicate should not be taken too seriously.) However, he felt that while things are getting worse, they would get incrementally worse over the course of 2-3 (maybe even 4!) years without running the risk of catastrophe. On the other hand, Iraq's stability is less certain, with the possibility, given a triggering event, of returning to high levels of violence over a matter of weeks.

Second, US interests in Iraq are more critical than its interests in Afghanistan, since Iraq is adjacent to the chief oil-producing nations in the Middle East. At present, Al-Qaeda has a significant presence in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan - it is currently headquartered in western Pakistan. However, Biddle believes if bin Laden were to choose which of the two countries he would rather have as a headquarters, he would probably choose Iraq because of its greater potential instability and resources.

He concludes with a clear call for an Iraq first strategy, akin to the Europe-first strategy that was outlined (though not always followed) in World War II.

I'll fill in Q&A a bit later - it was fairly extensive.

Q1: Where do the militias get their money?

A1: The Shiite militias get a lot of their money from Iran. The Sunnis get money from Saudi Arabia and Syria. Biddle also notes that a lot of money acquired by Ba'athists while Saddam Hussein was in power left the country. [NB: I don't think he mentioned when] Much of that money is returning to Iraq now. Critically, Iraq's own oil revenue helps the insurgency to be financed from internal resources.

Q2: What is your prediction for the configuration of US forces in the Middle East around 2010?

A2: Biddle focused on what he would like to see. He envisions 100,000 ground troops in 10-12 combat brigades. Some would be distributed among Iraqi army, and others doing peacekeeping. The key is to have American forces in sufficient numbers such that their presence is known and available, should fighting flare up. Currently, a lot of the American ground forces have shifted from counterinsurgency to peacekeeping (e.g. helping local law enforcement/militas track down violators of cease-fires using forensics).

Q3: My experience in Pakistan causes me to believe that it will be indefinitely unstable. Your thoughts?

A3: Biddle agrees that Pakistan is "a mess". He feels that principal-agent theory would play a prominent role in analyzing the situation in Pakistan. Pakistan is already waging a counterinsurgency war within its borders, especially in the West. He said that Pakistan deserved its own talk, and would defer to a Pakistan specialist.

Q4: Jonathan Kirschner pointed out that Biddle's talk a year ago claimed that either extreme (immediate withdrawal or continued, indefinite presence) would be preferable to a slow drawdown (a "middle road"). This year, it sounds like Biddle is actually advocating a "middle road" toward withdrawal. He also offered a realist take on Iraq: the issue is not security or confidence-building, but simply that the interests of the players are fundamentally different and irreconcilable. Wouldn't a withdrawal timetable just lead to the respective parties backward inducting and shifting their plans to incorporate the withdrawal date? Furthermore, you assume that the US peacekeeping effort will go through successfully - even if it did, mistakes might be made that would lead to renewed conflict.

A4: Biddle first noted, with humor, that he was happy realists were alive and well at Cornell. He feels, however, that currently it's in everyone's interest to cooperate. The key is to use the Balkans model of continued presence and a shift to peacekeeping to make sure it continues in everyone's interest to adhere to the 200 or so individual cease-fire agreements that have been negotiated.

Q5: How do you anticipate that your plan, McCain's plan, and Obama's plan would be affected by troop fatigue?

A5: The current level of 15 brigades (140,000 troops) is unsustainable.

One of the problems is that the current level may exist, in part, as a negotiation tactic by the current administration to make sure that troop levels aren't drawn down significantly below the minimum needed to maintain stability. (In his words, the administration would probably draw down to about 12 brigades today if they were certain that Obama wouldn't cut the force to 5 brigades upon taking office.)

Biddle feels that a political solution would be to work out a deal by which Bush and, say, an Obama administration would each help with the drawdown.

Q6: How would this assessment change if Israel attacked the Iran nuclear program?

A6: Biddle thinks this would be a huge disaster to American interests. However, he felt that America could prevent an Israeli raid. Israel would likely need to use Iraqi airspace in order to launch a strike. If the US were to withhold the IFF codes, it's possible that the Israelis would not want to run the risk of either crossing their powerful ally, or, barring that, being shot down by American anti-aircraft defenses.

Biddle says that very senior members of the administration have confirmed that the administration does not want a war with Iran. According to them, they have to pretend that military options are on the table to negotiate with a stronger hand to get Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. They also note that it may be perceived to be an empty threat, because of ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In response to a comment that Dick Cheney might decide we should go to war: "Dick Cheney might pull a gun in the Oval Office and get a war in Iran. Life is probabilistic." (Biddle said "Life is probabilistic" a couple times in his talk, to underline that weird things happen that good theorists might not be able to predict or anticipate.)

The Israelis are another matter - they will definitely seek to attack Iran if it does not give up its nuclear ambitions.


Q7: Could you respond to Prime Minister al-Maliki's comments that indicated support for Obama's plan for withdrawal of US forces?

A7: Biddle believes that this is primarily driven by Iraqi domestic politics. He notes a couple key trends:
(1) Incumbents in Iraq are tremendously unpopular.
(2) Even though the al-Mahdi army and insurgent groups may be less popular then they are now, they are still considerably more popular than incumbents. Consequently, it is likely that they will increase their political representation in the upcoming provincial elections.
(3) The Sunnis will also increase their representation, especially in the form of political alignments built around the Sons of Iraq (note: the Sunnis largely boycotted the last election.)

According to Biddle, al-Maliki does not have a political base. He is Prime Minister because he was "everyone's second choice and no one's tenth choice."

Al-Maliki sees an opportunity to position himself as a Shiite nationalist - he can do this by pushing for a withdrawal of American troops.

Predictably, most Iraqi politicians do not want a withdrawal but will not say so publicly. More interestingly, most of the Iraqi people also do not want a withdrawal, but also blame American troops for a lot of the country's problems.

Anti-American rhetoric had been tolerated by the United States as being politically necessary for Iraqi politicians to campaign successfully. However, since the political debate has bid itself up such that withdrawal is a necessary plank in any candidate's platform, it will be difficult to negotiate a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that permits US forces to legitimately remain in the country. However, Biddle thinks there will be a solution - possibly depending on some formula that provides enough flexibility for sufficient ground forces to remain in the country.

Q8: How long can we permit Afghanistan to deteriorate?

A8: Biddle feels that the condition in Afghanistan is not nearly as critical as that in Iraq. This is primarily because of the weakness of support for the Taliban. In Afghanistan, the enemy depends heavily upon ideology and not very much on ethnicity. Furthermore, the Taliban's ideology is itself unpopular with the majority. In Iraq, on the other hand, the prime driver for insurgents is ethnic, not ideological. He reiterated that Afghanistan is under-resourced, and will grow consistently - though steadily - worse, with a crisis occurring in 2-4 years if no additional forces are deployed.


Q9: Is it reasonable to envision UN forces in Iraq?

A9: Yes, but it will take a couple of years. Unlike in most countries, the UN is not very popular (because of the sanctions), and would not be welcomed any more than American troops.

Q10: Where in the world is Moqtada al-Sadr?

A10: He is apparently in Iran studying to be an ayatollah. Biddle claims that he wants to be the new al-Sistani. He is also establishing offices in Europe.

His policies are viewed as inconsistent with the needs and desires of his core constituency - poor Shiites - who seek basic access to necessities and jobs more than global revolution. His eroding political position has made Maliki think he can claim poor Shiites as his political base.

Q11: What could happen domestically that would convince America that your plan is correct? Alternatively, what could happen that would make your plan of 100,000 troops until 2012 impossible?

A11: It's important for negotiations about peacekeeping through 2012 to be distinct from the idea of permanent war. As Biddle pointed out, the Democratic party has been supportive of peacekeeping in the past. He maintains that it is important to recognize that whatever errors were made going into the war, it would be a gross national error to withdraw prematurely and leave an unstable Iraq, where a civil war would extend to a regional war, engulfing most of the oil-producing Middle East.

Epilogue:


Dr. Stephen Biddle is an incredibly impressive person - he's one of the most solid scholars I've met. At Cornell, I've had the privilege of listening to a number of distinguished public figures and academics discuss world affairs. But unlike some of them (Frank Fukuyama comes to mind - not that I'm picking on him), Stephen has a solid delivery, a clear logical structure, and a way of covering just about all the bases in an hour address. Though I've never heard or read any of George Marshall's speeches during World War II, I have heard that a large part of the general's distinctiveness was his ability to think widely and deeply, and articulate that thought in a distilled, concise manner. This is the impression I got today.

I'm also happy to report that, unlike when I greeted General Zinni with a half-chewed Nutter Butter in my mouth, I was able to comport myself with (relative) dignity in this gathering.

As additional evidence of Biddle's solid memory, he remembered that I had sent him an email and given him some astronomy pictures for his daughter, Anna. With a mind like that working on Iraq, I'm sleeping a bit more easily. :)

The Bonus Army

Information about a little piece of American History: inspired by a quote.

The Bonus Army

(from Partners in Command)

With the nation mired in an economic crisis, World War I veterans lobbied to be paid the bonus promised them when they had signed up to fight in France. A "Bonus Army" of veterans descended on Washington to pressure Congress to act, but in July 1931 the Bonus Bill failed. Encamped in the swampy Anacostia Flats, the Bonus Army (some five thousand strong, including women and children, all living in hovels) became increasingly militant, greeting police patrols with bricks and stones. At the end of July 1931, Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley ordered MacArthur to intervene: "Proceed immediately to the scene of disorder.... Surround the affected area and clear it without delay." Summoned to the chief of staff's office, Eisenhower was ordered to accompany MacArthur at the head of the troops. Eisenhower was skeptical: "I told him that the matter could easily become a riot and I thought it highly inappropriate for the Chief of Staff of the Army to be involved in anything like a local or street-corner embroilment." MacArthur waved off Eisenhower's warning: there was incipient revolution in the air, he said, and he was going to do something about it.

With MacArthur in the lead, troops under the command of George Patton used tear gas to disperse the camp. the decision brought howls of protest from a nation that remembered the use of gas in the Great War. Told by President Hoover to use restraint and to stay out of Anacostia Flats, MacArthur later claimed that he never received such an order. That was a lie, and MacArthur and Eisenhower knew it. MacArthur had received the order; he just refused to obey it. Eisenhower was horrified by MacArthur's actions, but he defended them, writing an official report for MacArthur that was a model of discretion. But the difference between the two was obvious for all who saw them at Anacostia Flats: "there is MacArthur in full regalia, complete with several decks of ribbons, looking sternly upon the 'battlefield,' with the look of eagles in his eyes," a reporter later reflected. "Next to him is Ike, dressed in a regular unadorned uniform. If you take a close look at the expression on Eisenhower's face, you realize it is one of cold, caustic contempt. This is the closed Eisenhower, who later observed he had learned acting from MacArthur." Eisenhower was enraged by MacArthur's actions, telling the historian Stephen Ambrose in an interview toward the end of his life, "I told that dumb son of a bitch not to go up there." [1]







One footnote - one of the leaders of the protest was Joe Angelo, winner of the Distinguished Service Cross for saving his commanding officer, George Patton's life during the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, Sept 1918, during World War I.

Another quote:

In the smoldering aftermath, a dazed, rail thin Joe Angelo approached his old boss but was harshly rebuked. "I do not know this man," Major Patton growled. "Take him away and under no circumstances permit him to return." [2]

[1] Mark Perry, Partners in Command
[2] http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/5532