What happened to the Wall Street Journal's writing?

I'm catching up on news after a wonderful 4th of July. Evidently North Korea did launch several short-range missiles into the Sea of Japan yesterday.



As distressing as this development is, I found myself even more distressed by some not-so-nuanced reporting in the Wall Street Journal on this story. In particular, this passage bothered me:


North Korea's leaders are able to push forward their weapons program because they show little regard for the impact of weapons-related economic penalties on the country's people. Moreover, they have South Korea and Japan pinned down militarily by hundreds of missiles and artillery rockets and they have China fearful that their ouster and resulting instability would send many North Koreans into northeastern Chinese provinces. (emphasis added)


Now, I can tolerate the last few paragraphs reading like it was excerpted from a MPP class paper. It seems factually correct - it's true that China has seemed to be a bit more cooperative with the US as Kim Jong Il (or whoever is in charge) appears increasingly willing to take the country down the road to collapse. It's also accurate to say that the North Korean nuclear program has as much to do with blackmailing nearby nations as well as internal political machinations.

But it's decidedly incorrect to characterize Japan and South Korea as "pinned down militarily".

Japan officially has only a modest-sized Self-Defense Force. In practice, however, when considering the size and capabilities of Japan's domestic police force, it ranks around 4th in Jane's review of national militaries. (I don't have a recent reference for the Jane's statistic, and couldn't find it in a brief online query - an updated reference would be greatly appreciated!) Japan and South Korea also have access to Aegis Combat Systems - only five navies in the world currently have this - which have (some) anti-ballistic missile capabilities.

In practice, South Korea is "pinned down" economically, not militarily. The South Korean market tanked a couple weeks ago when rumors first started surfacing about Kim Jong Il preparing to hand over power, partly because ANY regime change carries with it the possibility of complete collapse. And a collapse of North Korea would expose South Korea to significant economic problems associated with refugees, security, and ultimately, reunification.

The German example is frequently cited as a lesson for South Korea. It appears the former Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) spent DM 350 billion over the first three years after unification, as well as an annualized DM 150 billion over the next few years. This translates into about 10-12% of West German GDP for that period.

Using a similar percentage of GDP for unification of the Korean peninsula (conservative, since East Germany was more industrialized than North Korea) and a 2006 GDP figure of USD 888 billion, one might expect reunification to cost somewhere around USD 90 billion per year to South Korea, with additional expenses incurred by China, Japan, and the United States. Given the German example, and given an overall worse state of affairs in North Korea than East Germany c. 1989, these expenses, conservatively estimated, would likely persist over at least a decade, and possibly two.

All this to say, sometimes, the size of the rocket doesn't matter. Yet another reason why I'll stick with the Financial Times/NYTimes/Washington Post for reporting/analysis.