Sputnik 50th Anniversary Speech

An edited, condensed version of the article I wrote on Sputnik in October. Recorded and on Youtube for a Science Communication project.

Speech delivered at Toastmasters, May 15, 2008

On October 4, 1957, Leave it to Beaver premiered on CBS. This show, more than any other, would capture the spirit of optimism and simplicity that characterized America at that time. Few Americans were aware that that same day, the Soviet Union had launched the first man-made satellite into space - Sputnik. The illusion of innocence was evaporating as the beep-beep of the Red Moon rising ticked off the seconds of the new era.

Sputnik immediately challenged the basic assumptions upon which Western security and American confidence, rested. American confidence depended upon the assumption that, by empowering the individual and not the state, a free and open society could better harness the collective energies and intelligence of its citizens to preserve peace and prosperity. Postwar American strategy presumed scientific superiority and depended upon high-tech solutions — in particular, a nuclear bomber deterrent — to balance Soviet numbers in Europe. Imagine the reaction, then, when it became apparent that this backward, repressive regime was able to beat the free world to the ultimate missile. It didn’t take a rocket scientist to realize that if the Soviets could launch a satellite into space, they could launch a nuclear weapon at American cities.

The American response was swift and substantial. In 1958, Congress created NASA to better direct the efforts of America’s various military and civilian aeronautical programs, whose petty rivalries had prevented the United States from being first to space. In time, America would use its own satellites to provide needed intelligence about the world beyond the iron curtain. That same year, Congress passed the National Defense and Education Act, which revamped science education and, for the first time, provided massive amounts of financial aid for college students.

Yet in spite of Eisenhower’s efforts to reassure the American people, fears of American technical inferiority and a “missile gap” helped decide the 1960 presidential election. Not since World War II, and perhaps never since, have science and technology been so politically central, so intimately linked in the American mind with the survival of the free world. Space exploration was a vision that transformed potency into existence, dreams into global impacts and politics into progress.

Sputnik created a host of institutions and a strong federal commitment to fund science. But its greatest, most critical legacy is a generation of scientists and citizens who embraced that shared vision of at last touching the heavens.

They were inspired and organized, trained and mentored, and overcame fear and challenges to explore the possibilities of this new age. These individuals now teach our classes, and serve in leadership positions in all areas of society. These men and women continue to expand the frontiers of science, to bring us sometimes wonderful, sometimes frightening, but unfailingly miraculous tomorrows.

No one living in the age of Sputnik, save the most farsighted scientists and unrepentant dreamers, could have imagined the world of today. We are equally ill-equipped to predict the events of the next half-century, either here on Earth, or in space.

This new ocean, like the seas of the twentieth century, may become the battlegrounds for bloody conflict. Or, space might be the exception in human history, the one frontier not consecrated with the blood of the innocent as well as the brave.

Perhaps in our efforts to explore beyond this pale blue dot, we might find the wisdom and means to build, here at home, what Langston Hughes called “the land that never has been yet — and yet must be/The land where every man is free.”

Whatever the future holds, one thing is certain — America and the world depend upon the genius, vision and character of its citizens, who dare to ask why, dare to dream, dare to challenge the frontiers of what is known, and dare to challenge themselves to become better through greater knowledge and wisdom.

History in general, and Sputnik in particular, tell us that there is little that collective human action cannot overcome, though it be matched against great challenges, natural or man-made. Thanks to that belief, and those believers, we can look at the heavens today and the earth below, with both greater knowledge and appreciation than any other generation in all history.

The Bonus Army

Information about a little piece of American History: inspired by a quote.

The Bonus Army

(from Partners in Command)

With the nation mired in an economic crisis, World War I veterans lobbied to be paid the bonus promised them when they had signed up to fight in France. A "Bonus Army" of veterans descended on Washington to pressure Congress to act, but in July 1931 the Bonus Bill failed. Encamped in the swampy Anacostia Flats, the Bonus Army (some five thousand strong, including women and children, all living in hovels) became increasingly militant, greeting police patrols with bricks and stones. At the end of July 1931, Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley ordered MacArthur to intervene: "Proceed immediately to the scene of disorder.... Surround the affected area and clear it without delay." Summoned to the chief of staff's office, Eisenhower was ordered to accompany MacArthur at the head of the troops. Eisenhower was skeptical: "I told him that the matter could easily become a riot and I thought it highly inappropriate for the Chief of Staff of the Army to be involved in anything like a local or street-corner embroilment." MacArthur waved off Eisenhower's warning: there was incipient revolution in the air, he said, and he was going to do something about it.

With MacArthur in the lead, troops under the command of George Patton used tear gas to disperse the camp. the decision brought howls of protest from a nation that remembered the use of gas in the Great War. Told by President Hoover to use restraint and to stay out of Anacostia Flats, MacArthur later claimed that he never received such an order. That was a lie, and MacArthur and Eisenhower knew it. MacArthur had received the order; he just refused to obey it. Eisenhower was horrified by MacArthur's actions, but he defended them, writing an official report for MacArthur that was a model of discretion. But the difference between the two was obvious for all who saw them at Anacostia Flats: "there is MacArthur in full regalia, complete with several decks of ribbons, looking sternly upon the 'battlefield,' with the look of eagles in his eyes," a reporter later reflected. "Next to him is Ike, dressed in a regular unadorned uniform. If you take a close look at the expression on Eisenhower's face, you realize it is one of cold, caustic contempt. This is the closed Eisenhower, who later observed he had learned acting from MacArthur." Eisenhower was enraged by MacArthur's actions, telling the historian Stephen Ambrose in an interview toward the end of his life, "I told that dumb son of a bitch not to go up there." [1]







One footnote - one of the leaders of the protest was Joe Angelo, winner of the Distinguished Service Cross for saving his commanding officer, George Patton's life during the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, Sept 1918, during World War I.

Another quote:

In the smoldering aftermath, a dazed, rail thin Joe Angelo approached his old boss but was harshly rebuked. "I do not know this man," Major Patton growled. "Take him away and under no circumstances permit him to return." [2]

[1] Mark Perry, Partners in Command
[2] http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/5532

Men

Be good fathers. Be good men, of character and integrity, who are unafraid of meeting their son's and daughter's and wife's eyes when bearing swaggering victory or bruising defeat. It is that trust and love that will redeem that swagger, and heal those bruises.

Be a man worthy of understanding and available for instruction. I do not have to tell you how much that means to a hungry young man, eager for guidance, vision, inspiration, and a spark to kindle ambition for a better life in a greater world. You know this yourself, either by the presence of that blessing or its gnawing absence.

Be a man who teach intensity and peace from the same book, who sees the continued necessity of the warrior as the product of our fathers' failure, and not their greatest triumph.

Be all these things, and more, as every holy book ever written has commanded, and every atom of good sense has suggested.

Long after you are gone, your guidance and strength will fortify those whom you love, through drought and famine and storm. It will also enrich them in times of peace and happiness, and will be the critical difference between prosperity and luxury.

You will know you have done what you must if, at your end, those by your side whisper those words of Dylan Thomas:

And you, my father, there on the sad height,
Curse, bless me now with your fierce tears, I pray.
Do not go gentle into that good night.
Rage, rage against the dying of the light.

A man does not rage at his children, his wife, or his parents, or at his life. He rages against death, which seeks to deny his final attempts to give with final gasp and howl his last lesson: Devour the days, sons and daughters of woe. Devour the days with earnestness bordering on desperation.

Therapy - working on your resume

(c) Gary Locke @ Time


For anyone who hasn't been paying attention to my life in the last three years, I'm leaving grad school to go to work. This process has actually ended up being a lot more painful than I thought it might be. In fact, my personal sense of self-worth and competence has been pretty hammered over the last three years.

As part of the process of finding a job, I decided to do something recommended by both What Color is Your Parachute and a Cornell Career Services representative. Both recommend that in order to identify potential jobs (and consequently items to stress on a resume), it's helpful to write out everything that one's done in one's life. After making such a list (chronologically, initially to help with recall), it's recommended to sort it by subject area.

At first, it seemed daunting. But ignoring lots of crap that didn't matter professionally for me (lots of episodes of Simpsons, lots of video games, a very short cross country career, etc.) I was able to come up with about two pages of things:


Caretaker
Helped with bedridden grandfather two days a week, (1998-2000)

Journalism
many awards for essay writing in K-12
co-editor in chief of high school newspaper (2000-2001)
wrote article on activism after cross-burning on Harvey Mudd campus (2004)
wrote article on Sputnik 50th anniversary for the Cornell Daily Sun (2007)
maintain blog reporting comments from various talks at Cornell (2006-2008)

Education
head of Academic decathlon team in high school (2000-2001)

Public Speaking
public speaking at school assemblies in 4th grade (1993)
8th grade graduation speech (1996)
Toastmasters (2007-2008)
Read books about political speeches (Kennedy, Churchill, etc.)

Government/Political Science
lots of history classes at Claremont
EU political science class at Claremont
science policy classes at Cornell
read books about history and political science
Partners in Command
Blowback
Sorrows of an Empire
Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic
regularly attend Peace Studies Program Seminar at Cornell (2007-2008)
regularly attend political science talks at Cornell

Financial/Business/Law
Setting up retirement investment plan and helping others with IRA planning (2006-present)
Applied for and received NSF graduate fellowship (2006)
Helped my mother handle monthly invoices for grandfather's trailer park (1993-1998)
Helped family understand contract at the age of 16 governing property management issues (1998)
Dealt with family issues surrounding living trust issues involving inheritance of small property (1999)
Drafted business plan for nonprofit group, Rosemead Citizens for Science (2006)
Developed funding guide for graduate students (2007)
Read management books (e.g. Winning by Jack Welch) and tax law books (Estate Tax for dummies)
Helped mom plan and execute retirement strategy (2008)
Worked on establishing special needs trust to protect Dad and his siblings from extraordinary medical expenses (2008)
Developed a personal investment strategy based on existing tax law (2008)

Science
Astronomy research at Harvey Mudd (2003-2005)
Three years at Cornell in Astronomy department (2005-2008)
Drafted business plan for nonprofit group, Rosemead Citizens for Science (2007)
Considerable outreach to high school, visiting groups (2005-2008)

Nonprofit
Saturday brunch program with the homeless (2005)
summer work at the Inland Valley Hope Center - hunger and homelessness (2004)
HMC volunteer coordinator (2002-2005)

Church
Assisted pastor in Confirmation class (2007)
Worship and Music committee (2007-2008)
Consecration Sunday committee (2007)


From this, it's pretty evident that my interests definitely lie in the political science/economic/business realm, and a fairly high degree of interest in writing.

But above and beyond telling me where I spend most of my time and seem to have most of my success, it also reminds me that I haven't completely wasted my young adulthood. I've done some good in the world, helped out my family a bit, and participated in (er, maybe listened in on) the ever-continuing conversation about the role of American in the world.

Another thing it's pointed out is that I have trouble closing the deal on a number of tasks. A few of these projects just never got off the ground. Even though that may be normal, I'll need to think about whether the range of topics and the handful of abandoned projects illustrate well-roundedness or a lack of focus on a few key projects.

Anyway, if you're stressed and a little depressed, try this process. At best, it will tell you - through the economists approach of revealed preferences - what you might want to be doing with your life. At worst, you might need a polished resume to transition out of an unhappy situation.

Is Romance Dead? What do you think?

I have a glass slipper on my desk.

I bought it to remind me of the need to be romantic, to keep in mind that there is someone who will fit perfectly.
Metaphorically of course - my dear officemates pointed out that anyone who actually could wear the slipper would probably be under the age of six.

(Thanks guys.)

In my youth, I wrote possibly hundreds of really, really bad poems. Some were about war, some where satire, but the vast majority were about love in one form or another.

I'm not sure when, but at some point I decided it was either stupid or a waste of time. Since I've been in Ithaca, I've written about three poems, lost somewhere on my hard drive, and possibly only one about love. I've written tens of essays on Cornell talks and political events, yet somehow sentiment hasn't really crept in as much as it used to.

The question is whether this reflects maturity or regression - maturity in the sense that an adult male has more important things to do than to write about how the evening shadows are the perfect mascara for a muse; regression in the sense that I wonder whether I'm becoming dumber and less creative the longer I am alive.

There's no doubt that people love each other. Hell, even I love people. But the question is whether that takes the form of a impressionistic sunrise or a Sargent painting - stark and efficient in its commentary.

One could also argue that being romantic, like any other skill, is blunted by disuse, assuming it is even learned properly to begin with. It is possible that I learned once, long ago, how to use one neuron could charm another, yet failed to translate this into the real world.

Perhaps there is a limit to how romantic one can be if we understand and take seriously the framework of evolution and that humans are not exempt from its implications.

As Ecclesiastes tells us, "For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

The point is, I am wondering whether it is something specific to me, my age group, or society as a whole. So, dear reader, I ask you to think about your opinions and experiences about romance. I've deliberately left "romance" itself undefined. I'm hoping to get responses from people who are in a relationship as well as those currently single. Send me a note, or better yet, post a comment!

American Foreign Policy After Bush - Francis Fukuyama at Cornell

Francis Fukuyama, Cornell '74 and author of The End of History and the Last Man spoke today as the 2007 Einaudi Center Foreign Policy Distinguished Speaker.

Fukuyama's talk, "American Foreign Policy After the Bush Administration", was fairly critical of the policies of the last years. This is particularly noteworthy since he initially shared the ideology, training, and perhaps even dormroom of Straussian neocons, including Paul Wolfowitz (Cornell '65).

Fukuyama first articulated his opposition to the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration. He began by outlining the four main components of the Bush doctrine, calling it "a coherent policy":

1. The US faces a dire threat assessment following 9/11.
2. Preemption is an effective way to eliminate current and future threats.
3. American leadership (unilateralism) is required in its dealings with allies.
4. Democracy promotion is the mission underlying policies involving preemption.

Fukuyama argues that while this policy is coherent and perhaps valid in a realist international system (with strong states), it uses faulty assumptions when operating in the modern world. "We live in a weak state world," he said. By this, he means that the Greater Middle East - defined by him as a swath of nations that encompasses North Africa, parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East proper, and South Asia to the India-Pakistan border - is composed of weak and failing states.

This point, he feels, has not been well understood by many people, including high-level American statesmen. He refers to an article Kissinger wrote after the 2006 Lebanon war, in which Kissinger recognizes that we no longer live in a world with Westphalian states. As Fukuyama wryly notes, anyone who has been paying attention to Africa in the last 20 years already knew that.

Fukuyama takes apart the four components of the Bush Doctrine:

1. The US faces a dire threat assessment following 9/11.

Fukuyama feels that the threat assessment is skewed, largely because of a fundamental misunderstanding of one question often asked in the weeks following 9/11:

Why do they hate us?

Two answers have frequently been offered:
1. They don't like our values.
2. They don't like our foreign policy.

The Bush administration officially concluded that answer 1 was correct, and frequently made reference to it in speeches. Considerable history and contemporary analysis suggests that answer 2 may be correct, and rooted in forward bases in the Middle East, the invasion of Iraq, and the US's unflinching support of Israel.

Fukuyama feels that both are needed to understand the situation. If "they" refer to Muslim extremists, then 1 is indeed the correct answer. If instead "they" refer to the populations of the Middle East, then 2 is more accurate.

2. Preemption is an effective way to eliminate current and future threats..

Fukuyama states that the logic of preemption is "iron-tight". If someone knew that an attack was imminent, it would make complete sense to do what it took to prevent it if possible, perhaps even through preemptive military action. Preventative war, however, fails to distinguish between deterring/combatting states within states (like Hezbollah or Al-Qaeda), and deterring actual states. While deterrence doesn't work well with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Fukuyama feels that it does work effectively with states that have a functioning central authority - Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. His claim is that no matter how crazy their foreign policies appear, the interests of the leaders are such that they will behave more or less as Westphalian states - affected by deterrence, bilateral negotiatons and other tools in the realist's toolbox.

3. American leadership (unilateralism) is required in its dealings with allies..

Fukuyama points out that even Bush realizes that this is not accurate. The Six-party talks regarding North Korea and the attempts to include the EU in efforts to get Iran to suspend its nuclear program reflect the growing need, if not willingness, of the Bush administration to include its allies and other nations in its efforts to bring about stability in two very volatile - but very different - places in the world.

However, Fukuyama does agree that American leadership is still essential. He points to the failure of the European Union and Russia to collectively act during the Balkans wars until US involvement in the conflict.

Nobody appreciated the headwind of anti-Americanism following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This headwind, he feels, may simply be a product of the disproportionate influence of America on the world, and the non-reciprocal relationship that many nations have vis a vis the United States. While the US has the power - military, economic, and cultural - to influence the process and impact of international organizations, trade agreements, and military actions against its enemies, many nations lack the resources to effect such change at even a regional level. In other words, it may be less in the substance of American values, institutions and culture and more in the power that arguably results from these that much of the rest of the world resents.

4. Democracy promotion is the mission underlying policies involving preemption.

Fukuyama strongly believes that democracy promotion is and ought to be the underlying goal of most US foreign policy efforts. However, he recognizes that a commitment to democracy can often be at odds with American short-term interests, and that the failure to be consistent can be even more costly than accepting the consequences of democracy. For example, he feels that the US would have been wiser not to put all of its eggs in Musharraf, and instead actively encouraged Musharraf to hold free and open elections. (In the Q&A that followed, Fukuyama points out that the Pakistan case is distinct from Gaza, noting that Pakistan had lawyers protesting in the street to defend the rule of law.)

Overall, he feels that regardless of the errors in policy, the administration was most guilty of gross incompetence in implementing and administering policy. Two examples he highlights are the reorganization of the federal government to create the Department of Homeland Security and the attempts - twice - to reorganize the intelligence agencies under a single Director of National Intelligence. Another example he references is the F process (transformational diplomacy initiative), a process by which foreign development aid is allocated within a broader strategic framework driven by the State department's political agenda. He did not make particular criticisms, except to suggest that this leads to excessive and counterproductive micromanagement of funds.

Perhaps most interestingly, Fukuyama devoted somewhat less than half of his talk to Asia, where he felt the rules were significantly different. He argued that, by and large, East Asia consisted of fairly stable states with effective central governments. Consequently, the old rules under which the international system operated can and do work. He may not be the first to point out that the "international system" is neither uniform nor unchanging with time, but I think he is the first I have heard to actually point this out in different areas, and to actually take a stand for retaining some of the tools of the Cold War era system in a particular area of the world.

Fukuyama felt that the largest challenge in Asia was to figure out how to accommodate a rising China and India. (He focused his talk primarily on China, presumably because India, being a democracy and having many complications associated with federalism and internal divisions, would not be nearly as aggressive or effective in its efforts to increase its economic and political power).

Fukuyama notes that, with one exception, the international system has failed to accommodate the entry of rising powers. The classic example he references is the failure of Britain and France to recognize the changes brought about by German unification in 1871, which laid the seeds for two world wars.

He alluded to the thesis that "democracies don't go to war with each other", and that many hold the hope that China will inevitably become a democracy. He feels that this might be the case, and that indeed, China may be the first country to become a democracy because of environmental issues. However, he feels that this would not happen within the next 10-15 years.

Fukuyama notes that the pressures to become liberal democracies in Western nations occurred because of a critical mass of middle class individuals demanded political participation. However, China's rapid economic growth has benefitted a relatively small subset of the population - Fukuyama states "200 to 300 million" out of a population of 1.3 billion. This is reflected in the Chinese Gini coefficient of about 49. By comparison, the US has a Gini coefficient of 47.0 in 2006 (and interestingly, has had a secular trend upward from 39.7 in 1967, when Gini was first measured), while most Western industrialized nations have a Gini around or below 40. (A Gini of 0 represents complete equality, and 100 represents complete inequality.)

In the Q&A section, Fukuyama also suggests that one of the main challenges facing the average Chinese citizen is that the central government does not exert much authority at the local level - local political bureaucrats collude with developers and other wealthy groups to exploit local villages and the environment. One consequence is the rise of violent popular protests - an estimated 4,000 in China last year.

Yet even if China became democratic, it would not solve the foreign policy problem.

Fukuyama commented that in 1945, the "Wise Men" (Acheson, Kennan) thought very much in institutional terms, and that it would benefit the United States to do so at this critical juncture. "Would China's ambitions expand, or will it become a stakeholder in international institutions?"

He suggests that if the habits of interaction and channels of communication are established now, then China would be far more likely to be a willing participant and effective leader in international institutions. The Cold War strategy might be to encircle China and its satellite states with a hostile military and economic alliance, a Marshall Plan and NATO for the East. However, Fukuyama feels that any institution needs to build China in, and make it beneficial for the nation to promote and preserve the institution.

Fukuyama would like to see the Six-party talks converted into a more permanent OSCE-like body for North East Asian security. Such a body would be responsible for developing forward-thinking institutions and strategies for various crises, including the possibly inevitable and catastrophic sudden collapse of North Korea.

In the Q&A, Fukuyama also discussed the challenges facing the next president. In particular, he highlighted groupthink and the imperial presidency.

From his own time as a staff member in the policy planning office of the Reagan State Department, Fukuyama suggests that those outside of the bureaucracy severely underestimate the effect of tribalism within the Exectuive branch. Loyalty is to the tribe, above and beyond all other loyalties. The tremendous power of the presidency and this pressure towards tribalism guarantees groupthink and sycophantism.

One anecdote, borrowed from Zbigniew Brzezinski, illustrated the point. Brzezinski was the National Security Advisor for Jimmy Carter. During the first year of Carter's term, he was able to come into the Oval Office and offer criticism to the President's policies. By the 4th year, that became impossible, as the President had become accustomed to demanding respect and deference from his subordinates.

Fukuyama closed with a brief comment on civil-military relations. He recognizes that America now is different from the America that existed during his time at Cornell, when there were armed students protesting Vietnam. The dependence on a volunteer army and the limitation of armed service to communities largely in the south guarantees a disconnect between how civilians and the military perceive the world. He did not go so far as to say that that was dangerous, but it was implied that this was an area of concern that could in principle be ameliorated by universal service.

Overall, I thought this was a great talk. Fukuyama got panned after the press latched onto the title of The End of History and the Last Man, and his reputation suffered even more when neoconservativism reared its ugly head in the last few years. I look forward to reading his new book, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy.