Presidential Candidacy Acceptance Speech at the PBS National Convention

(delivered at PBS National Convention, Denver, CO, Thursday, Nov. 1, 2007)


Ladies and gentlemen, nominators, members of the press, big oil, celebrities, despotic warlords, my fellow Americans... I humbly and graciously accept your nomination for the presidential candidacy of the United States. I am proud to represent the Party for a Beautiful Society, dedicated since 1798 to abolishing from the Americas ugly people of all races, creeds, genders, and sexual orientations. As I gaze out into the stands of tans, silicone implants, botox lips and lipo hips, I am tremendously proud of how far America has come these many years.

America is great for many reasons. It is great because of the rule of law. I wish to congratulate the Party for a Beautiful Society and the PBS chairman for his successful trademark infringement suit against the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. As we speak, law enforcement officials are storming Sesame Street offices, repossessing Ernie's rubber duckie, evicting Oscar the Grouch from his garbage can, sending Cookie Monster to the Betty Ford Clinic (where he can get the help he needs and deserves), and arresting Elmo on charges of tickle solicitation of minors.

America is also great because of our free markets. Where else but America can you find a nation that spends as much on plastic surgery, weight loss, cosmetics, and manicures as our federal government spends on education, and as much as the entire GDP of Kazakhstan?

But it is great especially because of our commitment to democracy. In that spirit, my runningmate and I will tattoo our campaign slogan - Beauty, Manliness, Codependency - to the body part that receives the most votes on the poll available on our campaign website, americahatesuggos.com

Beauty, Manliness, Codependency - what does it mean, exactly?

The beauty is self-evident. You beautiful, beautiful people have come from the beaches of California, from the tanning salons of South Carolina, from botox clubs in Connecticut and butt implant clinics in Texas. Yet America is facing a severe crisis - there is projected a shortage of beautiful people, and the people who maintain that beauty, as one generation of plastic surgeons, movie stars, and make-up research scientists retire. As president, I will make sure we expand our immigration application process to incorporate benefits for those who bring plastic surgery talent or cosmetic manufacturing, or the prime ingredient of attractiveness, good genes. I also pledge make cosmetic testing on humans mandatory. I also promise you a K-12 national make-up program, to be modeled after our public school free lunches, that will make ours, truly, a Great Society.

Across this country, people have asked me, Senator Yamada, how will you restore manliness to America? I'll tell you how I won't do this - by embracing the chauvinism of previous administrations. I promise you that as president, my cabinet will have more women than any in history. I'll go further- I pledge that it will be made exclusively of young, nubile women.

No, I believe that manliness must start at home before we seek to project it abroad with phallic cruise missiles. I pledge tonight to ensure that the legacy of my presidency will be unparalleled warfare between the branches of civil government, with the executive branch emerging bloody but unbowed after the first hundred days of partisan shock and awe.

In the days before the Civil War, it might be possible to find manly leaders like South Carolina Senator Brook, who in 1856 severely beat fellow Senator Sumner of Massachusetts with his cane on the Senate floor. I assure you that as president I will resurrect this ancient, manly tradition of mortal combat between our elected officials. I propose that we build a Supercolliding Senatorium, where the highest, most distinguished officials of the land will decide the issues of the day in a many demolition derby. And I promise you that we will not limit our destructive democratic derby to SUNDAY, SUNDAY, SUNDAY, but devote every working hour to the ideal the Greeks once articulated: truth is born from the collision of ideas - and the idea-doers.

And finally, codependency. Where would America - its families, its workplaces, its churches - be without codependency? Codependency has gotten a bad rap, mostly from the liberal academics and mainstream media. Codependency is the essence of a functioning democracy. Scientists tell us that the only thing keeping my Cro-Magnon, hormone-crazed mind from killing all male non-relatives in the room is my overpowering terror of being alone, unloved, and abandoned.

We are all codependent - this is a globalized economy. Now, we need to take the next step, and embrace codependent fiscal policy. Subprime? Sublime! I want every American to know that the government is like a loving parent - a willing, waiting, gentle cash machine, here to kiss all your boo-boos and make it better. Each individual must have the courage to invest his sense of self-worth in the opinions of others, in how he looks, and how much he makes, and shun the easy and familiar paths of character-building and independent reason. Only then can we become a united America, a closer America. Ladies and Gentlemen, tonight we sign this American Declaration of Codependence.

America is at a crossroads. At home our citizens are dispirited, frustrated, seeking direction, and angry about American Idol. My fellow Americans, we cannot let this continue.

If we are to be great, an Empire over which the sun does not set, we must build a space-based mega-magnifying glass, so that we may focus American will and the Sun's blessed rays in a terawatt beam of righteous fire to smite the evil-doers. If we are to be a nation without borders, we must conquer foreign soil until we are truly a world united under one system. And if we are to triumph over the Atlantian menace, we must extend our reach, too, to the undersea floor, by means of midget submarines, manned by our NBA all-stars, for in a mad age like ours, irony is our best defense against the undersea infidels.

You may elect me because I am sexy. And I will use my physical God-given gifts to seduce the leadership and movie stars of foreign nations to erect partnerships to cement American influence.

You may elect me because you think it would be interesting to have model minority Orientals in charge for a change. And I promise that my first act as President will be to rename the residence the Yellow House.

But I want you to support me, vote for me, bear arms for me, fight for me, have children for me, work for me, and die for me, because you genuinely believe that I am the best candidate, endowed with the arrogance, violence, ego, ambition, and psychedelic vision needed to lead this Empire for the term of my presidency... and, if our scientists should so bless us with the ability preserve my living floating head in a jar, for the next 1000 years of American hegemony, so help us God.

God save the American people from the enemies abroad and the ugly people at home. Thank you for this honor. Thank you for your love, and God bless America.

Returning to the blogosphere

After a long hiatus, I've decided that writing on a blog is a handy way to help refine my ideas. I have no idea if anyone reads this, nor does it really matter. What matters is the attempt to better frame, refine, and articulate ideas that are complicated, and yet require the attention and energy of all committed citizens.

To this end, I will begin by posting some recent articles/comments that appear on my Facebook page, but might potentially find interested parties here. Also going up will be my list of ten questions that will be the key questions of our age.

Comments on talk - "The Traditional Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons"

Letter to Dr. T. V. Paul



Dr. T. V. Paul,

Thank you for an interesting and enlightening talk. I have had a bit of time to digest your talk, and want to share my thoughts on the two aspects of reputation that were brought up: deterrence and non-use. Granted, I'm not a political scientist and have little formal training - please bear with me as I articulate my thoughts.

My comments are organized along the following points:

1. Reputational benefits for non-use and deterrence, while in principle coming at the expense of each other, both depend upon the potential for actual use.

Reputation from both non-use and deterrence both stem from one fundamental assumption: that the weapons could credibly be used. Without the credible potential for use, a nation gains no reputational advantage for not using them. Only by being in a position of strength is nonagression seen as a benevolent action. A state gains no positive reputation unless (1) the weapons could be used, (2) the state might incur some tactical or strategic disadvantage from their nonuse, (3) the potential target or third parties recognize both (1) and (2).

2. I assume that the credible use of nuclear weapons by any of the major nation-states has decreased with time, especially after the end of the Cold War.

The reasons for this are many - the decrease in great powers defining the conflict with other powers in existential terms; increased interdependence for economic growth, increasingly seen as a good in its own right and a source of legitimacy and power for ruling elites; and, not the least among these, the acceptance of non-use as a norm. It is possible that the diminished perceived possiblity of the use of nuclear weapons by the US or the other four major nuclear states comes from a qualitative change in the international system, where actual dominance over another nation's land, resources, and people occurs in the economic sphere.

Alternatively, perhaps because of the issues associated with the passage of time that Judith Reppy and others brought up at your talk, the credible use of nuclear weapons may have diminished with time. I have read Hiroshima; my family is from the area, and have a fair idea of the physics and material substance of a nuclear weapon. However, it is very, very hard for me - perhaps because I was born in 1983 - to imagine the use of nuclear weapons by anyone other than a rogue state/terrorist organization. While at some level this is a good thing - it reflects the strength of the norm, or at least the image of a norm, it does lead to problems, which takes me to point 3.

3. With diminished credibility of the threat comes a decrease both in their deterrence value and in the reputation for non-use.

A difference may exist between non-use against other nuclear powers, non-use against non-nuclear powers, and non-use against non-state actors. I believe you mentioned this in your talk, and would love to hear more about this.

4. Instead of strengthening the norm of non-use, the diminished credibility leads to a decrease in relevance of nuclear weapons.

In particular, the reputational benefit nuclear weapons provide, either deterrence or non-use, is diminished. By contrast, the opportunity cost of continuing to fund nuclear weapons development and maintenance instead of other areas of potential investment has increased because of increased opportunities to invest outside of one's national borders.

5. To restore the relevance of nuclear weapons as a tool of policy, the US could modify its nuclear arsenal to increase the credibility of the nuclear threat to uncooperative nations.

The most obvious way of doing this is to lower the yield. Though conventional weapons have equivalent yields, nuclear weapons will still remain a distinctive threat precisely because of the remaining differences in the material (specifically, radiation) and constructed (historical legacy, images of radiation) natures of the bomb.

6. Scientists, elements of the Pentagon, and perhaps elements of other branches in American government may acceede to such a policy for distinct reasons, but which converge upon a policy of a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon:

Scientists
a. assumption that the norm will not be violated gives scientists a clear moral conscience
b. need to redefine institutional and professional relevance of nuclear stockpile and associated workforce after end of Cold War
c. absence of alternative work opportunities (in the short-term), pending commitment in money and policy to an energy policy incorporating a heavy investment in nuclear energy

Department of Defense
a. restore credibility of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence
b. institutional desire to retain budgets and priority for programs

Other Branches
a. a credible nuclear deterrent is seen as a low-cost alternative to a conventional buildup (rationale probably originates from Eisenhower's desire to balance budgets while maintaining an effective counterweight to Soviet expansionism)
b. nuclear weapons (and advanced technology in general) is easier to sell to the American public than an increase in the number of people in the armed services


Aside:
One of the interesting features of the behavioral economics course I am taking is the concrete experimental evidence that losses are felt more strongly than gains by individuals. Generalizing from the micro to macro picture, it's possible not only to say that an institution/group will defend strongly its existing resources/budgets, but that it will do so even when faced with alternatives that may in fact be slightly more beneficial. What is true for money is definitely true for work experience and training, one thing that I hope US workforce retraining initiatives take into account. (I was inspired by this when thinking about the personal difficulty I am having leaving research science for a career in policy.)


Other notes:
Attitudes to the use of nuclear weapons may differ between the military and civilians, but is far from definite and may fall along defense/diplomacy lines (i.e., State department officials may have more in common with a Sec State who happens to be a general than other civilians in the DoD). Interesting case studies would include individuals who had served in both miliitary and civilian capacities (George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Colin Powell). It might be interesting to consult the literature on whether there is a difference between the uniformed individuals who serve as elected officials versus those appointed to civilian posts. Also, is there a selection effect - are the "right" generals more likely to be selected for civilian office?

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Historical aside:

A good illustration in the distinct personalities that exist within the military would be the contrast drawn between MacArthur and Eisenhower. There is a particularly vivid image of this, highlighted by Mark Perry in "Partners in Command", in which MacArthur's callous use of force and image of a commander surveying the battlefield is contrasted with Eisenhower's resigned, somber expression during the use of military

force against the "Bonus Army" of WWI veterans in the late Hoover administration. (image at http://images.encarta.msn.com/xrefmedia/sharemed/targets/images/pho/t029/t029187a.jpg) Perry writes: "But the difference between the two was obvious for all who saw them at Anacostia Flats: 'There is MacArthur in full regalia, complete with several decks of ribbons, looking sternly upon the 'battlefield,; with the look of eagles in his eyes,' a reporter later reflected. 'Next to him is Ike, dressed in a regular unadorned uniform. If you take a close look at the expression on Eisenhower's face, you realize it is one of cold, caustic contempt. This is the closed Eisenhower, who later observed he had learned acting from MacArthur." (Perry, 48)

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Best of luck. I hope these comments have proven worth your time reading.

Cheers,

Ryan

Consecration Sunday Speech

(delivered at St. Paul's United Methodist Church, Ithaca, NY, 7 Oct 2007)

Good morning everyone! My name is Ryan Yamada. I have the distinct privilege of announcing to this wonderful body of Christ that Consecration Sunday is this October 25! Consecration Sunday is a chance to ask ourselves what we feel compelled to give to God and His service, as so beautifully and remarkably demonstrated by all the good that comes from this faith community.

I've been asked to provide my own experiences in the Church and how I intend to approach Consecration Sunday, both of which I am happy to do.

About a year ago, you welcomed me into this congregation, and entrusted me with a most precious task - to help nurture and encourage the senior high students in confirmation class. I'm still amazed you let a virtual stranger do this - though Rebecca kept an eye on me to make sure no damage was done. I found the youth to be brilliant, kind, passionate, and most of all, generous in heart and spirit. I'm not sure what they got out of my presence, other than some wisecracks and enthusiastic support for the appreciation of caffeinated beverages. I found myself wondering, over and over again: why is it that these men and women are so awesome?

Credit goes to them of course, their friends and families, and God. But I think this spiritual community also played, and continues to play, a key role. During service, I'm often struck by a vision of a multi-generational construction project, in which you are building, brick by brick, an awesome sanctuary that extends far beyond these walls, and far beyond Sunday morning. From Buffalo Street to Bosnia, you extend comfort, nurture the spirit, and challenge hearts and minds to become stronger, wiser, and more loving. What you do demonstrates courage and conviction that can come only from loving something greater than yourself. It is here that I first felt the full force of 1 Cor 13:13 - "And now these three remain: faith, hope, and love, but the greatest of these is love."


Of course we’re not perfect. We are often failed saints, and all too often successful sinners; we have imperfect moral resumes. Even my flaws have flaws. But we do God's work as well as we can, however we can.

In so many ways I have trusted you with my heart and my soul; that decision to embrace this community has been one of the best of my life. It is therefore easy for me to trust this living church with what offerings I can give, for it is here that I see it work, in ways subtle and sublime.

We decide, as individuals, what we can give. Our reasons for giving are as complex and diverse as our reasons for coming here, and often remain unknown even to ourselves. But we must never underestimate the power of gifts, of talent, time, and tithe, to do so much good in the world, and to enrich our own lives. It truly is better to give than to receive, but by the grace of God we can do both.

As we approach October 28, I hope that all of us will take some time to increase our mindfulness of why we give, what it means to give, what we are called to give. And in these weeks, we will also reflect upon all that God gives to us, in particular, the opportunity to share a special time and spirit in a truly remarkable community.

Blessings to you in the coming weeks - may you feel what I feel, see what I see, whenever I walk among this living, awesome, sanctuary.

The Red Moon Rises: Sputnik and the Space Age Turn 50

My article in the Cornell Daily Sun, published October 2, 2007, two days before 50th anniversary.

http://cornellsun.com/node/24971/

Stephen Biddle on Iraq

Hi,

Recently, Dr. Steve Biddle, adviser to General Petraeus, spoke at the 2007 Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS) meeting in Ithaca, NY, organized by the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

I'm posting my notes on his comments because you may be in a better position to gather information and influence the debate than I. Either strategic option proposed by Dr. Biddle would have strong long-term economic and political consequences for America and its workforce - even astronomy will not remain unscathed by the expense that this, and social security, will inevitably pose upon the government budgets and the economy as a whole. Should you know of any current research on the economic and political impact of a Middle East regional conflict, please forward that information to me.

Kennedy once said that the greatest challenge facing a democracy is a loss of focus and mission. Our generation has often been criticized for being indecisive, noncommittal. We have been chastised for our pretensions to jadedness and wisdom, though we lack the experience that makes either credible. Perhaps it is in this area we may find purpose and rewarding employment of our talents.

Best wishes, and good luck with everything.

- Ryan


******
Summary of Steven Biddle talk: US Strategy in Iraq

Dr. Steven Biddle began with a recap of Iraq strategy under George Casey. Casey focused on three criteria for success:

1. political reform, in the form of a new Iraqi constitution, representative democracy, and an effective system of courts
2. economic development that provides incentive for individuals to be personally invested in the success of the nascent democracy
3. developing indigenous forces that would provide security and permit the phased withdrawal of US forces.

Stalled progress in these three areas have led to two principle policy changes:
1. increase in troop strength
2. joint campaign plan that focused on clearing operations in Baghdad

Biddle suggests that the perceived problem in Baghdad are conflicts between Sunni and Shiite militias in the city center. In actuality, Baghdad is now Shiite-dominated. Sunni militias are operating from a ring of suburban areas and villages about 10-50 miles outside of the capital, commonly known as the Baghdad belt.

Biddle tells two anecdotes to illustrate his point. The first involves his trip to a marketplace, surrounded by 12-foot concrete blast walls and several checkpoints. Escorted by a squad of heavily armed infantry, Dr. Biddle explored the marketplace and noted that the marketplace, at least, was economically vibrant, with CD players, radios, and other consumer goods readily available. He points this out to demonstrate that given a certain troop density, security infrastructure, and a system of checkpoints, it is possible to stop car bombers and attacks, or at least mitigate them enough to allow the local economy to recover.

His second anecdote tells of a trip in a column of humvees along a road policed by Iraqi forces. After passing the checkpoint controlled by an Iraqi officer, the column proceeded along a road, exchanged a bit of small arms fire from nearby rooftops, and eventually stopped in front of an improvised barricade that had been constructed in the last 12 hours. Observing that they were now surrounded by buildings with high rooftops, covered by swarming militia forces with machine guns, Biddle et al. soon beat a hasty retreat. He feels that the only reason why they did not receive a salvo of RPGs was that the convoy had arrived about 12 hours early, catching the would-be ambushers unawares. As they retreated through the checkpoint, the same Iraqi officer watched the convoy pass by, with the same impassive look on his face.

This story illustrates his point that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by both Sunni and Shiite militias. This has compromised both the efficacy of Iraqi forces to effectively keep the peace, and may even mean that improved training is only improving the combat effectiveness of sectarian militias anticipating the withdrawal of coalition forces and a full-scale civil war.

Biddle described the two main strategic theories underpinning the recent surge around Baghdad.

1. If you build it, they will come
According to this theory, Baghdad is the key to security in Iraq. If security can be guaranteed, then the political leaders of the various factions will be able to meet and, through the new democratic institutions, forge a grand compromise. Such a political settlement will translate into greater peace across the country.

Biddle's problem with this theory is that it assumes the factions want to forge a compromise. In fact, each faction perceives the others as a potential genocide threat. With that much at stake, no faction has an incentive to pursue negotiations with the goal of a final compromise, and instead will use the political process merely to prepare for what is believed to be an inevitable civil war.

2. Inkspot argument
According to this theory, just as an inkspot can slowly spread across a napkin, local stability can translate into regional stability. The strategy envisioned uses US soldiers as assault forces, clearing neighborhoods of sectarian militias. The Iraqi forces, though less well trained and equipped, do possess the competence needed to hold cleared neighborhoods and restore the rule of law.

Biddle notes that this would work if it weren't for the fact that the Iraqi army is heavily penetrated by sectarian militias. Consequently, when Iraqi forces are placed in command of cleared neighborhoods, these zones revert to sectarian violence. Without an Iraqi army capable of sectarian disinterestedness, there is no possibility for translating the local gains made by tactical actions into long-term strategic success, either locally or regionally.

Biddle then proposes two possible solutions:

1. The Long Shot

The Long Shot envisions a 20-year (generational) occupation of Iraq, with as many forces as possible. Biddle proposes 110,000 combat troops (not including support staff) as economically sustainable and politically feasible. These forces would selectively use military action to acquire and enforce bilateral arrangements with local leaders. Combined with very powerful incentives (patronage), the threat of military reprisal might be enough to maintain a dependence relationship between security forces and local tribal/civic leaders.

The reason why this approach might work is that Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other militias have disrupted the patronage trade that keeps local leaders in power. By exchanging material wealth for cooperation, US forces could help turn the militias into a common security threat, attacking and destroying those that refuse to be bought off or controlled by local leaders.

Biddle does not detail the cost in dollars, though he suggests that the human toll would be about 700 American lives a year. Assuming America does everything right, he places the probability of successfully averting a civil war at at 10%.

2. Complete Withdrawal

Complete Withdrawal could occur at best over 1-2 years. Biddle believes it would take this long because American forces would probably have to fight their way out, and also would need to move a vast amount of materiel in order to withdraw in good order.

This approach runs the risk of catalyzing the onset of a full-scale civil war. While such a war may be inevitable, Biddle believes that the greater problem lies in regionalizing the conflict. He claims that it takes about 10 years for a civil war to burn itself out, for the parties involved to be completely exhausted and materially depleted enough to pursue peace. However, by year 8 or so, it is highly likely that domestic pressures from religious/political groups and the strain of refugees will cause Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iran, Turkey, and possibly other nations to enter into the conflict on various sides.

Biddle acknowledges that some feel that the potential nation-state belligerents will restrict their participation to monetary and covert logistical support, and will not commit armed forces.

Beyond the obvious humanitarian issues, a regional conflict would severely impact oil production and transportation, driving up global petroleum prices and precipitating economic crises worldwide.

A third alternative which no one mentions is to commit about 500,000 soldiers (plus support staff) to peacekeeping in Iraq. This would likely require a draft.

Biddle also remarked on partition. He notes that while partition might lead to more defensible borders, fundamental problems remain. The Sunni heartland is perceived to not be economically viable. A three-state solution that depends upon a piece of paper for economic guarantees to oil profits would probably be unacceptable, leading to pressure to capture oil fields by force.

Biddle notes that neither option is popular in Congress. The most popular options involve a compromise between the two, which he feels would be doomed to failure and a waste of resources. Furthermore, the US military is currently forbidden from working on a withdrawal plan, particularly because it would be met by howls of derision from current pro-war Republicans that are staking their political lives on support for the president and the military. Biddle suggests that the White House might be able to manage the political fallout if it openly pushed drafting withdrawal plans out of prudence and responsibility to the American strategic position.

Finally, Biddle notes that no one in Europe has a plan in the event of a regional war. His conversations with his German counterparts suggest that they are unwilling or unable to shift away from the politically salient priorities of environmental security, narcoterrorism, democratization in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union states, and other domestic concerns and focus on the dire impact should Iraq fail. In fact, according to Biddle, an economic analysis of the impact of war in the Middle East is a severe gap in current scholarship and policy analysis, and could serve to better cast the debate and discussion.